these are the questions please follow the listed number order.

Oligopoly Theory Cournot Assume two firms 1 and 2. The inverse market demand function is given by: P=30-(q1+92) Each firm produces with marginal costs of MC = 6 Fixed costs are zero. The next questions refer to the Cournot duopoly. Question 1 (1 point) Saved What is Firm 1's total revenue function? O TR1=30q1 -91 -922 O TR1=30-291-92 O TR1=30q1 -912-92 None of the above. Question 2 (1 point) Saved What is Firm 1's marginal revenue function? MR1=30-2q1 -92 O MR1=30-q1-292 O MR1=30-2q1-292 O None of the above. Question 3 (1 point) Saved What is Firm 1's response function? q1=12-0.5q2 O q1=12-q2 O q1=12-292 O None of the above Question 4 (1 point) If Firm 1 thinks that Firm 2 chooses to supply q2=10, then Firm 1's profit maximizing quantity would be q1*= 0 6 07 O 8 O 10Question 10 {1 point] In equilibrium, each firm's total prot is Eli: Question 11 {1 point] In equilibrium, total consumer surplus is CS= Question 12 {1 point] In equilibrium, total welfare is W= Stackelbe rg The next questions refer to the Steckelberg Leader Follower model. Assume Firm 1 is the leader. Question 13 {1 point] What is the leader's total revenue function? 0 TR1=42q1 -1.5q12 O TR1 =30q1 -1.0q12 O TR1 =18q1 -0.5q12 O TR1=6q1-0.25q12 Question 14 {1 point] What is the leader's marginal revenue function? 0 MR1=6-0.5q1 O MR1 =18-1q1 O MR1 =30-2q1 Question 15 (1 point) What is the leader's chosen optimum quantity q1*= 0 6 O 12 O 15 Question 16 (1 point) What is the follower's s optimum quantity q2*= 0 6 0 9 O 12 O 15 Question 17 (1 point) The market price in equilibrium will be P*(q1+q2)= 12 O 14 O 16 O 18 Question 18 (1 point) In equilibrium, the leader's profit is 01= O 36 72 O 108 O 144 Question 19 (1 point) In equilibrium, the follower's profit is 02= O 36 O 72 O 108 O 144 Question 20 (1 point) In equilibrium, consumer surplus is CS= O 132 O 142 O 152Question 21 (1 point) In equilibrium, total welfare is W= O 270 O 280 O 290 O 300 Cartel For the next questions assume that Firm 1 and Firm 2 form a cartel (thus acting together like a monopolist). Question 22 (1 point) What will be the cartel's marginal revenue function? (where Q=q1+q2) O MRC=30-Q O MRC=30-2Q O MRC=30-3Q O MRC=30-4Q Question 23 (1 point) The cartel's profit maximizing price is PC*= 0 6 O 12 O 14 O 18 Question 24 (1 point) The cartel's profit maximizing quantity is Q*= O 12 O 14 O 18 O 20 Question 25 (1 point) Consumer surplus under the cartel solution is CS = 50 O 72 0 98 O 128Question 26 {1 point] Total producer surplus (cartel rent} under the cartel solution is equal to P5 = Question 27 {1 point] Total welfare under the cartel solution is equal to W= O 150 O 21.5 0 294 O 334 Bertrand The next questions refer to Bertrand competition. Question 28 {1 point] Betrand criticized the Cournot model. Bertrand's point of criticism was that firms cannot be assumed to compete through 0 quantities supplied 0 qualities produced 0 prices set 0 product differentiation Question 29 {1 point] In equilibrium, Bertrand competition is equivalent to the model of O Monopolistic competition 0 Perfect competition 0 Unfair competition 0 Ruinous competition Question 30 {1 point] Which statement is true? In equilibrium, 0 The cartel equilibrium price is highest 0 The Stackelberg leader-follower equilibrium price is higher than the Cournot duopoly equilibrium price O Both a. and b. are correct. 0 None of the above is correct. Game Theory Porsche vs. Targa The next questions refer to the following game. Porsche and Ferrari compete in the sports car market with new models. Below table shows the firms strategies and payoffs. Porsche Targa Carrera California 1,2 4,3 Ferrari Spider 2,1 3,6 Question 31 (1 point) If Ferrari thinks that Porsche launches the Targa, then Ferrari's best strategy would be to launch the O Targa O Carrera O California Spider Question 32 (1 point) If Ferrari thinks that Porsche launches the Carrera, then Ferrari's best strategy would be to launch the O Targa O Carrera O California O Spider Question 33 (1 point) For Ferrari, launching the Spider is O a dominant strategy O not a dominant strategy a Ciao Bella strategy not a Ciao Bello strategyQuestion 34 (1 point) For Porsche, launching the Carrera is a O a dominant strategy not a dominant strategy O Vorsprung-durch-Technik strategy O None of the above. Question 35 (1 point) The Nash equilibrium of the game is O California-Targa California-Carrera O Spider-Targa O Spider-Carrera Question 36 (1 point) The Nash equilibrium of the game is not a prisoner's dilemma the social optimum O a prisoner's dilemma O the result of each car manufacturer having a dominant strategy Question 37 (1 point) Assume cooperation were possible. Which deal between Porsche and Ferrari would allow for reaching the social optimum? O None. No cooperation already leads to the social optimum. Porsche pays Ferrari $2 to launch the Spider instead of the California. O Ferrari pays Porsche $1 to launch the Targa instead of the Carrera. Both b. and c. are correct.Coordination Games The next questions refer to the following game. Germany and France agreed to accept refugees from a refugee camp that is increasingly confronted with a humanitarian crisis. Each country can either commit to accepting a low contingent or a large contingent. France Small Large Small -3,-3 2,-1 Germany Large -1,2 -4,-4 Question 38 (1 point) Which statement is true? The game has O No Nash equilibrium O One Nash equilibrium Two Nash equilibria O Three Nash equilibria Question 39 (1 point) Which statement is true? O The players have no individual preference order The game has a Pareto superior Nash equilibrium The social optimum consists of both countries responding with a large contingency. O None of the above is true. Question 40 (1 point) Which statement is true if Germany could commit to a contingent first? Germany would choose small, France follow with small Germany would choose large, France follow with large Germany would choose large, France follow with small Germany would choose small, France follow with largeMixed Strategies Consider the following game between two players Bad-Boy and Good-Girl. Bad-Boy can either behave or misbehave whereas Good-Girl can either punish or reward. Below payoff matrix shows the game as pure strategies. Good Girl "E 10:10 Question 41 {1 point] What is the Nash equilibrium of the game in pure strategies? 0 Behave-Reward O Behave-Punish O Misbehave-Punish Q There is no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Question 42 {1 point] Assume Bad Boy knows that Good Girl rewards 80% of the time. Then, if Bad Boy misbehaves 100% of the time, Bad Boy's expected payoff is equal to Question 43 {1 point] Assume Bad Boy knows that Good Girl rewards 80% of the time. Then, if Bad Boy misbehaves 100% of the time, Good Girl's expected payoff is equal to Question 44 {1 point) Assume Bad Boy knows that Good Girl rewards 80% of the time. Then, if Bad Boy misbehaves 100% of the time, which statement is true? 0 Bad Boy exploits Good Girl being so nice 0 Good Girl will feel exploited and consider a mixed strategy 0 Both a. and b. are correct 0 This is the best that Good Girl can do. Question 45 {1 point) Assume Good Girl wants to consider a mixed strategy such that she randomly chooses "Reward" and "Punishment" such that Bad Boy is indifferent between "Behave" and "Misbehave". With what probability should Good Girl choose play "Reward." Question 46 {1 point] Assume Good Girl knows that Bad Boy misbehaves 90% of the time. Then. if Good Girl punishes 100% of the time. Good Girl's expected payoff is equal to Question 47 {1 point] Assume Good Girl knows that Bad Boy misbehaves 90% of the time. Then. if Good Girl punishes 100% of the time. Bad Boy's expected payoff is equal to Question 48 {1 point] Assume Good Girl knows that Bad Boy misbehaves 90% of the time. Then. if Good Girl punishes 100% of the time. then which statement is true? O Good Girl takes advantage of Bad Boy being so misbehaved O Bad Boy will feel taken advantage of and consider a mixed strategy 0 Both a. and b. are correct O This is the best that Bad Boy can do. Question 49 {1 point] Assume Bad Boy wants to consider a mixed strategy such that he randomly chooses "Behave" and "Misbehave" such that Good Girl is indifferent between "Reward" and "Punish." With what probability should Bad Boy play "Behave." Question 50 {1 point] A game in which players choose their strategies randomly are called O random games O chance games 0 no-clue games O mixed-strategy games Question 5 (1 point} If Firm 2 thinks that Firm 1 chooses to supply q1=7, then Firm 1's profit maximizing quantity would be q1"= Question 6 [1 point} In equilibrium. each firm will supply q1= Question 7 (1 point} The market price in equilibrium will be P'{q1+q2}= Question 8 [1 point} In equilibrium, each firm's total revenue is equal to TRI= O 10.5 C) 103 O 110 O 112 Question 9 [1 point} In equilibrium. each firm's total variable cost is TVCI= 03 016 032 043 Question 10 {1 point] In equilibrium, each firm's total prot is Eli: 032 040