This is a two-player, simultaneous one-move game represented as a game table (normal form). P1 \\ P2 A B C D A (17, 5) (11, 16) (15, 4) (3, 16) B (7, 13) (2, 10) (13, 9) (20, 5) C (12, 2) (6, 9) (20, 8) (3, 7) D (1, 20) (10, 20) (2, 12) (1, 17) a) What is the pure strategy Nash equilibrium outcome if there is one? [5 points] b) Is this a socially optimal outcome? If not, which outcome is preferred? [5 points] c) Do all three solution approaches for simultaneous games work independently (not together)? If not, which do not? [5 points] d) Draw the game as a game tree (extensive form). [5 points] e) Switch the payoffs in cells (A, A) and (D, D). What is the pure strategy Nash equilibrium outcome if there is one? [5 points]