This is the case of Doe v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese.

Question: please summarize and include

the following;

Fact:

Judgment:

Issue:

Holding:

General Analysis

Applied Analysis:

Doe V. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Indianapolis 958 N.E.2d 472 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) Jane Doe reported that she was sexually abused by a Roman Catholic priest when she was a teenager: In 1999, Doe's husband met with oicials of the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Indianapolis to discuss the abuse. Initially, the Does demanded a lump-sum payment from the Archdiocese as compensation for the abuse. The Archdiocese denied any legal liability to Doe and declined to make any direct payment to Doe in relation to her claim. Doe's husband pressed on, hiring an attorney and sending a letter in August 2000 indicating that, even though the Archdiocese had \"no legal responsibility at this time, \" it had a moral responsibility to Doe. Consistent with its policy on dealing with victims of childhood sexual abuse by church oicials, the Archdiocese oered to pay for Doe's therapy and counseling. The Does accepted that arrangement, and the Archdiocese began paying the fees in 2001. In 2006, the Archdiocese 's Chancellor became concerned that Doe's therapy was producing no signs of recovery despite more than $100,000 it had paid for Doe 's care. In consultation with multiple health professionals (though allegedly against the advice of Doe's psychiatrist and therapist), the Chancellor concluded that the Archdiocese would reduce its commitment to pay for Doe's psychotherapy from two sessions weekly to one session per month. Doe had no insurance. If the Archdiocese did not pay for her therapy, she had to pay for it out of pocket. Doe sued the Archdiocese for breach of contract. The trial court granted the Archdiocese 's motion for summary judgment, nding that it had no legal responsibility to continue paying all of Doe 's continuing therapy costs. Doe appealed. Baker, Judge Doe argues that that the trial court erred in granting the Archdiocese's motion for summary judgment primarily because the Archdiocese breached its obligation to continue paying for all of her therapist and counseling fees. Doe contends that the Archdiocese should have continued to pay because it was both legally and morally responsible for it to do so. At the outset, we note that the Archdiocesan \"Policy on Care of Victims Sexual Misconduct\" (Policy) provides for \"the general courses of action that may be taken by the chancellor.\" And one course of action described in the policy includes offering victims and/or the family \"appropriate counseling and spiritual direction, as needed.\" However, a portion of the Policy makes it clear that 4. This statement of policy does not constitute a contractual undertaking of any nature of the payment of any amount to any person, but is an exoteric statement for guidance of the resource team of the Archdiocese. In all cases, the Archdio- cese expressly reserves the right to withhold or change the terms of any benets payable pursuant to this statement of policy or any other arrangement with Victims, in the sole dis cretion of the Archdiocese. And, as mentioned above, Doe's husband expressly acknowl- edged in his letter of Augmst 11, 2000, that the Archdiocese's response was based upon its moral obligation. More specically, a portion of that letter acknowledges that Doe understood that \"the archdiocese has no legal responsibility at this time, but it seems to me that when the loss due to the actions of a represen- tative of the archdiocese is so evident and measureable, a moral responsibility remains to compensate for that loss.\" As the Archdiocese points out, a promise must be predicated upon adequate consideration before it can command perfor- mance. And a moral obligation to perform an agreement does not provide sufficient consideration to support the enforcement of an agreement nor does it create an enforceable contract. In this case, while the letters that the Archdiocese sent to the Does express an intent to assist them with counseling costs, that correspondence does not amount to a contract to provide them unlimited care and treatment at its expense. Therefore, the designated evidence establishes that there was no enforceable contract in this instance, and Doe's claim fails on this basis. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 2. consideration [enforceability] K must be \"supported by consideration\" = "bargained-forexchange\" (benefit: detriment) this-for-that = quid pro quo 3. reality of consent (= [no] conduct invalidating mutual assent) [validity] NOT: fraud (misrepresentation), (mutual) mistake, duress, undue influence 4. capacity (to contract = contractual capacity) [validity] except: minority, mentally impaired, intoxicated 5. legal [validity/enforceability] NOT: violation of statute or public policy (based on common/case law) 6. writing (required?) [enforceability] Yes if K \"within the Statute of Frauds\" (e.g., sale of real property) NO if not \"within the Statute of Frauds\