this is the full question I have included everything

industrial economics

1. Dynamic Games Consider the following two-player dynamic game between Player 1 and Player 2. Player 1 moves at information sets 1.1 and 1.2. Player 2 moves at information set 2.1. At every outcome, the payoffs of Player 1 are listed rst. Answer the following questions. (a) How many subgames does this game have? (b) Find all subgameperfect Nash equilibria (SPNEs) of this game. (0) For each SPNE from part (b), determine whether it is part of a weak sequential equilibrium (Perfect Bayesian equilibrium) of this game. [Hint: Start with the strategies from the SPNE and try to add appropriate beliefs. Do not forget to check sequential rationality and consistency of beliefs at all information sets where this is possible]