this project is for HW. can you please help me?

ma 3. Terrorism Game Mali to Pakistan to Iraq. We can use theory to think about the circumstances in which Terrorism is a problem that afflicts round the world, from Spain to Chechnya groups in society might engage in terronstativitiesImagine that there are two types preference for negotiations or violence. One type might be called "True Believers. The groups in society who might become terrorists and who can be distinguished by the fanatics who wish to engage in violent acts even if governments are willing to negotiate second type might be called "Reluctant Terrorists" or "Freedom Fighters." These are se them. We might think of al-Qaida members when we think of this type of social group acts if they are repressed by the government. One could argue that members of the Pales who would prefer to solve problems through negotiation but who will engage in te Liberation Organization (PLO) or the Irish Republican Army (RA) fall into this en preference for negotiations or repression. One type of government might be Imagine also that there are two types of governments that can be distinguished by "Repressive Governments" because they wish to repress all social groups that oppose are willing to listen to the demands of opposition groups and enter good faith negara The second type of government might be called "Responsive Governments" because request some policy concession from the government that will satisfy them politically engage in a violent terrorist act. If the social group chooses violence, then the game ends we We can think of a strategic situation in which a group in society must decide whether a terrorist act that leads to no cooperative negotiations and no change in the government whether to repress the social group now that it has identified itself or enter good ta position. If the social group requests some policy concession, the government must deco negotiations with it. As you can see, this Terrorism Game has three possible outcome Terrorist act, Repression, or Good faith negotiations. The basic game tree for the Terrorist Based on the story that we have just told, the preference ordering for the True Believers or 9 the three possible outcomes might be with them Game is shown in Figure 3.15. Terrorist act > Good faith negotiations > Being repressed. Basic Terrorism Game Showing Outcomes but Not Payoffs Terrorist Act FIGURE 3.15 Violence Social Group Repression Repress Negotiate Government Negotiate Good Faith Negotiations The preference ordering for the Reluctant Terrorists might be . Good faith negotiations > Terrorist act > Being repressed. The preference ordering for the Repressive Government might be Repression > Good faith negotiations > Terrorist act. The preference ordering for the Responsive Government might be . Good faith negotiations > Repression > Terrorist act. a. Draw the game tree for the Terrorism Game with the social group True Believers and a Repressive Government. Using the preference orderings shown above, write in the appropriate payoffs for each possible outcome. Use the numbers 3, 2, and 1 to indicate the preference ordering for the players as we did with the Senate Race Game. Solve the game using backward induction. What is the expected outcome of the game? What are the payoffs that each player receives? What is the subgame perfect equilibrium? b. Draw the game tree for the Terrorism Game with the social group True Believers and a Responsive Government. Using the preference orderings shown above, write in the appropriate payoffs for each possible outcome. As before, use the numbers 3, 2, and C. Does the type of government matter for the expected outcome of the Terror d. Draw the game tree for the Terrorism Game with the social group Reluctant Terros and 1 to indicate the preference ordering for the players. Solve the game using e. Draw the game tree for the Terrorism Game with the social group Reluctant Terrorists in the appropriate payoffs for each possible outcome. As before, use the numbers 3 2, and 1 to indicate the preference ordering for the players. Solve the game using f. Does the type of government matter for the expected outcome of the Terrorism h. The common assumption that terrorist acts are committed by crazy, irrational fanatics ples of Comparative Politics 1 to indicate the preference ordering for the players. Solve the game using backward induction. What is the expected outcome of the game? What are the payofts the each player receives? What is the subgame perfect equilibrium? Game of the social group is True Believers? and a Repressive Government. Using the preference orderings shown above, write in the appropriate payoffs for each possible outcome. As before, use the numbers 3.2. backward induction. What is the expected outcome of the game? What are the payoffs that each player receives? What is the subgame perfect equilibrium? and a Responsive Government. Using the preference orderings shown above, write backward induction. What is the expected outcome of the game? What are the payoffs that each player receives? What is the subgame perfect equilibrium? Game if the social group is Reluctant Terrorists? g. It is commonly assumed that terrorist acts are always committed by crazy, irrational fanatics. According to the various versions of the Terrorism Game that you have examined, are fanatics the only type of people who conduct terrorist attacks? helps to explain why so many countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom make public declarations that they will never negotiate with terrorists under any circumstances. Given that governments do not want terrorist acts, think about whether making such declarations matters for whether terrorist acts actually occur What if the social group is made up of True Believers? What if the social group is made up of Reluctant Terrorists? Hint: Think about how these declarations influence the perception of the social group about whether the government they are interacting with is responsive or repressive. Does it make sense to make these kinds of statements? If so, why? If not, why not? e Pay Raise Game ma 3. Terrorism Game Mali to Pakistan to Iraq. We can use theory to think about the circumstances in which Terrorism is a problem that afflicts round the world, from Spain to Chechnya groups in society might engage in terronstativitiesImagine that there are two types preference for negotiations or violence. One type might be called "True Believers. The groups in society who might become terrorists and who can be distinguished by the fanatics who wish to engage in violent acts even if governments are willing to negotiate second type might be called "Reluctant Terrorists" or "Freedom Fighters." These are se them. We might think of al-Qaida members when we think of this type of social group acts if they are repressed by the government. One could argue that members of the Pales who would prefer to solve problems through negotiation but who will engage in te Liberation Organization (PLO) or the Irish Republican Army (RA) fall into this en preference for negotiations or repression. One type of government might be Imagine also that there are two types of governments that can be distinguished by "Repressive Governments" because they wish to repress all social groups that oppose are willing to listen to the demands of opposition groups and enter good faith negara The second type of government might be called "Responsive Governments" because request some policy concession from the government that will satisfy them politically engage in a violent terrorist act. If the social group chooses violence, then the game ends we We can think of a strategic situation in which a group in society must decide whether a terrorist act that leads to no cooperative negotiations and no change in the government whether to repress the social group now that it has identified itself or enter good ta position. If the social group requests some policy concession, the government must deco negotiations with it. As you can see, this Terrorism Game has three possible outcome Terrorist act, Repression, or Good faith negotiations. The basic game tree for the Terrorist Based on the story that we have just told, the preference ordering for the True Believers or 9 the three possible outcomes might be with them Game is shown in Figure 3.15. Terrorist act > Good faith negotiations > Being repressed. Basic Terrorism Game Showing Outcomes but Not Payoffs Terrorist Act FIGURE 3.15 Violence Social Group Repression Repress Negotiate Government Negotiate Good Faith Negotiations The preference ordering for the Reluctant Terrorists might be . Good faith negotiations > Terrorist act > Being repressed. The preference ordering for the Repressive Government might be Repression > Good faith negotiations > Terrorist act. The preference ordering for the Responsive Government might be . Good faith negotiations > Repression > Terrorist act. a. Draw the game tree for the Terrorism Game with the social group True Believers and a Repressive Government. Using the preference orderings shown above, write in the appropriate payoffs for each possible outcome. Use the numbers 3, 2, and 1 to indicate the preference ordering for the players as we did with the Senate Race Game. Solve the game using backward induction. What is the expected outcome of the game? What are the payoffs that each player receives? What is the subgame perfect equilibrium? b. Draw the game tree for the Terrorism Game with the social group True Believers and a Responsive Government. Using the preference orderings shown above, write in the appropriate payoffs for each possible outcome. As before, use the numbers 3, 2, and C. Does the type of government matter for the expected outcome of the Terror d. Draw the game tree for the Terrorism Game with the social group Reluctant Terros and 1 to indicate the preference ordering for the players. Solve the game using e. Draw the game tree for the Terrorism Game with the social group Reluctant Terrorists in the appropriate payoffs for each possible outcome. As before, use the numbers 3 2, and 1 to indicate the preference ordering for the players. Solve the game using f. Does the type of government matter for the expected outcome of the Terrorism h. The common assumption that terrorist acts are committed by crazy, irrational fanatics ples of Comparative Politics 1 to indicate the preference ordering for the players. Solve the game using backward induction. What is the expected outcome of the game? What are the payofts the each player receives? What is the subgame perfect equilibrium? Game of the social group is True Believers? and a Repressive Government. Using the preference orderings shown above, write in the appropriate payoffs for each possible outcome. As before, use the numbers 3.2. backward induction. What is the expected outcome of the game? What are the payoffs that each player receives? What is the subgame perfect equilibrium? and a Responsive Government. Using the preference orderings shown above, write backward induction. What is the expected outcome of the game? What are the payoffs that each player receives? What is the subgame perfect equilibrium? Game if the social group is Reluctant Terrorists? g. It is commonly assumed that terrorist acts are always committed by crazy, irrational fanatics. According to the various versions of the Terrorism Game that you have examined, are fanatics the only type of people who conduct terrorist attacks? helps to explain why so many countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom make public declarations that they will never negotiate with terrorists under any circumstances. Given that governments do not want terrorist acts, think about whether making such declarations matters for whether terrorist acts actually occur What if the social group is made up of True Believers? What if the social group is made up of Reluctant Terrorists? Hint: Think about how these declarations influence the perception of the social group about whether the government they are interacting with is responsive or repressive. Does it make sense to make these kinds of statements? If so, why? If not, why not? e Pay Raise Game