This question is about the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma

(a) Suppose that player 1 and player 2 are both following the grim trigger strategy. What actions will be played in each stage of the repeated game? What are the payoffs to players 1 and 2 in each stage? or 0. Show (b) Using your result from part la, write down the expected payoff to player 1 from the entire repeated prisoner's dilemma in terms of c, b, and S.1. Grim Trigger in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma In one instance of the prisoner's dilemma, each player chooses whether to pay some cost c > 0 in order to confer a benefit b > c onto the other player. The payoffs from a single iteration of this prisoner's dilemma are therefore: Cooperate Defect Cooperate (b - c, b - c) (-c, b) Defect ( b, - c) (0, 0) The repeated prisoner's dilemma is built out of several stages, each of which is a copy of the above game. At the end of each stage, the two players repeat the prisoner's dilemma again with probability o, where 0 .\f