Question
To keep employees from shirking, invest in greater monitoring a. especially when monitoring is not very efficient b. when incentives fail to solve either moral
To keep employees from shirking, invest in greater monitoring
| a. | especially when monitoring is not very efficient | |
| b. | when incentives fail to solve either moral hazard and adverse selection problems with employees | |
| c. | when monitoring is expensive relative to its benefits | |
| d. | when employees respond well to incentive contracts |
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Microeconomics
Authors: Dean S. Karlan, Jonathan J. Morduch
2nd edition
1259813337, 1259813339, 978-1259813337
