Two bus companies must select how many busses per day they will send to make the trip from ~ Eugene to Portland in one day. The inverse demand is such that the price consumers are willing to pay is P (Q) = 20 - 3Q, where Q = q4 + 48 is the total number of busses, qA is the number of busses sent by firm A, and qp is the number of busses by firm B. If each firm must choose between sending 1, 2 or 3 busses that day, and the cost of sending a bus that route is $4 (that is, C (q, ) = 4 . q;), then what is the equilibrium number of busses sent? Recall that each firm's profits will be II, (q.; q-, ) = P (qi + 92 ) - q. - C (q. ) Note, for example, if each firm sends 1 bus, then Q-2, and the market price will be P(2)-20-3*2-14. This makes each firm's profit to be: II (1; 1) - P (2) . 1 - 4 . 1 - 14-4 = 10 Alternatively, if firm A sends 2 busses and firm B sends 3 busses, then Q-2+3-5 and the market price will be P(5)-20-3*5-5. Firm A's profits will be II, (2; 3) - 5 . 2 - 4 - 2 - 2 while firm B's profits will be IIs (3; 2) - 5 - 3 - 4 - 3 - 3 You can make a bimatrix table with the information above and then find the Nash Equilibrium. 1,1 1.2 3.3 2.2 3.2 2.3 0 2.1 1.3 3.1