Two firms compete in a market to sell a homogenous product with inverse demand function = 600 3. Each firm produces at a constant marginal cost of $300 and has no fixed costs (() = 300). Answer the following questions: (20) a. What is the market price, output of the two firms, and firm profits in the Cournot model? (5) a. Firm 1 and Firm 2's best response functions are: 1(2) = 50 1 2 2 2(1) = 50 1 2 1 b. What is the market price, output of the two firms, and firm profits in the Stackelberg model? (5) a. Best response functions for the leader and follower are: = 50 () = 50 1 2 c. What is the market price, market output, and industry profits in the Bertrand model? (5) d. What is the market price, market output, and industry profits in the Collusion model? (5) a. The marginal revenue function if the firms collude is: = 600 6