Two firms, Firm 1 and Firm 2, compete by simultaneously choosing prices. Both firms sell an identical product for which each of 100 consumers has a maximum willingness to pay of $40. Each consumer will buy at most 1 unit, and will buy it from whichever firm charges lowest price. If both firms set the same price, they share the market equally. Costs are given by ci (qi) = 16q; . Because of government regulation, firms can only choose prices which are integer numbers, and they cannot price above $40. Answer the following: a) If Firm 1 chooses p1 = 26, Firm 2's best response is to set what price? b) If Firm 2 chooses the price determined in the previous question, Firm 1's best response is to choose what price? c) If Firm 1 chooses p1 = 9, Firm 2's best response is a range of prices. What is the lowest price in this range? d) Now suppose both firms are capacity-constrained: Firm 1 can produce at most 15 units, and Firm 2 can produce at most 47 units. If firms set different prices, consumers will first buy from the firm charging the lower price. Once that firm's supply is exhausted, consumers will buy from the firm charging the higher price until that firm's supply is exhausted. What is Firm 1's equilibrium profit