Two firms produce luxury sheepskin auto seat covers: Western Where (WW) and B.B.B. Sheep (BBBS). Each firm has a cost function given by: C = 15q + 1.5q2 The market demand for these seat covers is represented by the inverse demand equation: P =600 -3Q, where Q =q1 + 92 is total output. If each firm acts to maximize its profits, taking its rival's output as given (i.e., the firms behave as Cournot oligopolists), what will be the equilibrium quantities selected by each firm? What is total output, and what is the market price? What are the profits for each firm? WW's equilibrium output is q1 = 48.77 units and BBBS's equilibrium output is 92 = 48.77 units. (Enter numeric responses rounded to two decimal places). Total output is Q= 97.54 units. The market price is P = $ 307.40 . Profit for the firms is 1 = $ 10,691.80 and #2 = $ 10,691.80. It occurs to the managers of WW and BBBS that they could do a lot better by colluding. If the two firms collude, what will be the profit-maximizing choice of output? The industry price? The output and the profit for each firm in this case? Total output is Q = units