(U) CHAPTER TWO The Process of Command and Control (U) "To be a successful commander, one must combine qualities of leadership with a knowledge of his profession. Either without the other is not of much avail." --Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, U.S. Navy (U) In learning to deal with the unavoidable friction and disorder of military operations, a naval leader must under stand the process of command and control. It is this process that translates idea into action, enabling the naval commander to coordinate the actions of his forces throughout the battlespace. Understanding this process entails understanding the cyclic nature of command and control, the role of information, the strategies people use in making decisions, and the various ways commanders control the actions of their subordinates. This understanding, in turn, will serve as the basis for creating an effective system for command and control. (U) The Decision and Execution Cycle (U) Command and control is a continuous, cyclical process by which a commander makes decisions and exercises authority over subordinate commanders in accomplishing an assigned mission. Each naval commander's decision and execution cycle-or "OODA Loop"can be seen as having four sequential phases, as illustrated by the model in Figure 2-1.4 This model applies to any two-sided conflict, whether the antagonists are two individuals locked in hand-to-hand combat or two large naval formations in combat on the open ocean. Although it vastly simplifies an extremely complex process, the model is useful in showing how command and control works. First, the model recognizes the decision maker as the crucial element in the entire process of command and control. Accordingly, a commander first observes the environment (using sensors, information systems, and situation reports from his subordinates) to collect data about his surroundings and the status of enemy and friendly forces. These data are typically correlated, fused, and displayed in a common tactical picture-a representation or image of the battlespace that is shared among 1 commanders at various levels. Next, a commander orients himself to the environment-that is, he forms a mental picture of the situation-by converting sensor data and other information into estimates, assumptions, and judgments about what is happening. The intelligence process plays a key role in supporting the commander's ability to orient. From his orientation the commander derives his understanding of the battlespace, or situational awareness. Based on this understanding, he then decides on a course of action and comes up with a plan. Finally, he sets forth his intent and issues orders to put that plan into action. During the action, the commander monitors the execution of operations and gauges their results, bringing him full circle to the observation phase, from which he begins the cycle again. Throughout the entire cycle, the friction and fog of war continually hinder the commander's ability to observe, orient, decide, and act. (U) 4 The OODA Loop was developed by COL. John R. Boyd, USAF (Ret), "An Organic Design for Command and Control," A Discourse on Winning and Losing. Unpublished lecture notes, August 1987. OODA is an acronym for Observe-Orient-Decide-Act. 2 (U) In general, we base our decision making on our orientation to the situation. Orientation is the result of a cognitive process that turns data gathered from the environment into knowledge and understanding. It is the key to the entire decision and execution cycle, because it influences the way we observe, decide, and act. The orientation process shapes the character of the current decision and execution cycle; in turn, present cycles shape the character of future cycles. Our experience, expectations, culture, and the unfolding circumstances of war all influence our ability to orient. The commander's orientation, however, is rooted in what he believes to be the current "reality" of the battlespace. This image of reality is derived from his direct observation, sensors, intelligence systems, and situation reports from subordinate commanders. Since these sources of information are imperfect and may be manipulated by the opposing side, his perception of "reality" will inevitably be something other than absolute reality. Accordingly, a commander should constantly strive to build, validate, update, and disseminate his image of the battlespace. At the same time he should recognize the unavoidable uncertainty inherent in this image. He also should recognize the advantages to be gained by increasing the level of uncertainty existing in his opponent's image of the battlespace. (U) Since the decision and execution cycle is a continuous process, all phases of the cycle are active at each echelon of command. Each commander will gather information, develop situational awareness, and plan for future operations at the same time he is conducting current operations. Meanwhile, senior and subordinate commanders are gathering information and working through decision and execution cycles at their respective levels. However, the essential lesson of the decision and execution cycle is the absolute importance of generating tempo. Maintaining rapid decision and execution cycles-and thus a rapid tempo of operations-requires that seniors and subordinates alike have an accurate image of the battlespace and a shared vision of what needs to be done. With this common perspective, commanders are able to experience superior situational awareness and make more effective decisions, enabling them to exercise initiative during combat. To exercise initiative successfully, a subordinate must understand his senior's intent. Thus, a key tenet of naval warfare is that commanders at every level must understand their seniors' intent, so they can exploit rapid decision and execution cycles in harmony with the broader, more general efforts at higher levels. 3 (U) The Cognitive Hierarchy (U) To this point, we have used the term "information" generically to refer to all forms of description or representation, from raw data to knowledge and understanding. We will continue to use the term generically when we are discussing information as one of the three components of the command and control system (as discussed in the next chapter), or information management in general. However, we will use the term more precisely when we discuss information as one of four steps in generating understanding, or situational awareness, as illustrated in Figure 2-2.5 Understanding is the desired end state of the orientation phase of the decision and execution cycle. (U) 5 Based on Jeffrey R. Cooper, "The Coherent Battlefield-Removing the 'Fog of War' : A Framework for Understanding an MTR of the 'Information Age.'" Unpublished paper. SRS Technologies, 9 June 1993. 4 (U) The first step toward understanding is gathering data-the building blocks of understanding. Data are bits and bytes transferred between computers; transmissions sent by telephone, radio, or facsimile; rolls of undeveloped film. We gather data primarily from our sensors in the form of raw signals. These signals may take the form of a Sailor or Marine's direct observation of the battlespace, radar returns from a target, or radio signals intercepted from enemy communications. To be meaningful, however, these raw signals must be processed so that they can be understood by the people who must use them. (U) Processing involves organizing, formatting, collating, filtering, plotting, and all other functions that turn data into information. Within this context, "information" is the name we assign to data once it is collected from the environment and processed into usable form. In this sense, information may refer to a report called in by a reconnaissance team, radar returns that have been processed and identified as a particular class of air track, or enemy radio transmissions that have been detected, classified, and geolocated by radio direction finding. Processing gives the data a limited amount of value. Although not yet fully analyzed and correlated, processed data clearly has immediate use for people in avoiding threats, acquiring targets, and building situational awareness. Combat information is one form of information that a commander relies on to make decisions while conducting operations. (U) Information-i.e., processed data-allows us to generate knowledge through cognition: the act of learning, of integrating various pieces of processed data. Knowledge results from analyzing, correlating, and fusing data that have been processed and evaluated as to their reliability, relevance, and importance. For the naval commander, naval intelligence is a form of knowledge that helps build a picture of the situation-as it exists now and may exist in the future. As we gain knowledge we begin to see the relationships between events in the battlespace, to fathom the way an enemy thinks, and to project what he might do. More importantly, at this level we begin to recognize some of the things that will forever remain unknown-and thus identify the uncertainty we must deal with. (U) Finally, by applying judgment, we transform knowledge into understanding. Judgment is a purely human skill, based on experience, expertise, and intuition. Automated information systems can play a 5 crucial role in collecting and processing data, but they play a very limited role at present in generating understanding. Understanding is distilled from knowledge that has been synthesized and applied to a specific situation to gain a deeper level of awareness-a knowledge of the situation's inner workings. We may know what is going on; we understand why. Understanding equates to situational awareness, through which we can see patterns emerging from events in the battlespace and anticipate the consequences both of our actions and those of the enemy. True understanding should be the basis for our decisions. At the same time, however, we must recognize that the inevitable constraints of uncertainty and time in combat, may preclude full situational awareness prior to deciding and acting. (U) Decision Making Theory (U) Making sound and timely decisions is a key objective of the command and control process. In military operations, several general principles of decision making apply. First, because war is a clash of opposing wills, we realize that we cannot make decisions in a vacuum. We must take our enemy into account-recognizing that, while we are trying to impose our will on him, he is trying to do the same thing to us. Second, whoever can make and implement sound decisions faster gains a telling-often decisive-advantage. Third, a military decision is much more than a mathematical computation-it requires intuition and analysis to recognize the essence of the problem and creativity to devise a practical solution. Such ability is the product of experience, education, intelligence, boldness, perception, and character. Fourth, because all decisions must be made in the face of uncertainty and every situation is unique, there is no perfect solution to any problem in military operations-so we should not agonize over finding one. Instead, we should adopt a promising course of action with an acceptable degree of risk, and execute it before an adversary can get oriented and take action. Finally-in general-the lower the echelon of command, the faster and more direct decision making can be. An individual unit commander can normally base decisions on factors that he observes firsthand. At successively higher echelons of command, commanders are further removed from events by time and distance. As a consequence, in a well-trained force, imbued with 6 initiative, the lower we can push the decision-making threshold, the swifter our decision and execution cycle will become. (U) The defining features of the command and control problem- uncertainty and time-exert a significant influence on decision making. As knowledge about a situation increases, our ability to make an appropriate decision also increases. Knowledge is a function of information so, as the quantity of information increases, the effectiveness of the decision also should increase. At some point in the process, however, when basic knowledge has been gained and the quest for information focuses more on filling in details, we reach a point of diminishing returns. At this point, the potential value of the decision does not increase in proportion to the information gained or the time and effort expended to obtain it. As the amount of information increases to this certain point, knowledge is increasing and the time needed to make an effective decision is decreasing. Beyond this point, additional information may have the opposite effect-it may only serve to cloud the situation, impede understanding, and cause the commander to take more time to reach the same decision he could have reached with less information. Therefore it is not the quantity of information that matters; it is the right information made available to the commander at the right time. (U) "A good plan violently executed now is better than a perfect plan next week." --General George S. Patton, Jr., U.S. Army (U) One theory of decision-making sees it as an analytical process. The commander generates several options, then identifies criteria for evaluating these options, assigns values to the evaluation criteria, and rates each option according to these criteria. The basic idea is to compare multiple options concurrently to arrive at an optimal solution. Analytical decision-making tends to be thorough, but timeconsuming. Theoretically, experience is not necessary for effective analytical decision making-reasoning power is enough. (U) A second approach to decision making is based on intuition. This approach relies on an experienced commander's ability to recognize the key elements of a problem, rapidly integrate them, and make a proper decision. Intuitive decision-making thus replaces analysis with experience and judgment. The intuitive model credits an experienced commander with the ability to grasp the situation in its entirety, an 7 ability sometimes called coup d'oeil.6 Intuitive decision making strives to find the first solution that solves the problem, rather than waiting for the "best" solution. The speedier intuitive model is consistent with the view that war is ultimately an art rather than a science-there is no absolutely correct answer to any problem. The intuitive model works on the assumption that, by drawing upon personal experience, the commander will generate a workable first solution, and therefore does not need to develop numerous options. If time permits, the commander may evaluate his decision; if he finds it defective, he moves on to the next reasonable solution. (U) 6 Literally, "stroke of eye"-a quick view or survey. (U) Each model of decision-making has its strengths and weaknesses; which is better depends on the nature of the situation, particularly on the time and information available. Typically, the analytical approach is more appropriate for deliberate planning prior to military action, when the time is measured in hours or days and extensive information can be gathered and processed. In this situation, modeling, simulation, and exercises may be useful in allowing the commander to evaluate his potential courses of action. The intuitive approach is clearly more appropriate for the fluid, rapidly changing environment of combat, when time and uncertainty are critical factors. In practice, the commander usually will incorporate certain analytical methods and decision aids into an essentially intuitive process whenever the situation warrants and time permits. 8