\"umm- 350 --_ T50 son m -m 350 \"1-\" Refer to Table. If the market for gasoline in Lakerville is perfectly competitive and in longrun equilibrium then the equilibrium price of gasoline in the market would be and the equilibrium quantity in the market would be gallons. (Hint: think in terms of economic profit for a competitive firm.) Instead. assume there are two sellers of gasoline in Lakerville [a duopoly): QuikStop and Fill-R-Up. Suppose these two sellers colluded and formed a cartel to operate as a monopoly. What quantity would be sold in the market? If both rms cheat on the cartel agreement they made and each station sells an additional 50 gallons {instead of the agreed upon amount in question C above], total prot in the market would be? [100 extra gallons would be sold than in question C above) The Nash equilibrium quantity sold by the firms together in this oligopoly market would be gallons. True or false. The oligopoly Nash Equilibrium outcome in this market is more efficient than the competitive outcome