Use the following normal$-$form game to answer the questions below.

Player $2$

Strategy C D

Player $1$ A $40,4090,10$

B $10,9045,45$

a$.$ Identify the one$-$shot Nash equilibrium.

multiple choice $1$

$($B$,$D$)$

$($B$,$C$)$

$($A$,$D$)$

$($A$,$C$)$

b$.$ Suppose the players know this game will be repeated exactly three times. Can they achieve payoffs that are better than the one$-$shot Nash equilibrium?

multiple choice $2$

No

Yes

c$.$ Suppose this game is infinitely repeated and the interest rate is $6$ percent. Can the players achieve payoffs that are better than the one$-$shot Nash equilibrium?

multiple choice $3$

No

Yes

d$.$ Suppose the players do not know exactly how many times this game will be repeated, but they do know that the probability the game will end after a given play is $\backslash$theta $.$ If $\backslash$theta is sufficiently low, can players earn more than they could in the one$-$shot Nash equilibrium?

multiple choice $4$

No

Yes