Use the following to answer questions (1) - (15): Suppose a particular market has two firms, 1 and 2, that produce an identical product. The market demand is given by: Q = 30 - P, where Q is the market quantity and P is the market price. Further, suppose 1 and 2 have the following total costs: I's total cost (TC,): TC, = 6q, (where q, is firm I's quantity) 2's total cost (TC,): TC2 = 2q2 (where q, is firm 2's quantity) [1] The market structure these two firms operate in is definitely not monopolistic competition. A. True B. False (2] Initially behaving as Cournot competitors, which equation below corresponds to firm I's reaction function? A 91 = 30 - 292 B. 91 = 30 - 1/292 C. 91 = 24 - 1/292 D. None of the above [3] Behaving as Cournot competitors, at the Nash equilibrium firm 1 produces a quantity closest in value to: A. B. [4] Behaving as Cournot competitors, at the Nash equilibrium the market quantity is closest in value to: 12 18 21 [5] Behaving as Cournot competitors, at the Nash equilibrium the market price is closest in value to: A. 20 B. 17 12 D. [6] Behaving as Cournot competitors, at the Nash equilibrium firm I's profit is closest in value to: 40 [7] Behaving as Cournot competitors, at the Nash equilibrium firm 2's profit is closest in value to: A. 50 B. 80 C. 120 D. 150 8] Suppose 2 becomes a Stackelberg leader, while 1 becomes a Stackelberg follower. Accordingly, this is represented as a dynamic game. A True B. False [9] Suppose 2 becomes a Stackelberg leader, while 1 becomes a Stackelberg follower. Accordingly, 1 moves first while 2 moves second. A. True B. False [10] Suppose 2 becomes a Stackelberg leader, while 1 becomes a Stackelberg follower. Solving by using backwards induction, 2 will produce a quantity closest in value to: A. 14 B. 17 C. 19 D. 21 [11] Suppose 2 becomes a Stackelberg leader, while 1 becomes a Stackelberg follower. Solving by using backwards induction, the market quantity is closest in value to: A 15 B. 18 20 25