Use the following to answer questions (25) - (27):Two large tech firms, Dapple (D)and Googley(G), are consideringa no poachingscheme. In sucha scheme, firms agree not to hire (i.e., poach) employees away from each other. Suppose each firm has todecide to eitherpoach (P)ornotpoach (NP)employeesaway fromthe otherfirm, with the outcomesprovided in the payoff matrix below:GPNPDP10, 100, 50NP50, 030, 30Note:Gs payoffs (in millions of dollars) are listed 1st, while Ds payoffs (in millions of dollars)are listed2nd. [25]The Nash equilibrium for the one-shot game is that both D and G select P as their strategy.A.TrueB.False[26]Suppose the game is played three times (i.e., 3 periods), with each firmadoptinga tit-for-tatstrategy. AssumingGs discountfactor() is 0.25, across the three periods whatis the mostlikely presentvalue ofGs payoff stream?A.90B.53.125C.39.375D.13.125[27]Suppose the game is repeatedlyplayed an infinite numberoftimes, with each playeradoptingatriggerstrategy. Whatvalues ofthe discountfactorwould ensure continuous cooperation amongthe twoplayers? A. > 0.25B. > 0.50C. > 0.75D. = 0[28]Currently, an industryis operatingata point where price = 20, quantity = 10, slope ofthe demandcurve = -1, and marginalcost= 20. Accordingly, the degree ofcompetition in this industry, as measured bythe conjectural variation, equals:A.0.B..C.1.D.2.