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Imperfect Competition - End of Chapter Problem Because cooking souffles is incredibly difficult, the supply of souffles in a small French town is controlled by two bakers, Gaston and Pierre. The demand for souffles is given by P = 30 - 20. and the marginal and average total cost of producing souffles is $6. Suppose Gaston and Pierre are each faced with the choice of baking 3 or 4 souffles each morning. a. In the table. specify the profits each would earn based on the decisions they make. with Gaston's profit on the left and Pierre's on the right. Pierre Bake 4 Souffles Bake 3 Souffles Bake 4 Souffles Gaston Bake 3 Souffles b. Gaston's profits depend O exclusively on the number of souffles Pierre bakes. O on random events over which he has no control. O exclusively on the number of souffles he bakes. O partly on the number of souffles he bakes and partly on the number of souffles Pierre bakes.Imperfect Competition - End of Chapter Problem Because cooking souffles is incredibly difficult, the supply of souffles in a small French town is controlled by two bakers, Gaston and Pierre. The demand for souffles is given by P = 30 - 20. and the marginal and average total cost of producing souffles is $6. Suppose Gaston and Pierre are each faced with the choice of baking 3 or 4 souffles each morning. a. In the table. specify the profits each would earn based on the decisions they make. with Gaston's profit on the left and Pierre's on the right. Pierre Bake 4 Souffles Bake 3 Souffles Bake 4 Souffles Gaston Bake 3 Souffles b. Gaston's profits depend O exclusively on the number of souffles Pierre bakes. O on random events over which he has no control. O exclusively on the number of souffles he bakes. O partly on the number of souffles he bakes and partly on the number of souffles Pierre bakes.c. How would the situation of Gaston and Pierre compare with that of Disney and Warner Brothers, depicted in Table 11.1 in the chapter? O Like Disney and Warner Brothers, Gaston and Pierre are led by individual incentives to a collectively optimal outcome. O Like Disney and Warner Brothers, Gaston and Pierre are led by individual incentives to a collectively suboptimal outcome. Unlike Disney and Warner Brothers, Gaston and Pierre are led by individual incentives to a collectively suboptimal outcome. Unlike Disney and Warner Brothers, Gaston and Pierre are led by individual incentives to a collectively optimal outcome.c. How would the situation of Gaston and Pierre compare with that of Disney and Warner Brothers, depicted in Table 11.1 in the chapter? O Like Disney and Warner Brothers, Gaston and Pierre are led by individual incentives to a collectively optimal outcome. O Like Disney and Warner Brothers, Gaston and Pierre are led by individual incentives to a collectively suboptimal outcome. Unlike Disney and Warner Brothers, Gaston and Pierre are led by individual incentives to a collectively suboptimal outcome. Unlike Disney and Warner Brothers, Gaston and Pierre are led by individual incentives to a collectively optimal outcome