+ VYVYYYYY stag hunt game stag have 1 's stag 515 01 1 is hare 10 1, 1 p50. 2 1 (stag , stag) mixed : P = 0.2 (hare , have ) 3 Rq. F. ( 5) = 55 + ( 1- 5) 0 -(53 Ty ( 8 ) - 814 ( 1- 8 ) 1 -1 sl 1 F (s) 0. 2 1Consider a Stag Hunt game, where choice between hunting for stag requires cooperation while hare can be hunted by individual hunter. The payoffs in the matrix are, by assumption, Bernoulli payoffs. stag hare stag 10,10 0,1 hare 1,0 2,2 (a) Find the pure strategy equilibria and discuss their properties. Is one more likely to occur than the other? Why yes or why not? (b) Find a mixed strategy equilibrium in which 193 > 0, pH > 0, qs > 0 and q H > 0. (c) Draw the best response functions for ROW and COL in the strategy space. Identify the mixed strategy equilibrium. Identify the pure strat- egy equilibria (if any). Let h be the proportion of people who choose hare. (d) Construct tness functions for strategies stag and hare as a function of h. (e) Construct and carefully label a diagram that illustrates the evolution- ary equilibria. Show the evolutionary dynamics. Discuss properties of the equilibria. In the context of this example, what does it mean if equilibrium is dynamically stable / unstable