W InreJ.w. Copy Citation Request Law School Case Briefs Court of Appeal of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division One January 31, 2023, Opinion Filed D081036 Reporter 2023 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 645 * | 2023 WL 1193005 Inre J.D., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. K.D., Defendant and Appellant. Notice: NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS. CALIFORNIA RULES OF COURT, RULE 8.1115(a), PROHIBITS COURTS AND PARTIES FROM CITING OR RELYING ON OPINIONS NOT CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION OR ORDERED PUBLISHED, EXCEPT AS SPECIFIED BY RULE 8.1115(b). THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION OR ORDERED PUBLISHED FOR THE PURPOSES OF RULE 8.1115. mean. When J.D. and the social worker met, she informed the social worker she had changed her mind. Her caregivers expressed a commitment to adopting J.D.,and J.D!s Q> clinician opined that the caregivers' home was a good fit. The social worker expressed no concerns regarding the care J.D. was receiving with her caregivers and continued to recommend adoption. IV. Section 366.26 Hearing The section 366.26 hearing took place on August 12, 2022. The Agency entered into evidence the section 366.26 report and several addendum reports without objection. The reports recommended that the juvenile court terminate parental rights and select a permanent plan of adoption for J.D. The reports opined that although J.D. may have a negative emotional reaction to the discontinuation of visits with Father, she had stabilized in the past when she and Father had no contact. Thus, the Agency concluded that the benefits of adoption outweighed any detrimental harm related to [*10] the termination of J.D!s relationship with Father. Father and a social worker for the Agency testified at the hearing. The social worker testified that J.D. knows her Father and spoke positively about him. The social worker expected that J.D. would likely experience sadness if contact between J.D. and Father was terminated. However, she noted that J.D. is young and resilient, and she has previously terminated. However, she noted that J.D. is young and resilient, and she has previously gone through periods of no-contact with Father and done well. The social worker testified that the primary benefit of adoption for J.D. is stability, which she has been without for much of her young life. Father testified that he had consistent 15-minute weekly telephone calls with J.D. during his most recent term of incarceration. During their calls, J.D. and Father discussed activities in her life and Father felt J.D. was open with him. However, on some occasions, Father was unable to speak with J.D. because her caregivers did not answer his calls or because J.D. was busy doing other activities. Father further alleged that he sent letters and drawings to J.D., but she hadn't received them in two to three months. He felt that terminating his relationship with J.D. would be detrimental and [*11] that it would "crush [J.D.] if she was never to speak to [Father] again." At the conclusion of evidence, Father asked the juvenile court not to follow the Agency's recommendation to terminate parental rights. Father addressed the prongs of the beneficial parent-child relationship exception, first contending that Father maintained regular visitation with J.D. Father asserted that he maintained regular phone contact with J.D. before and during his incarceration, and that in-person contact was likely affected by the Covid-19 pandemic. He then addressed the bond between J.D. and Father, and he asserted that for the first four years of her life, he was J.D!'s primary caretaker. Father argued that his weekly phone calls with J.D. continued the bond previously built during the first years of J.D!s life. He contended that the positive relationship between J.D. and Father outweighed the benefits of adoption, particularly in light of the issues J.D. faced in finding a permanent adoptive home. Prior to rendering its decision, the juvenile court commented on the difficulty of this case because the evidence demonstrated that Father loved, cared for, and was emotionally devoted to J.D. The juvenile [*12] court then addressed the legal and factual issues and found by clear and convincing evidence that J.D. was likely to be adopted if parental rights were terminated. The juvenile court then turned to the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to the statutory preference for adoption. The juvenile court stated that the exception requires three elements: (1) regular visitation and contact; (2) a beneficial relationship for the child; and (3) "that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child because of the severance of that relationship." As to the first element, the juvenile court characterized Father's recent communication with J.D. from jail as consistent. However, when the juvenile court examined Father's contact with J.D. over the duration of the dependency case, the court found that his contact with J.D. was sporadic. The juvenile court noted there were times when Father's visitation with J.D. was not restricted by court order or the limitations of incarceration, and yet Father did not contact or visit with J.D. Thus, the juvenile court found the first element was not met because there were significant periods of time in which Father did element was not met because there were significant periods of time in which Father did not have any contact [*13] with J.D. due to his "own decisions." The juvenile court combined its analysis of the second and third element, and found that Father had not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the detrimental harm of severing the relationship outweighed the benefits of adoption. The juvenile court started its analysis by noting that the interactions between Father and J.D. were generally positive. However, the juvenile court found that J.D.'s special needs and behavioral issues were not necessarily addressed or helped through her relationship with Father. On balance, the juvenile court found that Father's relationship with J.D. was not so beneficial that the detriment of its loss outweighed the benefits of the security and stability provided by adoption. Consequently, the juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that none of the exceptions enumerated in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1), existed, and that adoption was in J.D!s best interest. The juvenile court terminated all parental rights and declared J.D. free from the custody and control of Father. Father filed a timely notice of appeal. DISCUSSION Father argues the juvenile court erred when it failed to apply the beneficial parent-child relationship exception [*14] to the statutory preference for adoption. The Agency argues the juvenile court did not err by declining to apply the exception because: (1) the first element of the exception was not supported by sufficient evidence; and (2) the juvenile court appropriately found that the benefits of adoption outweighed any detriment ensuing from the termination of Father's parental relationship with J.D. We agree with the Agency and conclude: (1) substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's finding that the first prong of the beneficial parent-child relationship exception was not proven; and (2) the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to apply the exception and terminated Father's parental rights. A. General Legal Principles "'At a permanency plan hearing, the court may order one of three alternatives: adoption, guardianship or long-term foster care. [Citation.] If the dependent child is adoptable, there is a strong preference for adoption over the alternative permanency plans. [Citation.]" (In re B.D. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 1218, 1224, 281 Cal. Rptr. 3d 726.) The burden then shifts to the parent to demonstrate the application of a statutory exception to adoption. (/d. at pp. 1224-1225.) If the child is found adoptable, and the parent does not establish [*15] the application of a statutory exception, the juvenile court must terminate parental rights. (In re Katherine J. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 303, 316, 289 Cal. Rptr. 3d 904.) One such statutory exception is the beneficial parent-child relationship exception. ( 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) This exception applies if, "[t]he court finds a compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child" because "[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship." ( 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) This exception is applicable if the parent proves the following three elements by a preponderance of the evidence: "(1) regular visitation and contact, and (2) a relationship, the continuation of which would benefit the child such that (3) the termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child." (Inre Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 631, 278 Cal. Rptr. 3d 872,486 P.3d 1096 (Caden C.), italics in original.) "We review the juvenile court's findings as to whether the parent has maintained regular visitation and contact with the child, as well as the existence of a beneficial parental relationship, for substantial evidence." (In re B.D., supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at p. 1225.) We do "'not reweigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or resolve evidentiary conflicts' and will not disturb the juvenile court's findings even where substantial [*16] evidence to the contrary also exists. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 640, citations omitted.) "We review its ruling on the third element under a hybrid standard, reviewing its factual determinations concerning the detriment analysis for substantial evidence but its ultimate weighing of the relative harms and benefits of terminating parental rights for an abuse of discretion." (Inre Eli B. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1061, 1068, 289 Cal. Rptr. 3d 297.) A court abuses its discretion """'by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination.""" (Caden C., supra, at p. 641, citations omitted.) B. Analysis The first element of the beneficial parent-child relationship exception is "'straightforward' and '[t]he question is just whether "parents visit consistently," taking into account "the extent permitted by court orders."" (Inre D.M. (2021) 71 Cal. App.5th 261, 268, 286 Cal. Rptr. 3d 195.) This analysis is "'quantitative and relatively straightforward, asking whether visitation occurred regularly and often! [Citation]" (In re A.G. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 973, 994,273 Cal. Rptr. 3d 36.) Sporadic visitation is insufficient to prove regular contact and In this case, Father acknowledges "there were long periods of time when [Father] was not visiting [J.D.] in person or even telephonically. However, he contends that he consistently called and wrote letters to J.D. during the ten months prior to the section 366.26 [*17] hearing. Father further emphasizes that he was J.D!s sole caretaker during the first four C years of J.D!s life. Consequently, he argues the juvenile court erred in finding he failed to maintain regular visitation and contact with J.D. as the evidence supported a contrary conclusion. We disagree. Father's weekly phone calls with J.D. during his most recent term of incarceration were not representative of his contact with J.D. throughout the duration of the case. As Father concedes, there were extensive periods of time in which he did not initiate any contact with J.D., even when he was not subjected to the limitations of incarceration. His recent weekly phone calls with J.D. were sporadic when viewed within the context of the entirety of the dependency case. And, while he may have been a consistent presence in J.D!s life prior to the initiation of dependency proceedings, Father's relationship with J.D. was not consistent in the two years since the dependency petition was filed. Accordingly, we conclude substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's finding that Father did not prove the element of regular contact and visitation. We next address Father's argument that the evidence [*18] established the second and third elements of the beneficial parent-child relationship exception. 3 The second elementwhether the parent and child have a beneficial relationshipsignificantly overlaps with the first element "because '[t]he |[benefit] exception applies only where the court finds regular visits and contact have continued or developed a significant, positive, emotional attachment from child to parent.' [Citation.]" (In re G.H. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 15,26-27,300 Cal. Rptr. 3d 115.) Factors the juvenile court may consider in evaluating the beneficial nature of the parent-child relationship are: "(1) the age of the child, (2) the portion of the child's life spent in the parent's custody, (3) the positive or negative effect of interaction between the parent and the child, and (4) the child's particular needs. (Inre Angel B. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 454, 467, fn. omitted, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 482.) The third element of the beneficial parent-child exception requires the juvenile court to determine whether terminating the parental relationship would be detrimental to the child. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 633.) The second and third elements of the exception also "significantly overlap." (In re Katherine J., supra, 75 Cal. App.5th at p. 317, fn. 7.) "For example, evidence that terminating parental relation would cause harm indicates that the child would lose important relational benefits if severed from her parent [*19] (Ibid.) "When the relationship with a parent is so important to the child that the security and stability of a new home wouldn't outweigh its loss, termination would be 'detrimental to the child due to' the child's beneficial relationship with a parent." (Caden C., supra, at pp. 633-634.) "[1In assessing whether termination would be detrimental, the trial court must decide whether the harm from severing the child's relationship with the parent outweighs the benefit to the child of placement in a new adoptive home. [Citation.]" (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) This requires the juvenile court to determine "how the child would be affected by losing the parental relationshipin effect, what life would be like for the child in an adoptive home without the parent in the child's life!" (Id. at p. 633.) The juvenile court must then weigh the loss of this relationship with "the benefit of placement in a new, adoptive home." (Ibid.) Father contends the evidence established a significant and meaningful bond between Father and J.D., and therefore the beneficial relationship element was supported by substantial evidence. He discusses the positive nature of his telephone conversations with J.D., noting that J.D. asked to live with Father. He argues that J.D.'s positive [*20] statements about their relationship evidence the continuation of the bond they established during the first four years of J.D.s life. As to the detriment element, Father contends the juvenile court did not consider the appropriate evidence because it failed to order a bonding study and did not consider how J.D. interacted with, looked to, or talked about Father. He further contends that the detriment of terminating the relationship was apparent because the development of J.D.'s behavioral issues started when she was removed from Father's care. Father asserts he was the singular consistent figure in J.D!s life following J.D.'s multiple placements within the foster care system, and he notes that J.D. expressed her to desire to maintain a relationship with him. Core Terms juvenile court, terminating, aunt, detrimental, beneficial, social worker, visitation, parental right parent-child, caregivers, benefits, custody, incarceration, outweighed, parental relationship, interacted, juvenile, weekly, regular visitation, bonding study, telephone, contends, reunification services, dependency case, first element, phone call, participated, proceedings, permanent, stability Counsel: Konrad S. Lee , under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Claudia G. Silva , County Counsel, Caitlin E. Rae , Chief Deputy County Counsel, and Dana C. Shoffner -, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. Judges: MCCONNELL , P. J.; HUFFMAN , J., DO, J. concurred. Opinion by: MCCONNELL , P. J.As a preliminary matter, we conclude the juvenile court did not err by failing to order a bonding study. "'There is no requirement in statutory or case law that a court must secure a bonding study as a condition precedent to a termination order. .. ! [Citation.]" (Inre Richard C. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1191, 1195, 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 887.) And, notably, the record does not reflect that Father asked for a bonding study at any point during the proceedings. (See In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal. App.4th 1330, 1338, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 562 Q@ [When a parent fails to ask the juvenile [*21] court for a bonding study, they waive the issue for the purposes of appeal]; see also Inre G.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 25 ["The parent bears the burden of proving that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child"].) We find no authority requiring the juvenile court to order a bonding study sua sponte, and we impose no such duty on the juvenile court in this case. We further find no merit to Father's argument that the juvenile court failed to consider the requisite factors articulated in Caden C. Father contends that Caden C. "requires that the court consider ... how the child feels about, interacts with, looks to, or talks about the parent." However, Caden C. simply states that juvenile courts may rely on "a slew of factors" in weighing the parental relationship, and "[juvenile] courts often consider how children feel about, interact with, look to, or talk about their parents." (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) Caden C. does not require the juvenile court to discuss specific enumerated factors. (See also Inre A.L., supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 1156 [the juvenile court is not required to recite specific findings in rendering its conclusions related to the parent- child relationship exception].) But, even if we were to infer such a mandatory requirement from Caden C., in rendering its decision the juvenile court [*22] stated that it considered the totality of the evidence "from the perspective of the child." The juvenile court then proceeded to sufficiently discuss the nature of the relationship between Father and J.D. The record was replete with Agency reports that documented J.D.'s interactions with and feelings towards Father, and these reports were admitted into evidence and considered by the juvenile court at the section 366.26 hearing. Accordingly, we find no error in the factors and evidence considered by the juvenile court. The record further demonstrates that the juvenile court appropriately considered and weighed the benefits of adoption with the detriment of terminating the parental relationship. The juvenile court emphasized that Father and J.D. clearly shared a degree of affection and a bond. Prior to the initiation of dependency proceedings, Father was J.D.'s primary caretaker and their bond was apparent through J.D!'s positive expressions about Father. Although he did not maintain a consistent presence in J.D!s life throughout the dependency case, J.D!'s social workers noted that Father and J.D.!s communications were generally positive. J.D!s counsel made clear that seven-year-old J.D. did not [*23] want her relationship with Father to end. However, while the evidence may have demonstrated a bond between Father and J.D., the strength of this bond was diminished by Father's prolonged absences from J.D's life. (See Inre A.G., supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at p. 995 ["'A showing the child derives some benefit from iy cient ground to depart from the statutory preference for R e ng the dependency case, the most consistent period of communication between Father and J.D. occurred while Father was in custody. Father's long absences when he was released from jail support a conclusion that he will not maintain a consistent presence in J.D!s life when he is no longer incarcerated. Although J.D!s social worker opined that J.D. may experience sadness at the discontinuation of her relationship with Father, she also noted that J.D. previously adjusted well to periods of no- contact with him. By contrast, the benefits of adoption in this case are evident, particularly in light of J.D.'s specialized needs. The record demonstrated that J.D.'s emotional and developmental problems were exacerbated when she experienced instability, and that she progressed when she received consistent care and [*24] attention from her caregivers. As the social worker noted, "[a] permanent plan of adoption [would] allow [J.D.] the opportunity to experience consistent care, consistent relationships, a sense of belonging, security and stability." J.D.'s caretakers consistently provided for her needs and remained committed to pursuing her adoption. Thus, even if we assume that Father proved he shared some beneficial relationship with J.D., substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's factual findings related to the detriment of terminating the parental relationship, and we conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion when it found that any potential detriment was outweighed by the INTRODUCTION K.D. (Father) appeals a juvenile court order terminating his parental rights under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. 1 Father's sole contention on appeal is that the juvenile court erred in failing to apply the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to the statutory preference for adoption. We disagree and affirm the order. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND J.D. first came to the attention of the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) in 2015 when J.D!s mother disclosed methamphetamine use while she was pregnant with J.D. 2 A dependency case was opened and Father participated in an Intensive Family Preservation Program as part of the case. Father engaged in services through the Agency, submitted negative drug tests, and provided for J.D.'s care. Father was granted sole physical [*2] and legal custody of J.D. in September 2015, when she was eight months old. In August 2019, Father left four-year-old J.D. in the care of a nonrelative individual. The individual, whom Father's family did not know, brought J.D. to the paternal grandmother's home. J.D. did not have any belongings with her aside from the clothes she was wearing. The individual informed the family that Father had been arrested and that she could not care for J.D. The paternal family contacted the Agency to report that family members living in the grandmother's home were unable to care for J.D. J.D!s paternal aunt, K.O. (aunt K.O.), took J.D. into her care. Aunt K.O. disclosed to the Agency that, on a prior occasion, Father left J.D. with the family without providing information as to his whereabouts. Aunt K.O. did not have J.D!'s medical history and she was concerned that J.D. had not received proper medical care and immunizations, and that she was not enrolled in school. She believed J.D!'s development was delayed due to her limited speech and lack of appropriate boundaries with strangers. Multiple family members reported concerns to the Agency that Father was using drugs and engaging in criminal activity. [*3] They further informed the Agency that J.D. and Father were homeless and had been living in Father's car. The paternal family and the Agency attempted to contact J.D.!'s mother, but their attempts were unsuccessful. On August 23, 2019, Father contacted aunt K.O. and informed her that he had been arrested for a drug-related charge, but that he had been released from jail. Father told aunt K.O. that the car he and J.D. had been living in had been towed during his arrest. aunt K.O. that the car he and J.D. had been living in had been towed during his arrest. Father asked aunt K.O. to care for J.D. for a month, but thereafter he did not contact aunt K.O.or the Agency regarding his plans to regain custody of J.D. or provide for her care. The petition alleged J.D. suffered, or was at substantial risk of suffering, serious physical harm or iliness. Specifically, it stated that Father negligently and/or willfully failed and refused to provide J.D. with the necessities of life, including, but not limited to, food, clothing, or financial support. . Initial Dependency Proceedings On September 10, 2019, the juvenile court conducted a detention hearing. At this point, the Agency's attempts to locate Father had been unsuccessful, and Father was not present at the hearing. The juvenile [*4] court made prima facie findings on the petition and detained J.D. in out-of-home care. Although aunt K.O. previously requested placement of J.D.in her home, she withdrew her request and J.D. was placed with a resource family. On November 19, 2019, the juvenile court conducted the jurisdiction and disposition hearing. The Agency was still unsuccessful at locating Father, and Father was not present at the hearing. The juvenile court made a true finding on the petition and declared J.D. a dependent of the juvenile court. J.D. was formally removed from Father's custody and placed in a resource home. The juvenile court denied reunification services to Father. [1. Reunification Period In December 2019, Father was arrested for drug-related charges. From custody, Father met with a social worker and informed her that he had not seen J.D. since August 2019. Father told the social worker he did not want to see J.D. while he was in custody. The juvenile court conducted a special hearing and ordered telephonic visitation and written communication between Father and J.D., and reunification services for Father. Father participated in services while he was incarcerated in the county jail. In April 2020, [*5] Father was released from custody. After his release, Father did not participate in services or make himself available for visits with J.D. Father missed an appointment with the assigned social worker and failed to maintain regular contact with the Agency. At the six-month review hearing in August 2020, Father had not seen J.D. in-personin a year. Father tested positive for methamphetamine the same day as the hearing. The juvenile court found that Father had failed to make any progress at reunification, but ordered the Agency to continue to provide Father with services and monitored visitation with J.D. From December 2019 to September 2020, J.D. remained in the care of aunt K.O. During this time, aunt K.O. reported that J.D. was happy and healthy, and that her verbal this time, aunt K.O. reported that J.D. was happy and healthy, and that her verbal development had improved. However, she also had long crying outbursts and asked about Father. J.D. had difficulty following directions and was undergoing therapy to develop impulse control. As a result of these behavioral issues, in September 2020, aunt K.O. asked the Agency to remove J.D. from her home. J.D. was removed from aunt K.O!'s home and placed at Polinsky Children's Center (PCC). Father visited J.D. at PCC once, [*6] but he did not schedule additional visits. In October 2020, J.D. was placed with her maternal aunt, AT. (aunt AT.). Inaunt AT!s care, J.D. started virtual kindergarten and participated in weekly therapy sessions. Although she experienced tantrums and needed redirection during school, J.D. interacted well with her cousins and peers, and was observed to be happy and healthy. Aunt AT. and her husband expressed interest in becoming J.D!s legal guardians. During this time, Father did not visit with or contact J.D., nor did he contact aunt AT. or the Agency. On February 11, 2021, the juvenile court conducted the twelve-month review hearing. Father was not present. Father had not participated in any reunification services and did not maintain contact with the Agency, nor had he visited with J.D. since September 2020. The juvenile court found the Agency had provided Father with reasonable reunification services and that Father had made minimal progress. The juvenile court terminated reunification services and set the matter for a section 366.26 hearing. [11. Postreunification Period InJuly 2021, Father was again arrested for a drug-related offense and sentenced to a term of incarceration. From custody, [*7] Father began receiving supervised written contact and telephonic communication with J.D. J.D. expressed excitement to receive a letter from Father. When J.D. and Father talked over the phone, they expressed that they missed and loved each other. In November 2021, the Agency received a child abuse referral that alleged abuse by aunt AT. J.D. had scratches and bruising that were indicative of physical abuse. J.D. was removed from aunt AT's home and placed at PCC. The allegations of physical abuse were substantiated, and J.D. was moved from PCC to a family resource home. Due to the abuse she suffered in aunt AT!'s home, the juvenile court determined J.D. required a higher level of care and ordered her placed in licensed foster care. J.D!s caregivers reported behavioral issues with J.D., including poor boundaries, defiance, rudeness, and aggression towards animals in the home. The caregivers further observed J.D. slap herself and make statements about wanting to kill herself when she experienced frustration. J.D. was diagnosed with ADHD (attention deficit hyperactivity disorder) and prescribed medication. J.D. was referred for Therapeutic Behavioral Services and medication management, [*8] and she worked with an academic tutor. During this time, Father consistently participated in weekly phone calls with J.D. In March and April 2022, Father filed a section 388 modification petition and an amended petition with the juvenile court. Father sought to reestablish reunification services based on his continued communication with JD and participation in services while he was incarcerated. On April 7, 2022, the juvenile court denied the petition on the basis that Father had not established the requested modification was in J.D.s best interest. In May 2022, the Agency provided addendum reports to the juvenile court prior to a pretrial status conference. The Agency reported that J.D. and Father spoke on a weekly basis over the telephone. The Agency noted that although she sometimes declined Father's phone calls when she was engaged with other activities, J.D. enjoyed speaking with Father. The Agency further observed that she did not show distress when she ended her calls with Father. The Agency reported that J.D!s development was progressing, and that her caregivers ensured she was receiving the services and medication to meet her needs. J.D. had made friends and was engaged in extracurricular [*9] activities. Although she struggled academically, her caregivers reported that J.D!s behavior in school had improved. Two weeks prior to the section 366.26 hearing, the social worker met with J.D. because J.D. asked to live in another home after telling minor's counsel that her caregivers were mean. When J.D. and the social worker met, she informed the social worker she had