1. What is the role of Plato's view of property and its role in corruption? What is the solution to this problem that results in corruption?
2. What does Plato think will happen to the family with the communalization of property?
3. What is the association between private possession of women and corruption for Plato?
4. What is meant by adultery in ancient Greece?
5. What were the customs with regard to women?
6. Why is Plato's proposal control the intimate lives of his guardians viewed supposedly as impossible to enact when women's sexual lives have been restricted throughout history?
7. How was kinship ties expanded rather than obliterated in the guardian class?
8. Plato, in Laws, introduces the concept of the "second best city", and in he reinstates private property. What kinds of consequences does this have?

Article:

Philosopher Queens and Private Wives: Plato on Women and the Family

Plato's ideas about women have attracted considerable attention in the last five years.' This is not surprising, since his proposals for the edu- cation and role of the female guardians in Book V of the Republic are more revolutionary than those of any other major political philos- opher, not excluding John Stuart Mill. However, Plato on the subject of women appears at first to present his reader with an unresolvable enigma, especially when his other dialogues are taken into account. One might well ask how the same, generally consistent philosopher can assert, on the one hand, that the female sex was created from the souls of the most wicked and irrational men and can argue, on the other hand, that if young girls and boys were trained identically, their abilities as adults would be practically the same. How can the claim that women are "by nature" twice as bad as men be reconciled with the radical idea that they should be included among the exalted philo- sophic rulers of the ideal state? While I cannot here discuss all the relevant dialogues, the following paper attempts, through analysis of Plato's arguments about private property and the family in relation to the polis, to explain why he An earlier draft of this paper was presented in a panel on "The Family in Political Thought," at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association in Chicago, I976. i. See, for example, Christine Pierce, "Equality: Republic V," Monist 57, no. i (January 1973); Anne Dickason, "Anatomy and Destiny: The Role of Biology in Plato's Views of Women," The Philosophical Forum 5, nos. I-2 (I973-I974); and, since this paper was written, Arlene Saxenhouse, "The Philosopher and the Female in the Political Thought of Plato," Political Theory 4, no. 2 (May I976).

346 Philosophy & Public Affairs appears so inconsistent about the nature and the proper role of women. I contend that when one compares the arguments and proposals of the Republic with those of the Laws, it becomes clear that the absence or presence of the private family determines whether Plato advocates putting into practice his increasingly radical beliefs about the potential of women. Only by examining the proposals of Republic V in the con- text of the overall aims and structure of the ideal society, and by doing likewise with the contrasting proposals regarding women in the Laws, will we find the differences intelligible. The aim of the true art of ruling, as Plato conceives of it, is not the welfare of any single class or section, but the greatest possible happi- ness of the entire community.2 "Happiness," however, can be a mislead- ing word, for if it leads us to thoughts of freedom, individual rights, or equality of opportunity, we are far from Plato's idea of happiness (eudaimonia). Neither equality nor liberty nor justice in the sense of fairness were values for Plato. The three values on which both his ideal and his second-best cities are based are, rather, harmony, effi- ciency, and moral goodness; the last is the key to his entire political philosophy. Because of his belief in the intrinsic value of the soul and the consequent importance of its health, Plato does not think that happiness results from the freedom to behave just as one wants; it is in no way attainable independently of virtue. Statesmen, therefore, should "not only preserve the lives of their subjects but reform their characters too, so far as human nature permits of this."3 Though the ultimate aim of the true ruler is the happiness of all his subjects, the only way he can attain this is by raising them all, by means of educa- tion and law, to the highest possible level of wisdom and virtue. The gravest of all human faults, however, one considered by Plato to be inborn in most people is that "excessive love of self" which is "the cause of all sins in every case."4 Worse still, whereas the soul and next 2. The Republic of Plato, trans. Allan Bloom (New York, i968), 420b. 3. Statesman, trans. J.B. Skemp, The Collected Dialogues of Plato, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (New York, i961i), 297b. Cf. Laws, trans. R.G. Bury (Cambridge, Mass., 1926), 63oc, 644-645, 705d-706a, 707d; Euthydemus, trans. W.H.D. Rouse, The Collected Dialogues, 292b-c; and cf. Sheldon Wolin, Politics and Vision (London, I196I), pp. 34-36. 4. Laws, 731e.

347 Plato on Women the body should take priority, man's all too prevalent tendency is to give his property-in truth the least valuable of his possessions-his greatest attention. Thus, in the Laws, the currency and system of pro- duction, while allowing for private property, are so designed as to ensure that "a man by his money-making [will not] neglect the objects for which money exists: . . . the soul and the body . .. Wherefore we have asserted (and that not once only) that the pursuit of money is to be honoured last of all."5 Clearly Plato's citizens were never to forget that material possessions were but means to far more important ends. The ruler's task in promoting his subjects' virtue is therefore two- fold. He must aim to overcome their extremes of self-love and their fatal preference for material possessions over the welfare of their souls. A man who is to be virtuous and great must be able to transcend his own interests and, above all, to detach himself from the passion to acquire. As Glenn Morrow has noted, there is abundant evidence in both the Republic and the Laws that Plato regarded the maintenance of a temperate attitude towards property as essential for the security and well-being of the state.6 It was acquisitiveness, after all, that had led the first city Socrates depicted-the simple, "true" and "healthy" city -into war with its neighbors and all the complications that this en- tailed. Again, corruption that results from increasing possessiveness is the recurrent theme of Republic VIII, which analyzes the process of political degeneration.7 The Republic is an extremely radical dialogue. In his formulation of the ideal state, Plato questions and challenges the most sacred con- temporary conventions. The solution he proposes for the problem of selfishness and divisive interests is that private property and hence private interests be abolished to the greatest possible extent. For in this city, not just harmony but unity of interests is the objective. "Have we any greater evil for a city," asks Socrates, "than what splits it and makes it many instead of one? Or a greater good than what binds it together and makes it one?" He concludes that the best gov- erned city is that "which is most like a single human being."8 Nothing 5. Laws, 743d-e. 6. Glenn R. Morrow, Plato's Cretan City (Princeton, I960), p. IOI; cf. Laws, 736e. 7. Republic, 372e-373e, and VIII passim. 8. Republic, 462a-e.

348 Philosophy & Public Affairs can dissolve the unity of a city more readily than for some of its citi- zens to be glad and others to grieve over the same thing, so that all do not work or even wish in concert. The highest possible degree of unity is achieved if all citizens feel pleasure and pain on the same occasions, and this "'community of pleasure and pain" will occur only if all goods are possessed in common. The best governed city will be that "in which most say 'my own' and 'not my own' about the same thing, and in the same way."9 If he had thought it possible, Plato would certainly have extended the communal ownership of property to all the classes of his ideal city. The first of the "noble lies," according to which all citizens are told that they are one big family, can be read as the complete expression of an ideal which can be realized only in part. Because he believes in the tendency of most human beings to selfishness, Plato considers the renunciation of private property to be something that can be attained only by the best of persons. This is made clear in the Laws, where he rejects the possibility of eliminating ownership for the citizens of his projected "second-best" city, since tilling the soil in common is "be- yond the capacity of people with the birth, rearing and training we assume."'l What is impossible for the citizens of the second-best city, with all their carefully planned education, must regretfully be re- garded as beyond the capacity of the inferior classes in the ideal city. Thus it is the guardian class alone which is to live up to the ideal of community of property and unity of interests." The overcoming of selfish interests is regarded as most necessary for those who are to have charge of the welfare and governance of all the other citizens-quite apart from their greater capacity for it. Since a person will always take care of what he loves, the guardians, especially, must love the whole community, and have no interests other than its welfare. Above all, then, the permitted, property arrange- ments for them must be "such as not to prevent them from being the best possible guardians and not to rouse them up to do harm to the other citizens.'2 Plato argues that the possession by the rulers of pri- vate lands and wealth would inevitably lead to their formation into a 9. Republic, 462a-e. Io. Laws, 739c-740a. I i. Republic, 4I6C-417b. I2. Republic, 4i6c-d.

349 Plato on Women faction, whereupon they would constitute "masters and enemies in- stead of allies of the other citizens."13 The combination of wealth and private interests with political power can lead only to the destruction of the city. Plato's ideal for the guardians is expressed by the proverb, "friends have all things in common."'14 But if communal ownership of inani- mate property is a great aid to the unity of the city, it appears to him to follow that communal ownership of women and children will con- duce to even greater unity. It is clear from the way Plato argues that he thinks the communalization of property leads directly to the abolition of the family. He does not regard them as distinct innova- tions requiring separate justifications. In fact, he slides over the first mention of the abolition of the family, almost as a parenthesis,'5 and in both the Republic and the brief summary of this aspect of it pre- sented in the Laws, the two proposals are justified by the same arguments and often at the same time. In the Laws especially, when Plato looks back to the institutions of the ideal city, the classification of women and children with other possessions occurs frequently. Thus he talks of "community of wives, children, and all chattels," and later, by contrast, of that less desirable state of affairs in which "women and children and houses remain private, and all these things are estab- lished as the private property of individuals."'6 Women are classified by Plato, as they were by the culture in which he lived, as an important subsection of property.17 The very expression I3. Republic, 417a-b. I4. Republic, 423e; Laws, 739C. 15. Republic, 423e. i6. Republic, 423e, 462, 464; Laws, 739c, 807b. 17. The Greeks' basically proprietary attitude towards women is well illus- trated by the following statement from Demosthenes' account of the lawsuit, Against Naera: For this is what living with a woman as one's wife means-to have children by her and to introduce the sons to the members of the clan and of the deme, and to betroth the daughters to husbands as one's own. Mistresses we keep for the sake of pleasure, concubines for the daily care of our persons, but wives to bear us legitimate children and to be faithful guardians of our households. Demosthenes, Private Orations, Loeb edition, trans. A.T. Murray (Cambridge, Mass., I939), III: I22. For confirmation that this was a prevalent attitude, see Victor Ehrenberg, Society and Civilization in Greece and Rome (Cambridge, Mass., I964), p. 26.

350 Philosophy & Public Affairs "community (or common having) of women and children," which he uses to denote his proposed system of temporary matings, is a further indication of this, since it could just as accurately be described as "the community of men," were it not for its inventor's customary way of thinking about such matters.18 Just as other forms of private property were seen as destructive of society's unity, so "private wives" are viewed by Plato as diverse and subversive in the same way. Thus, in contrast to the unified city he is proposing, he points to those institutional arrangements that foster the ascendance of particularism and factionalism, with "one man drag- ging off to his own house whatever he can get his hands on apart from the others, another being separate in his own house with separate women and children, introducing private pleasures and griefs of things that are private."19 Again, in the Laws, he strikes simultane- ously against contemporary Athenian practices with regard both to private property and to women: "we huddle all our goods together, as the saying goes, within four walls, and then hand over the dispensing of them to the women. *"20 It is clear that conventional marriage and woman in her traditional role as guardian of the private household were seen by Plato as intimately bound up with that system of private possessions which was the greatest impediment to the unity and well- being of the city. In Republic VIII, however, as Plato reviews the successively degen- erate forms of the political order, we can see his association of private women with corruption at its most graphic. Just as women were com- munalized at the same time as other property, so are they now, with- out separate explanation, made private at the same time as other prop- erty, as the course of the city's degeneration is described. Once private, moreover, women are depicted as hastening the course of the decline, due to their exclusive concern with the particular interests of their families. First, when the rulers begin to want to own land, houses, and money, and to set up domestic treasuries and private love-nests, they will begin to fail as guardians of the people, and the city will start to degenerate.2' Thereafter, private possession of women is depicted as a i8. Cf. G.M.A. Grube, Plato's Thought (London, 1935), p. 89. :9. Republic, 464c-d. 20. Laws, 80oe. 21. Republic, 547b, 548a.

35I Plato on Women major cause of further corruption. The mother's complaints that her husband's lack of concern for wealth and public prestige disadvantages her among the other women make the timocratic youth begin to de- spise his worthy father and to feel challenged into showing that he is more of a man. The wife with her selfish concerns, who "chants all the other refrains such as women are likely to do in cases of this sort," is, like Pandora, the real originator of the evils that follow.22 The fact that Plato identifies the abolition of the family so closely with the communalization of property, and does not appear to regard the former as a more severe emotional deprivation than the latter, must be understood in the context of the functions and status of women and the family in contemporary upper-class Athenian life. In view of the chattel status of Athenian women and the "peculiarly close relation thought to hold between a family and its landed property," Plato's blending of two issues, which to us appear to be much more distinct, is far from inexplicable.23 There is abundant evidence in clas- sical Greek literature that the women who were eligible to become the wives of Plato's contemporaries were valued for silence, hard work, domestic frugality, and, above all, marital fidelity. Confined to the functions of household management and the bearing of heirs, they were neither educated nor permitted to experience the culture and in- tellectual stimulation of life outside their secluded quarters in the house. Accordingly, it was almost impossible for husbands and wives to be either day-to-day companions or emotional and intellectual inti- mates.24 Consequently, as recent scholars of Greek life agree, "the fam- ily does not bulk large in most Greek writing, its affective and psycho- logical sides hardly at all," and "family life, as we understand it, hardly 22. Republic, 549C-e. 23. Morrow, Plato's Cretan City, n. I3 on p. I02, in which he notes that in Athens custom forbade the alienation of family land. The connection in classical Greek thought and practice between the wife and custody of the household prop- erty is amply confirmed in the descriptions of household management given by Xenophon and Aristotle. 24. See, for example, Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 46; Sophocles, Ajax, Loeb edition, trans. F. Storr (Cambridge, Mass., I9I3): 29I-293; Xeno- phon, Oeconomicus, in Xenophon's Socratic Discourse, trans. Carnes Lord, ed. Leo Strauss (Ithaca, I970); p. 29 and cf. 30-33; Aristotle, The Politics, I, xiii, ii; Victor Ehrenberg, The People of Aristophanes, 2d rev. ed. (Oxford, I95I), pp. 202, 295.

352 Philosophy & Public Affairs existed" in late fifth-century Athens.25 The prevailing bisexuality meant that "two complementary institutions coexisted, the family taking care of what we may call the material side, pederasty (and the courtesan) the affective, and to a degree the intellectual, side of a man's intimate life."26 On the other hand, while the family was certainly no center of the upper-class Greek's emotional life, it did function in ways that the modern family does not-ways which rendered it potentially far more socially divisive. The single-family household had emerged from the clan in comparatively recent times, and only gradually did the polis gain the loyalty that had once belonged to the autonomous clan. An- tigone represents the paradigm example of this conflict of loyalties; there were, in fact, various areas of life where it had not yet become clear whether family or civic obligations should prevail. The extent to which the victim's kin, rather than the rulers, were responsible for ensuring that crime was properly avenged is well documented in the Laws.27 Again, the predominance of duties to parents over any notion of legal justice is clearly indicated in the Euthyphro, where Socrates is incredulous that a man could even think of prosecuting his own father for the murder of anyone who was not a relative.28 Despite its minimal functioning as an emotional base, then, the Athenian family of the early fourth century, as a firm economic entity and the focus of important duties, constituted an obviously divisive force and poten- tial threat to civic loyalty. Those Plato scholars who have expressed profound horror at the idea that the family be abolished and replaced by those mating ar- rangements designed to produce the best offspring seem to have treated the issue anachronistically, by neglecting the function of the family in Athenian life. When G.M.A. Grube, for example, objects to the system of temporary matings advocated for the guardians as "un- desirable because it does violence to the deepest human emotions" and 25. M.I. Finley, The Ancient Greeks (New York, i963), pp. 123-I24; Ehren- berg, Society and Civilization, p. 59. 26. Finley, p. 124. 27. Laws, for example, 866 and 873e. 28. Euthyphro, 4a-b.

353 Plato on Women "entirely ignores the love element between the 'married' pair,"29 he seems to be forgetting that at the time, the family was simply not the locus for the expression of the deepest human emotions. Even a cur- sory knowledge of the Symposium, with its deprecating comparison of those who turn their love towards women and raise families with those whose superior, spiritual love is turned towards boys and philosophy, reveals that Plato and his audience would not have regarded the aboli- tion of the family as a severe limitation of their intimate lives. Stranger still is the attitude taken by Leo Strauss, who not only assumes that the family is "natural" and any move to abolish it "convention," but makes the issue of whether the abolition of the family is possible or not into an acid test for determining the feasibility of the entire ideal state.30 Those passages of the Republic to which he refers in order to demonstrate the supposed "fact that men seem to desire naturally to have children of their own" are remarkably inadequate to prove his point. Moreover, his objection that Plato's controls on heterosexual be- havior mean that "the claims of eros are simply silenced" implies a complete denial of the prevailing homosexual eros of the time. It is very probable that Plato's listeners would have regarded the ideal state's restrictions on their homosexual behavior as far more repressive of their sexual feelings than the abolition of the family and the con- trols placed on heterosexual intercourse. The same scholars-Grube, Taylor, and Strauss-who reject the abo- lition of the family as impossible, are those most intolerant of the proposed alternative, in which partners are chosen for each other, sup- posedly by lot but, in fact, for eugenic purposes. Those who reject such proposals as quite impracticable, given human nature, because of their "intolerable severity"31 would do well to consider the position of respectable Greek women. For they were just as controlled and de- prived in their sexual lives as both sexes of guardians were to be in the ideal city, and without having available to them the compensations 29. Grube, Plato's Thought, p. 270; cf. A.E. Taylor, Plato, The Man and His Work (London, I926; 7th ed., I960), p. 278. 30. Leo Strauss, "On Plato's Republic," in The City and Man (Chicago, I964), p. II7. 3I. Taylor, p. 278; see also Grube, p. 270, and Strauss, p. II7.

354 Philosophy & Public Affairs of any participation in life outside the domestic sphere. The Greek woman was not permitted to choose her sexual partner, any more than Plato's guardians were. Moreover, in her case the partner had not only the absolute right to copulate with and reproduce via her for the rest of her life, but also all the powers which her father had previously wielded over her. Once married, a woman had no condoned alterna- tive sexual outlets, but was entirely dependent on a husband, who might have any number of approved hetero- or homosexual alterna- tives, for any satisfaction that he might choose to give her. The extent of the double standard is brought clearly into relief by the fact that the Greek word for adultery meant nothing but sexual intercourse be- tween a married woman and a man who was not her husband. Need- less to say, the punishments were very severe. Even if her husband died, a woman had no control over her life or her body, since she was returned to the custody of her father or guardian, who could remarry her at his pleasure. Alternatively, a citizen could give his sister or daughter into concubinage, from which she could be sent to a brothel without any reproach to her owner.32 If Athenian women of the highest class, living in one of the most highly cultured societies the world has known, could be controlled and deprived to this extent, it is hardly arguable that the exigencies of human nature render the Platonic mating system, with its require- ment of supposedly "unnatural continence,"33 impossible to enact. Women's sexual lives have been restricted throughout the greater part of world history, just as rigidly as Plato proposes to control the inti- mate lives of his guardians. "The claims of eros" have been "simply silenced" in women with considerable success. It is apparent from much of the history of the female sex that, with suitable indoctrination and strong sanctions, human beings can be conditioned to accept vir- tually any extent of control on their sexual and emotional lives. The point is, of course, that the scholars concerned have used the terms "human emotions" and "human nature" to refer only to men. What seems really horrific to Grube, Taylor, and Strauss is that whereas the Greeks, like many other peoples, merely reserved women for the pro- 32. Jean Ithurriague, Les idees de Platon sur la condition de la femme (Paris, I93'), P. 53. 33. Grube, p. 270.

355 Plato on Women duction of legitimate issue and controlled their lives accordingly, Plato has dared to suggest that the sexual lives of both male and female guardians should be controlled for the purpose of producing the best possible offspring for the community. The significance of Plato's abolition of the family is profound; the proposal has been echoed by a number of subsequent theorists or rulers of utopian societies that depend to a very high degree on cohe- sion and unity. As Stanley Diamond has asserted, in an illuminating essay which analyzes the significance of Plato's treatment of the fam- ily, "The obvious aim is to disengage (the guardians) from all connec- tions and motives which might diminish their dedication to the state ... Plato clearly sensed the antagonism between state and family, and in order to guarantee total loyalty to the former, he simply abolished the latter."34 It is important to notice that Plato's revolutionary solution to the conflict was not to obliterate the primary ties of kinship, but to extend them throughout the entire ruling class. The guardians were in fact "to imagine that they were all one family,"35 and it is stressed in many ways that the formation of the rulers into one family is to be no mere formality. They are required not only to address but to behave towards each other as brother, parent, and so on. "It would be ridicu- lous," Glaucon agrees, "if they only mouthed, without deeds, the names of kinship."36 Thus, the fear and shame associated with violence towards a parent will operate as an unusually strong sanction against attack on anyone at all of the older generation. Likewise, lawsuits and factional disputes will be no more common than they would be within a family, and the city's success in war will be in large part due to the fact that soldiers will be no more likely to desert their comrades than to abandon members of their own families.37 Indeed, as Gregory Vlas- tos has concisely stated, "The ideal society of the Republic is a political community held together by bonds of fraternal love."38 The most radical implication of Plato's transforming the guardian class into a single family concerns the role of women. Rousseau, in the 34. Stanley Diamond, "Plato and the Definition of the Primitive," in Culture in History, ed. Diamond (New York, ig60), p. I26. 35. Timaeus, trans. Benjamin Jowett (Oxford, i87I), i8c-d. 36. Republic, 463c-e. 37. Republic, 464d-e, 465a-b, 47ic-d. 38. Gregory Vlastos, Platonic Studies (Princeton, I973), p. I I.

356 Philosophy & Public Affairs course of a bitter attack on Plato both for doing away with the family and for giving equal opportunities to women, nevertheless reveals a perceptive understanding of the connection between the two in- novations. "I am well aware that in the Republic Plato prescribes the same exercises for women as for men," he says. "Having dispensed with the individual family in his system of government, and not know- ing any longer what to do with women, he finds himself forced to turn them into men."89 It appears that he is correct, except that in place of "cmen" we should substitute "'people," since for Rousseau in many im- portant respects only men were people. Scholars who have considered the connection between the first two "'waves of paradox" of Book V- the granting of equal opportunities to women and the abolition of the family-do not, however, agree. Some have stressed the independence of the two proposals, some have maintained that there is probably a causal link between them but have not committed themselves on its direction, and at least one has asserted, without giving any reasons, that it is the emancipation of women which renders necessary the abo- lition of the family.40 For a number of reasons, however, it seems that the causal connection that exists between the two paradoxes goes the other way, as Rousseau claims. In the ideal city, since there is no private wealth or marriage for those in the guardian class and since their living arrangements are to be communal, there is no domestic role such as that of the traditional housewife. Since planned breeding and communal childrearing mini- mize the unpredictability of pregnancy and the time demanded of mothers, maternity is no longer anything approaching a full-time oc- cupation. Thus, women can no longer be defined by their traditional roles. However, every person in the ideal city is defined by his or her function; the education and working life of each citizen are to be dedi- cated to the optimal performance of a single craft.4' If the female guardians were no longer to be defined in relation to particular men, 39. Rousseau, Emile, edition Pleiade (Paris, 19I4): 4: 699-700 (my transla- tion). 40. For examples of these three positions, see Christine Pierce, "Equality: Republic V," p. 6; Strauss, "On Plato's Republic," p. ii6; A.E. Taylor, Plato, The Man and His Work, p. 278. 4I. Republic, 370; this is graphically illustrated by the assertion at 4o6d- 407a, that if one can no longer perform one's task, it is worthless to go on living.

357 Plato on Women children, and households, it seems that Plato had no alternative but to consider them persons in their own right. If they were to take their place as members of the guardian class, each must share in the func- tions of that class. Thus Plato had to convince his skeptical audience that women were able to perform tasks very different from those cus- tomarily assigned to them. Socrates first reminds his audience that they have all agreed that each individual should be assigned work that is suited to his or her nature. But, he says, since none of them will claim that there is no difference of nature between the male and the female, they are in danger of contradicting themselves if they argue that the female guardians should do the same work as the male. However, there are many ways in which human beings can differ, and we do not regard all of them as relevant in assigning different functions to different persons. Socrates asserts that we have not yet considered "what form of different and same nature, and applying to what, we were distinguish- ing when we assigned different practices to a different nature and the same ones to the same."42 But, he continues, is it not reasonable to consider only those differences and similarities that have some bear- ing on the activity in question? We do not worry about whether a man is bald or longhaired when assessing his capacity to be a good shoe- maker. There is, therefore, no reason to consider the difference in pro- creative function between the sexes-"that the female bears and the male mounts"-as relevant in deciding whether they should play equal roles in the ruling class. Socrates lays the burden of proof firmly on whoever should claim that it is. He argues, rather, that since the char- acteristics of the soul determine whether a person is capable of a cer- tain pursuit, and since sex is no more related to the soul than the presence or absence of hair, members of both sexes will be skilled in all the arts, depending on the nature of their individual souls. Thus, though he asserts that women in general are not as capable as men in general, especially in physical strength, individual members of both sexes will be capable of performing all the functions needed by the city, including guardianship and philosophy. The only way to ensure that persons are assigned the jobs for which they are best suited is to assess the merits of each, independently of sex. 42. Republic, 454b; cf. 454-456 in general for source of this paragraph.

358 Philosophy & Public Affairs This argument, simple as it seems, is unique in the treatment of women by political philosophers, and has revolutionary implications for the female sex. Plato's bold suggestion that perhaps there is no difference between the sexes, apart from their roles in procreation, is possible only because the requirement of unity among the ruling class, and the consequent abolition of private property and the family, en- tail the abolition of wifehood and the absolute minimization of mother- hood. Once the door is open, the possibilities for women are boundless. The annihilation of traditional sex roles among the guardians is total -even the earliest childcare is to be shared by men and women.43 Plato concludes that, though females as a class are less able, the best of women can share with the best of men in the highest functions in- volved in ruling the city. The "philosopher monarchs," as they should always have been called, were to include both sexes.44 The overwhelming hostility from male scholars to Plato's first wave of paradox is fascinating in its own right, but this is not the place to discuss it. However, one charge that has been laid against him must be dealt with here. Leo Strauss and Allan Bloom have claimed that Plato's arguments for the equality of women depend on his "abstract- ing from" or "forgetting" the body, and particularly his "abstracting from the difference between the sexes with regard to procreation."45 Clearly they do not. Plato is very careful to take into account those differences between the sexes that are palpably biological and there- fore inevitable-pregnancy, lactation, and a degree of difference in physical strength. These scholars, in the company of millions of other people, mistakenly assume, as Plato very rationally does not, that the entire conventional female sex role follows logically from the single fact that women bear children. The real significance of the treatment of the woman question in Republic V is that it is one of the very few instances in the history of thought when the biological implications of femaleness have been clearly separated from all the conventional, in- stitutional, and emotional baggage that has usually been identified with them. Plato's elimination of a private sphere from the guardians' 43. Republic, 460b. 44. Republic, 540C. 45. Strauss, "On Plato's Republic," pp. ii6-iI7; Allan Bloom, "Interpretive Essay," The Republic of Plato, pp. 382-383.

359 Plato on Women lives entailed the radical questioning of all the institutionalized dif- ferences between the sexes. During the argument about the proper education and role of women, Socrates twice indicates directly that these and the abolition of the family are really parts of the same issue. He talks, first, of the "right acquisition and use of children and women" and later of "the law con- cerning the possession and rearing of the women and children."46 In addition, the way he introduces the emancipation of the female guard- ians is in itself significant. Having dropped in an aside the proposal that the guardians will have women and children as well as their other possessions in common, Socrates is challenged, at the beginning of Book V, to justify this important decision. In answer to this challenge, he embarks on his discussion, first, of the equal education and treat- ment of women and, second, of the communal breeding and rearing arrangements. It seems, then, that having decided to do away with the conventional role of women by doing away with the family, he feels impelled to support this proposal by demonstrating that women are capable of filling many roles outside of their traditional sphere. A brief passage from the Laws shows how aware Plato was of the danger of freeing women from their confined, domestic role without giving them an alternative function. He thought the example of the Spartans should be enough to discourage any legislator from "letting the female sex indulge in luxury and expense and disorderly ways of life, while supervising the male sex."47 Thus it was his dismantling of the family which not only enabled Plato to rethink the question of women and their potential abilities but forced him to do so. Two additional arguments show clearly that it is the abolition of the family that leads Plato into emancipating the female guardians rather than vice versa. First, no mention is made of the women of the inferior classes. We are told that among these householders and farmers, private land, houses, and other property are to be preserved. The close connection between these things and the private ownership of women and children implies, though we are not specifically told this, that the family too is preserved among the lower classes.48 Effi- 46. Republic, 451C, 453d. 47. Laws, 8o6a-c. 48. Republic, 417a-b.

360 Philosophy & Public Affairs ciency is no doubt one of Plato's primary aims in the organization of the artisans. But although the argument in Book V about women's tal- ents is just as applicable to the other crafts as to that of governing the city, there is no suggestion of applying it to the women of any class but the guardians. The only possible explanation seems to be that where the family is retained, women continue to be private wives and func- tional mothers, so that their equality with men in other roles is not considered an open issue.49 Second, what happens to women in Plato's second-best city-that de- picted in the Laws-overwhelmingly confirms our hypothesis. On the subject of women, Plato in the Laws is a study in ambivalence. He is caught in a dilemma caused by the impossibility of reconciling his increasingly firm beliefs about the potential of the female sex with the reintroduction of private property and the family into the social struc- ture of his city. On the one hand, having thought about women as individuals with vast unused talents, Plato seems to have been more convinced than ever, by the time he wrote the Laws, that existing practice with regard to women was foolish and that they should be educated and used to their greatest capacity. In theory, the radical statements about women from Republic V are carried in the Laws to new extremes. On the other hand, the Laws is a considerably less revolutionary document than the Republic; far from being "a pattern laid up in heaven," the second-best city is put forward as a far less utopian construct.50 The very title of the dialogue, usually translated "Laws," is in fact more accurately rendered as "Tradition." A sig- nificant casualty of this "realism" is Plato's conception of the role of women. What is proposed for them in general terms is simply not fulfilled by the details of the society, in which they are again private wives and the functioning mothers of particular children. 49. It is illuminating that in Aristotle's response to the proposals of Book V, once the issue of the family is settled, that of the role of women is not consid- ered an independent one. It is clear that, since Aristotle considers himself to have refuted the proposal for the community of women and children, he does not deem it necessary to argue against Plato's wild ideas about women and their potential as individual persons. Given the family and the private household, women are private wives with domestic duties, and further discussion of the sub- ject would be superfluous. Politics, II: 1264b. 5o. Republic, 592b; Laws, 739.

36I Plato on Women Plato's arguments and conclusions in the Laws about the natural potential of women are far more radical than those of the Republic. He appears to attribute to the different rearing and education of the two sexes practically all differences in their subsequent abilities and achievements. Pointing to the example of the Sarmatian women, who participate in warfare equally with the men, as proof of the potential of the female sex, he argues that the Athenian practice of maintaining rigid sex roles is absurd. Only a legislator's "surprising blunder" could allow the waste of half the state's available resources, by prescribing that "most irrational" practice-"that men and women should not all follow the same pursuits with one accord and with all their might."5' In addition, a few speeches before these striking assertions are made, Plato prepares the way for them by means of an elaborate metaphor about ambidexterity-a lightly veiled allusion to his belief that men and women, like right and left hands, would be far more equal in ability if they received equal training.52 By the time he wrote the Laws, then, Plato had clearly come to recognize that female human nature was not fairly represented by the deprived and stunted women of his own society. Indeed, it was as yet unknown, although one could derive some impression of what women were capable of achieving from the example of the female warriors who in other societies held their own with the men in battle. However, in the Laws, the statements of general principle about women are far more radical than the actual details of the society as it is drawn up. Having made the general proclamation that the law should prescribe the same education and training for girls as it does for boys and that "the female sex must share with the male, to the greatest extent possible, both in education and in all else"-should "share with men in the whole of their mode of life"53-Plato's Athenian legislator fails to apply these precepts, in many of the most crucial instances. In order to understand the inconsistency between the gen- eral statements about women and the detailed specifications given for the most important of civic duties, we must turn to the effects on women of the reintroduction of private property and the family. 51. Laws, 805a-b. 52. Laws, 794c-d; see also Morrow, Plato's Cretan City, p. 329. 53. Laws, 8o5c-d.

362 Philosophy & Public Affairs Though it is clearly a source of regret to Plato, he concedes that the citizens of the second-best city, not being gods or sons of gods, are not capable of holding their property in common. The reinstatement of private property, one of the most far-reaching differences between the Laws and the Republic, brings with it in the same paragraph the rein- troduction of marriage and the family.54 It is clear from the context that the need for a property-holding man to have an heir requires the disappearance of the communal ownership of women and children si- multaneously with that of other property. However, the identification of women and children together with other possessions was so auto- matic to the Greek mind that, again, no separate justification is felt to be necessary. The failure to achieve communism of property, it seems, entails the private possession of women. The family, moreover, is the basis of the polity planned in the Laws. As Glenn Morrow has noted, "the state is a union of households or fam- ilies, not a collection of detached citizens," and "the vitality of the family in Plato's state is evident at many points in his legislation."55 The existence of family shrines, the complexity of marriage and in- heritance laws, the family's crucial role in the prosecution of criminal justice, and the denial to sons of the right to defend themselves against their fathers-all these provisions indicate the central and au- thoritative position of the family.56 The marriage laws are the first to be drawn up, and their repercussions for the position of women are immediate and extensive. In contrast to the temporary mating system of the Republic, in which neither sex had more freedom to choose or refuse a mate than the other, the reintroduction of permanent mar- riage seems to involve, without any explanation, a very different de- gree of choice of spouse for women and men. Marriage is to be com- pulsory for all, since procreation is regarded as a universal duty. But whereas a man, subject to the provision that he seek a partnership that will result in the best offspring for his society, decides whom he will marry, a woman is "given" in marriage.57 The "right of valid betrothal" of a woman belongs in turn to a long succession of male kindred, and 54. Laws, 74oa-c. 55. Morrow, Plato's Cretan City, pp. I I8-iI9g. 56. Laws, 866a, 868bc, 87ib, 879c; cf. Morrow, pp. 120-121. 57. Laws, 772d-773e, 774e.

363 Plato on Women only if she has no close male relatives at all can she have any say in choosing her husband. Ironically, considering this preemption of wom- en's choice, Plato refuses to enforce legally the prohibition of unsuit- able marriages, since he considers that to do so, "besides being ridicu- lous, would cause widespread resentment."58 Apparently what was to be customary for women was considered intolerable control if applied to men. The treatment of women by the marriage laws is closely related to the fact that they are virtually excluded from property ownership. Even if she has no brothers, a daughter can participate in the inher- itance of the family estate only by serving as the instrument through which the husband her father chooses for her can become her father's heir, if she has no brothers.59 The Laws documents the essential con- nection of property and inheritance to the marriage system and posi- tion of women. When a man owns inheritable property, he must own a wife too, in order to ensure a legitimate heir. The fact that women are private wives entails that in many ways they are treated as prop- erty rather than as persons. They themselves cannot inherit real prop- erty, which to a large extent defines personhood within the society (a disinherited son must leave the city unless another citizen adopts him as his heir) ;60 and they are treated as commodities to be given away by their male relatives. Given these basic features of the social struc- ture of the city, it is not surprising that Plato, in spite of general pro- nouncements to the contrary, is not able to treat women as the equals of his male citizens. Their status as property seems to prevent the execution of his declared intentions. Although the legal status of women in Plato's second-best city is an improvement on that in contemporary Athens, it is not one of equality with men. Glenn Morrow has said that "it is certainly Plato's expressed intention (though not fully carried out) to give women a more equal status under the law ."61 The proposed divorce laws, unlike the mar- riage laws, do treat women considerably more equally than did those of contemporary Athens; the criminal statutes enforce the same pun- 58. Laws, 773c. 59. Laws, 923e. 6o. Laws, 928e-929a. 6i. Morrow, p. I I3, n. 55.

364 Philosophy & Public Affairs ishments for the wounding or murder of wives as of husbands, and they are generally applied without discrimination according to the sex of either plaintiff or defendant.62 The most striking instance of equal treatment before the law is in the case of extramarital intercourse, where the same penalties are extended to offenders of both sexes.63 This unusual departure from the double standard that one might ex- pect to find in a society so firmly based on monogamy and inheritance can probably be explained by Plato's wish to make all the members of his city as virtuous and temperate as possible. After all, the standards are not relaxed for women, but they are considerably tightened up for men. However, the Athenian concept of women as legal minors is still present in significant ways in the Laws. Besides not being eligible to own property, they are not allowed until the age of forty to give evi- dence in a court of law or to support a plea, and only if unmarried are they allowed to bring an action.64 Women, especially if married, are still to a large extent femmes couvertes. What begins to be revealed through the denial of important civil and legal rights to women is strongly confirmed by the roles allotted them within the official governmental sphere. In the Republic, once we have been told that women of the guardian class are to share with men in every aspect of ruling and guarding, they are not specifically assigned to any particular offices, and there is no implication that they are in- eligible for any. The only case where women are specifically mentioned as being eligible for office is at the end of Socrates' account of the phi- losophers' education. Here, presumably because the very idea must have seemed so outrageous, Plato feels it necessary to remind his audi- ence that everything he has been saying applies equally to all women with the necessary abilities.65 It is most unlikely that the women guard- ians, if allowed to compete for the highest rank of all, would have been excluded from any other office. Thu the Laws, by contrast, in spite of the general pronouncements cited above, Plato both specifies when a certain function, such as the 62. Laws, 784b, 92ge, 930b, 882c; cf. Morrow, p. i2I. 63. Laws, 784d-e. 64. Laws, 937a-b. 65. Republic, 540c. The fact that Plato's rulers have always been referred to as philosopher kings suggests that the reminder was, and still is, necessary.

365 Plato on Women priesthood, is to be performed by persons of both sexes, and makes par- ticular mention of women's holding certain offices, frequently with the strong implication that only women are eligible for them.66 Thus, it is women who supervise married couples, who look after infants, whose role in the educational system is to provide the children's meals and oversee their games-in short, who perform, in positions not of the highest rank, all those domestic, nurturing, child-oriented tasks to which women have traditionally been assigned. On the other hand, there is no hint of women's participation in the magistracy, or the "divine nocturnal synod," whose role parallels that of the philosophers in the Republic.67 The children are given their lessons by male educa- tional officers; the post of supervisor of education is "by far the most important . . . of the highest offices of State" and must be filled by "that one of the citizens who is in every way the most excellent," and it is explicitly laid down that its occupant be male, for he must be "the father of legitimate children."68 This qualification adds weight to what is implied throughout the work-that in the second-best city, unless the eligibility of women is plainly mentioned, most offices, and especially high ones, are reserved for men.69 Even for those in which she can share, a woman is not eligible until age forty, whereas a man is eligible from the age of thirty.70 In spite of his controversial proposal in the Laws that, in the inter- ests of order and discipline, even married women should take their meals communally, though segregated from the men, it is clear that Plato was ambivalent about the wisdom, or perhaps the feasibility, of bringing wives out of their domestic seclusion. Thus when he describes the funeral processions for distinguished citizens, women of child- bearing age are noticeably omitted from a list in which every other class of citizen has its place. They are similarly omitted from the cho- 66. Laws, 741c, 759b, 764c-d, 8oob, 813c, 828b, 784a-c, 79oa, 794a-b, 795d, 930. 67. Laws, 96I. 68. Laws, 765d-766b. 69. Ronald Levinson agrees with this conclusion-see In Defense of Plato (Cambridge, Mass., 1953), p. 133-and Morrow notes that Plato gives no hint that women should perform the basic civic function of attending the assembly of the people. See Plato's Cretan City, pp. 157-158. 70. Laws, 785b.

366 Philosophy & Public Affairs ral competitions.7' Most remarkable, however, given his previous in- sistence that neither gymnastics nor riding are improper for women, and that trained women can perform in the military sphere equally as well as men,72 is the fact that, once the detailed regulations are being made, he exempts women almost entirely from military service. Young girls are to learn the military arts only "if they agree to it," whereas they are obligatory for the boys.73 Then, although he makes the gen- eral provision that men, women, and children are all to participate in military training at least one day a month, when the details are given, women after the age of marriage (twenty at the latest) are again noticeably absent. They are not included either in races or in wrestling, both of which are integral parts of the training. As for horsemanship, it is decreed that "it is not worthwhile to make compulsory laws and rules about their taking part in such sports," but that they may do so "without blame," if they like.74 It should be noted that Plato was not in the habit of making aspects of his educational systems optional- particularly those relating to the defense of the state. Finally, whereas the term of military service for men is from the ages of twenty to sixty, "for women they shall ordain what is possible and fitting in each case, after they have finished bearing children, and up to the age of fifty, in whatever kind of military work it may be thought right to employ their services."75 This means that for all the grand assertions about the necessity and rationality of women's being trained equally with men to share in the defense of the state, they are in fact allowed, not compelled, to train up to the age of, at latest, twenty, they are then excluded from most military activity until they are past child-bearing, and they are subsequently exempted again at fifty. In a society in which men had no other condoned sexual outlet than their wives, and contraception was hardly in an advanced state, this could well mean an expectation of five years of military service from adult women. Surely this was no way to produce Amazons. Despite Plato's professed intention to have the women of the second- 71. Laws, 947b-d, 764e. 72. Laws, 804e-805a, 8o6b. 73. Laws, 794c-d. 74. Laws, 833c-d, 834a, 834d. 75. Laws, 785b.

367 Plato on Women best city share equally with the men in all the duties of citizenship, the fact that they are private wives curtails their participation in public life for three reasons. The first is pregnancy and lactation, which is not controlled and predictable as it was in the Republic, where the guardians were to mate only at the behest of the rulers. In the Laws, since women are permanent wives, they are far less able to time or limit their pregnancies and cannot be held continuously liable for pub- lic and, especially, military duties. Second, the reinstitution of the pri- vate household makes each wife into the mistress responsible for its welfare, and it is clear that in the Laws a mother is to participate far more in early childcare than did the female guardian, who was not even to know which child was hers.76 The third reason is that Plato found it inconceivable that women who are "private wives"-the private property of the male citizens- should play the same kind of public and, especially, military roles as the female guardians, who were not defined in terms of a traditional relationship to a man. Whereas the female guardians, like their male counterparts, could exercise naked, the young girls in the Laws must be "clad in decent apparel," as if a maiden who was shortly to become the respectable wife and private property of a citizen could hardly be seen naked by the world at large.77 Plato expresses as much expecta- tion of ridicule for his suggestion in the Laws that wives should dine at public, though segregated, tables as he had expressed in the Repub- lic for his proposal that all the guardians of both sexes should exercise together naked.78 Although he thought it even more dangerous to leave women undisciplined than to neglect men and insisted that women too should dine in public, he was well aware that, in the kind of society he was planning, there would be enormous resistance to such an idea. Consequently, although he deplored the fact that even the supposedly trained women of Sparta had panicked and run when an enemy in- vaded their city, and thought it folly that so important a potential for defense as the entire female sex should be neglected, he seems to have found it impossible to hold to his original proposal that women should participate in military activities equally with men. If the segregated 76. Laws, 8o8a, 8o8e. 77. Laws, 833d. 78. Compare Laws, 781c-d with Republic, 452a-b.

368 Philosophy & Public Affairs public dining of private wives could cause a general outcry, there was no knowing what revolutions might be provoked by the proposal that men should mingle with other men's private wives on the battlefield. Despite all his professed intentions in the Laws to emancipate women and make full use of the talents that he was now convinced they had, Plato's reintroduction of the family has the direct effect of putting them firmly back into their traditional place. In the Republic, because the abolition of property and the family for the guardian class entails the abolition of woman's traditional sphere, the difference between the sexes is reduced to that of their roles in procreation. Since the nature of the women of this class is declared to be the same as that of the men, the radical proposal that their educations and lifestyles are to be identical follows accordingly. Plato has prescribed an androgynous character for all the guardians; both male and female are to be courageous and gentle, and both, be- cause of their education and continued fellowship, will hold precious the good of the entire community. For the purposes of this society, therefore, the abolition of traditional sex roles is declared to be far more in accordance with nature than is the conventional adherence to them. In the Laws, by contrast, the reinstatement of property requires monogamy and private households, and thus restores women to their role of "private wives" with all that this entails. Although his general statements about women's potential are considerably stronger here than in the Republic, Plato cannot, because of the economic and social structure he has prescribed, carry out to any significant extent the rev- olution in woman's role that would seem to follow from such beliefs. In this society, the "nature" of woman must be different from the "na- ture" of man. She must be pure and respectable, as befits a private wife who is to ensure the legitimacy of the property owner's heir, while he is to retain the noble and courageous qualities which resemble those of the ideal guardian. The striking difference between the roles of women in the Republic and the Laws, then, is not due to a change in Plato's beliefs about the nature and capacities of women. On the contrary, his convictions ap- pear to have changed in exactly the opposite way. The difference is due

369 Plato on Women to the abolition of private property and the family, in the interest of unity, in the former dialogue, and their reinstatement in the latter. When woman is once again perceived as the privately owned append- age of a man, when the family and its needs define her function, the socialization and regulation prescribed for her must ensure that her "nature" is formed and preserved in accordance with this role.