When they act as a profit$-$maximizing cartel, each company will produce

$120$

cans and charge

$$1\mathrm{.}20$

per can. Given this information, each firm earns a daily profit of

$

$,$ so the daily total industry profit in the beer market is

$

$.$

Oligopolists often behave noncooperatively and act in their own self$-$interest even though this decreases total profit in the market. Again, assume the two companies form a cartel and decide to work together. Both firms initially agree to produce half the quantity that maximizes total industry profit. Now, suppose that Stargell decides to break the collusion and increase its output by $50\%,$ while Schmidt continues to produce the amount set under the collusive agreement.

Stargell's deviation from the collusive agreement causes the price of a can of beer to to

$

per can. Stargell's profit is now

$

$,$ while Schmidt's profit is now

$

$.$ Therefore, you can conclude that total industry profit when Stargell increases its output beyond the collusive quantity.Deviating from the collusive outcome

Stargell and Schmidt are brewing companies that operate in a duopoly $($two$-$firm oligopoly$).$ The daily marginal cost $($MC$)$ of producing a can of beer is

constant and equals $$1\mathrm{.}20$ per can. Assume that neither firm had any startup costs, so marginal cost equals average total cost $($ATC$)$ for each firm.

Suppose that Stargell and Schmidt form a cartel, and the firms divide the output evenly. $($Note: This is only for convenience; nothing in this model

requires that the two companies must equally share the output.$)$

Place the black point $($plus symbol$)$ on the following graph to indicate the profit$-$maximizing price and combined quantity of output if Stargell and

Schmidt choose to work together.

Monopoly Outcome