Which of the followings added by a system designer will be considered as a hardware Trojan? Modify the system specification so when a specific input sequence is given, a critical component will be disabled Add an extra output pin to test a particular signal on the chip Assign specific values to some don't care conditions in the system specification as a proof of designer's signature Use a custom designed functional unit (e.g. dedicated for modular exponentiation) to speed up the computation point In the example we have showed for trusted IC and hardware Trojan, the following functions are used to implement F(z) what will be the output when 11102-1410 is entered as the input? Enter your answer in binary and from 2 to Z7 Enter answer here We have shown that replacing Z2 = X2X3 with Z2 = (X1 + X2X3 will add a hardware Trojan to the circuit in question 2. Which of the following statements about hardware Trojan- free (or trusted IC) implementation is FALSE? We need to make sure that for any input az between 10 and 15, the circuit does not output ar2 Replacing Z question. 0 by Z6- X1X3 cannot prevent the hardware Trojan showed in this We need to make sure that the circuit will give correct output values for input values 0-9 O Replacing Z1=Xi by Zi-Xi X can prevent the hardware Trojan showed in this question. point 4. Hardware Trojans can be functional, which will change the system's functionality, or non- functional, which do not. Non-functional hardware Trojans are also known as Trojans Enter answer here point 5 Which of the following statements about hardware Trojan detection is true (assume that the Trojan detection tool is trusted)? When a Trojan is reported, the IC cannot be trusted. When the hardware Trojan detection tool does not find any Trojan, the IC is trusted When all components of the IC are tested and Trojan-free, the IC is trusted. When a Trojan is found and fixed, the IC can be trusteg 6 Which of the following statements about physical attacks and hardware Trojan detection approaches is FALSE? Unlike physical attacks, hardware Trojan detection normally does not have a specific target Physical attacks can target system at normal operation, but most hardware Trojans are triggered by rare events They both try to find hidden information or design details in the chip. Physical attacks can be invasive, but hardware Trojan detection cannot. point 7 Which of the following statement about side channel analysis based hardware Trojan detection methods is INCORRECT? The accuracy of these detection methods is related to the models we use for system's normal (Trojan-free) behavior. The variations during chip's fabrication process will impact the accuracy of these The accuracy of these detection methods will be affected by the environment we test The errors in collecting side channel measurements do not impact the accuracy of detection methods the chip these detection methods. A small kill switch (a 2-input AND gate and a triggering signal) is added to the chip to disable the encryption engine. Which of the following hardware Trojan detection approaches most likely will NOT be able to catch it? O Logic test at test time Run time monitoring Power side channel analysis. Delay side channel analvsis. point For two FSMs M1 and M2 and their product machine M, which of the following statements about FSM equivalence is correct? If M1 and M2 have different number of states, they cannot be equivalent. If M1 and M2 give different outputs for the following input 1010101010, they cannot be equivalent Let k1, k2 and k be the number of starting states in M1, M2, and M, respectively, then k-k1 + k2 Let k1, k2 and k be the number of states in M1, M2, and M, respectively, it is possible to have k > ki x k2. 10. Which of the following statements about hardware Trojan prevention is true? Rare event removal approaches remove the rare events from the chip so they will not occur and thus hardware Trojan cannot be triggered by them Shadow registers can help to measure the delay of internal paths. So it can make the path delay based hardware Trojan detection approaches more effective. If you cannot trust the CAD tools, you should not use it because there is no way you can build trusted IC from the untrusted CAD tools. Digital watermarking (e.g. those based on don't care conditions) is used to prove IP's authorship. It cannot be considered as a way to defend against reverse engineering attack. point Which phase in the IC supply chain is considered trusted? Wafer probe Packaging Deploy and monitor Specification Design 12. Which of the following is NOT a payload of hardware Trojan? Change IC's functionality Reduce circuit reliability Leak senstive information Remove IC designer's watermark point 13. Which of the following hardware Trojan detection methods CANNOT catch non-functional Trojans? Run-time monitoring mechanisms Logic test based approaches Side channel analysis based methods point 14. Which of the following approaches is a pre-synthesis hardware Trojan prevention method? Removal of dead space Test and validation Formal verification Interface protection Shielding wires