while uB : SA SB R is the payoff function of the player B, which is given by uB s1A. ,s1B uB s2A, s1B uB . s3A,s1B = 2; uB s1A,s2B = 3; uB . s1A,s3B = 2; uB s1A. ,s4B = 2; = 8; uB. s2A,s2B = 4; uB s2A, s3B = 2; uB s2A,s. 4B = 5; = 1; uB s3A,s2B = 2; uB s3A,s3B = 1; uB s3A,s4B = 0.

(1) Draw the game matrix of this game.

(2) Is there a weakly strictly dominant strategy equilibrium of this game? If so, write down all of the weakly strictly dominant strategy equilibria in this game. If no, write down the reason why no weakly dominant strategy equilibrium exists.

(3) If the answer of the question (2) is no, then apply the iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies and describe the procedure to reduce the game matrix from the original one. Moreover, specify the set of undominated strategies.