Write me a complete five-case legal memorandum on the following cases. Case-I:Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503(1969)

Case Facts: In December 1965, a group of students in Des Moines held a meeting in the home of 15-year-old Christopher Eckhardt to plan a public showing of their support for a truce in the Vietnam War. They decided to wear black armbands throughout the holiday season and to fast on December 16 and New Year's Eve. The principals of the Des Moines school learned of the plan and met on December 14 to create a policy that stated that any student wearing an armband would be asked to remove it, with refusal to do so resulting in suspension. On December 16, Mary Beth Tinker and Christopher Eckhardt wore their armbands to school and were sent home. The following day, John Tinker did the same with the same result. The students did not return to school until after New Year's Day.

Procedural History:The Plaintiff sued the school district, alleging a violation of their First Amendment rights. The case was then filed in the United States District Court by petitioners, through their fathers, under 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code. It prayed for an injunction restraining the respondent school officials and the respondent members of the board of directors of the school district from disciplining the petitioners, and it sought nominal damages. After an evidentiary hearing, the District Court dismissed the complaint, stating that these officials not only have a right but also must prevent anything that might be disruptive to such an educational environment. The plaintiffs then took the case to the Eighth CircuitU.S. Court of Appeals. It upheld the constitutionality of the school authorities' action because it was reasonable to prevent disturbance of school discipline.258 F. Supp.(1966). The court referred to but expressly declined to follow the Fifth Circuit's holding in a similar case that the wearing of symbols like armbands cannot be prohibited unless it "materially and substantially interferes with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the schoolBurnsidev.Byars,363 F. 2d 744, 749(1966).On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit considered the caseen banc. The court was equally divided, and the District Court's decision was accordingly affirmed, without opinion. 383 F.2d 988 (1967). We granted certiorari. 390 U.S. 942 (1968).

Rationale: In a 7-2 decision, the Supreme Court's majority ruled that neither students nor teachers "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." The Court took this position stating that school officials could not prohibit it only on the suspicion that the speech might disrupt the learning environment. The Court also emphasized that symbolic speech is protected, and the school's actions were an unconstitutional infringement on the student's freedom of expression. The case eventually established the "Tinker Test," which asks whether the speech would disrupt the school environment.

Concurring Opinion:Justice Potter Stewart wrote that children are not necessarily guaranteed the full extent of First Amendment rights. Justice Byron R. White wrote a separate concurring opinion in which he noted that the majority's opinion relies on a distinction between communication through words and communication through action.

Holding: Justice Hugo Black dissented, arguing that the Court overstepped its boundaries by involving itself in the internal affairs of public schools. The dissent argued that the First Amendment does not grant the right to express any opinion at any time. Students attend school to learn, not teach. The armbands were a distraction. School officials, acting on a legitimate interest in school order, should have broad authority to maintain a productive learning environment.

Obiter Dicta: The Court emphasized the importance of protecting free speech rights, even within the school environment. The Court also stated, "It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." The Tinker standard eventually became a benchmark for balancing students' rights and maintaining order in schools based on previous precedent.

Case-II: Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986)

Case Facts:In 1986, Matthew Fraser made a speech nominating a fellow student for elective office. In his speech, Fraser used what observers believed was a graphic sexual metaphor to promote the candidacy of his friend. As part of its disciplinary code, Bethel High School enforced a rule prohibiting conduct that "substantially interferes with the educational process including the use of obscene, profane language or gestures." Fraser was suspended from school for three days and his name would be removed from the list of candidates for graduation speaker at the school's commencement exercise.

Procedural History: The plaintiff then filed an action suit in the U.S District Court for the Western District of Washington citing a violation of his First Amendment right to freedom of speech and sought both injunctive relief and monetary damages under 42 U.S.C 1983. In its ruling, the District Court upheld the school's sanctions violated the respondent's right to freedom of speech under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, that the school's disruptive-conduct rule is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad and the removal of the student's name from the graduation speaker's list violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the disciplinary rule makes no mention of removal as a possible sanction. The court then awarded the Plaintiff the amount of $278 in damages, 12,750 in litigation fees, and enjoined the school district from preventing the student from speaking at the commencement ceremonies. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the District Court, 755 F.2d 1356 (1985), holding that the respondent's speech was indistinguishable from the protest armband inTinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist.,393 U. S. 503(1969). The court explicitly rejected the School District's argument that the speech, unlike the passive conduct of wearing a black armband, had a disruptive effect on the educational process.Finally, the Court of Appeals rejected the School District's argument that incident to its responsibility for the school curriculum, it had the power to control the language used to express ideas during a school-sponsored activity. We granted certiorari, 474 U.S. 814 (1985). We reverse.

However, the Court acknowledged inTinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., supra,that students do not "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate."Id.at474 U. S. 506.

Rationale: In a 7-2 decision, the Court found that it was appropriate for the school to prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive language. Chief Justice Burger distinguished between political speech which the Court previously had protected in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District (1969) and the sexual content of Fraser's message at the school. Justice Burger then concluded that the First Amendment did not prohibit schools from prohibiting vulgar and lewd speech since such discourse was inconsistent with the "fundamental values of public-school education.

Fraser established a lower threshold for school restrictions on student speech when it involves offensive or indecent language on school campuses. Chief Justice Warren Burger referenced Tinker, noting that the case resulted in the broad protection of student speech, but that protection only extended to speech that was not disruptive to the educational process. Fraser's profanity was determined to be disruptive, and therefore it was not protected speech. The two dissenting justices disagreed with the majority, asserting that the lewd speech was not disruptive.

Dissent: Justice Brennan dissented, asserting that the school's actions violated Fraser's First Amendment rights, as the speech did not disrupt the educational process.

Obiter Dicta: The Court recognized the authority of schools to maintain a proper educational environment and protect students from disruptive or offensive speech.

Case III: Wisniewski ex rel. Wisniewski v. Board of Education of the Weedsport Center School District, 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007)

Case Facts: This case arose out of an Internet transmission by an eighth grader at Weedsport Middle School, in the Weedsport Central School District in upstate New York. In April 2001, the pupil, Aaron Wisniewski ("Aaron"), was using AOL Instant Messaging ("IM") software on his parents' home computer. Instant messaging enables a person using a computer with Internet access to exchange messages in real-time with members of a group (usually called "buddies" in IM lingo) who have the same IM software on their computers. Instant messaging permits rapid exchanges of text between any two members of a "buddy list" who happen to be online at the same time. Different IM programs use different notations for indicating which members of a user's "buddy list" are online at any one time. Text sent to and from a "buddy" remains on the computer screen during the entire exchange of messages between any two users of the IM program.

Procedural History:This case concerns aFirst Amendmentchallenge to an eighth-grade student's suspension for sharing with friends via the Internet a small drawing crudely, but clearly, suggesting that a named teacher should be shot and killed.Plaintiffs-AppellantsMartin andAnnette Wisniewski, the parents ofAaron Wisniewski, appeal from theJune 30, 2006, amended judgment ofthe District Court for theNorthern District of New York(Norman A. Mordue, Chief Judge), dismissing their federal civil rights claims against theDefendants-AppelleesWeedsport Central School District Board of Education and School SuperintendentRichard Mabbettand declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims.Weconclude that the federal claims were properly dismissed because it was foreseeable that Wisniewski's communication would disrupt the school environment, and that it was appropriate not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.Wetherefore affirm.

Rationale:InNovember 2002Aaron's parents filed on his behalf the current suit against the Board and Superintendent Mabbett, seeking damages under42 U.S.C. 1983.The complaint included five counts: the first count claimed that Aaron's icon was not a"true threat,"but was protected speech under theFirst Amendment.It therefore alleged that in suspending Aaron the Board acted in a retaliatory manner in violation of hisFirst Amendmentrights.The second and third counts alleged that the Board and Mabbett, respectively, had failed to train school staff in threat assessment, thereby leading to the violation of Aaron'sFirst Amendmentrights.The fourth and fifth counts claimed the Board had violatedNew YorkState Education Law.

InJune 2006,Chief JudgeMorduegrantedthe Defendants'motion for summary judgment.The District Courtfirst found that the hearing officer had made a factual determination, entitled to preclusive effect, that the icon was a threat and, as such, not protected by theFirst Amendment.Alternatively,the Courtmade its determination that the icon was reasonable to be understood as a"true threat"lackingFirst Amendmentprotection.The Courtalso found that, in any event, Mabbett would be entitled to qualified immunity.Having dismissed all three federal law claims,the District Courtdeclined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining two state law claims and dismissed them without prejudice.

Holding: " Tinker affords no protection against school discipline" for a student's online creation and transmission of an icon calling for the killing of his teacher that occurred away from school property because it "foreseeably created a risk of substantial disruption within the school environment"

Dissent: There was no dissenting opinion in this case because the case was decided on a summary judgment by a single judge.

Obiter Dicta: The court acknowledged the challenges of applying traditional school speech principles to the internet age and the need for a careful balance between school authority and students' off-campus speech rights.

Case IV: Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B.L., 2021 U.S. LEXIS 3395 (2021)

Case Facts: B.L., a student at Mahanoy Area High School (MAHS), tried out for and failed to make her high school's varsity cheerleading team, making instead only the junior varsity team. Over the weekend and away from school, she posted a picture of herself on Snapchat message criticizing the school cheerleading team. The photo was visible to about 250 people, many of whom were MAHS students and some of whom were cheerleaders. Several students who saw the captioned photo approached the coach and expressed concern that the snap was inappropriate. The coaches decided B.L.'s snap violated team and school rules, which B.L. had acknowledged before joining the team, and she was suspended from the junior varsity team for a year.

Procedural History: The Plaintiff sued the school under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging (1) that her suspension from the team violated the First Amendment; (2) that the school and team rules were overbroad and viewpoint discriminatory; and (3) that those rules were unconstitutionally vague.The district court granted summary judgment in B.L.'s favor, ruling that the school had violated her First Amendment rights. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed. The First Amendment limits but does not entirely prohibit regulation of off-campus student speech by public school officials, and, in this case, the school district's decision to suspend B.L. from the cheerleading team for posting to social media vulgar language and gestures critical of the school violates the First Amendment. Justice Stephen Breyer authored the 8-1 majority opinion of the Court.

Although public schools may regulate student speech and conduct on campus, the Court's precedents make clear that students do not "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression" when they enter campus. The Court has also recognized that schools may regulate student speech in three circumstances: (1) indecent, lewd, or vulgar speech on school grounds, (2) speech promoting illicit drug use during a class trip, and (3) speech that others may reasonably perceive as "bearing the imprimatur of the school," such as that appearing in a school-sponsored newspaper. Moreover, inTinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969), the Court held that schools may also regulate speech that "materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others."

Rationale: The District Court found in B. L.'s favor. It first granted a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction ordering the school to reinstate B. L. to the cheerleading team. In granting B. L.'s subsequent motion for summary judgment, the District Court found that B. L.'s Snapchats had not caused substantial disruption to the school. Cf.Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist.393 U.S. 503,89 S.Ct. 733,21 L.Ed.2d 731(1969). Consequently, the District Court declared that B. L.'s punishment violated the First Amendment, and it awarded B. L. nominal damages and attorneys' fees and ordered the school to expunge her disciplinary record.

On appeal, a panel of the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's conclusion. See964 F.3d 170, 194(2020). In so doing, the majority noted that this Court had previously held inTinkerthat a public high school could not constitutionally prohibit a peaceful student political demonstration consisting of " 'pure speech' " on school property during the school day.393 U.S., at 505-506, 514,89 S.Ct. 733. Inreaching its conclusion inTinker, this Court emphasized that there was no evidence the student protest would "substantially interfere with the work of the school or impinge upon the rights of other students."Id., at 509,89 S.Ct. 733. But the Court also said that: "conduct by a student, in class or out of it, which for any reasonwhether it stems from time, place, or type of behaviormaterially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others is ... not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech."Id. at 513,

Majority Holding: The majority panel held that this additional freedom did "not apply to off-campus speech," which it defined as "speech that is outside school-owned, -operated, or -supervised channels and that is not reasonably interpreted as bearing the school's imprimatur."964 F.3d at 189.Because B. L.'s speech took place off campus, the panel concluded that theTinkerstandard did not apply, and the school consequently could not discipline B. L. for engaging in a form of pure speech. A concurring member of the panel agreed with the majority's result but wrote that the school had not sufficiently justified disciplining B. L. because, whether theTinkerstandard did or did not apply, B. L.'s speech was not disruptive.

Dissent: Justice Thomas dissented, expressing concern about the majority's application of the Tinker standard to off-campus speech.

Obiter Dicta: The Court highlighted the importance of considering the off-campus context and the potential chilling effect on student expression in the digital age.

Case V:B.H. ex rel. Hawk v. Easton Area Sch. Dist., 725 F.3d 293 (3d Cir. 2013)

Case Facts: A breast-cancer foundation launched a breast-cancer-awareness campaign with the slogan "I boobies." The motivation behind the irreverent slogan was to encourage young people to break perceived taboos surrounding conversations about breast cancer. BH (plaintiff), a student at an Easton Area School District (district) (defendant) middle school, embraced the campaign and, along with several classmates, began wearing bracelets with the slogan to school. Several faculty members expressed reservations about the bracelets to school administrators, even though the bracelets had not caused any disruptions. The administration agreed to ban the bracelets, and the decision was announced over the school public address system by the seventh-grade assistant principal. The assistant principal used the term boobies while making the announcement. Later, BH and two classmates chose to wear the bracelets during the school's observance of Breast Cancer Awareness Day. BH and a classmate refused to remove the bracelets when asked, and the school suspended them. The district then issued a district-wide ban on bracelets. BH sued the district, claiming a violation of her right to free expression under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of BH, and the district appealed.

Procedural History: The Plaintiff through their mothers, B.H. and K.M. sued the School District under42 U.S.C. 1983.Compl., ECF No. 1 1 3, B.H. v. Easton Area Sch. Dist.,No. 5:10-CV-06283-MAM (E.D. Pa. Nov. 15, 2010). They sought a temporary restraining order allowing them to attend the Winter Ball and a preliminary injunction against the bracelet ban.B.H. v. Easton Area Sch. Dist.,827 F.Supp.2d 392, 394(E.D.Pa.2011). At the District Court's urging, the School District reversed course and permitted B.H. and K.M. to attend the Winter Ball while retaining the option to impose a comparable punishment if the bracelet ban was upheld.Id.The District Court accordingly denied the motion for a temporary restraining order.Id. The District Court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the request for a preliminary injunction. It soon became clear that the School District's rationale for disciplining B.H. and K.M. had shifted. Although B.H.'s and K.M.'s disciplinary letters indicated only that they were being disciplined for "disrespect," "defiance," and "disruption," the School District based the ban on its dress code policy together with the bracelets' alleged sexual innuendo.

Rationale: The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania agreed with the students that the bracelets are not lewd or vulgar and are protected speech. The school appealed the decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The Third Circuit ruled in favor of the student, emphasizing that the school's reaction was based on the bracelet's ambiguous message and not a substantial disruption. The decision by the court shows that this case does not fall under theBethel School District v. Fraserrule because most people would not consider the word "Boobies" lewd or offensive even if the bracelets are considered lewd, fighting breast cancer is an activity with social redeeming value.

Dissent: There was no dissenting opinion in this case.

Obiter Dicta: The court underscored the importance of context and potential misinterpretations in assessing the disruptive impact of student speech, urging schools to consider the broader implications before restricting expression.