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YVONNE'S BISTRO 20 (Defect) 26 (Cooperate) 20 (Defect) 288,288 360,216 XAVIER'S TAPAS 26 (Cooperate) 216,360 324,324 (a) (10 points) Suppose this game is played an infinite number of times. Yvonne decides to use a grim- trigger strategy, wherein she continuously chooses a price of 26 (cooperation) as long as Xavier does the same, but she will choose 20 (defection) forever once Xavier chooses to defect. Knowing Yvonne's strategy, Xavier must decide whether to defect in the first round (and all sub- sequent rounds) or cooperate forever. If the discount factor between rounds is r = 0.05, should Xavier defect or cooperate?(b) (10 points) Now suppose that each town in America contains two restaurants that compete against each other. Restaurant owners are one of two \"phenotypes\"; they either cooperate and set a price of 26 or defect and set a price of 20. In each market, the restaurant that earns lower prots will be outcompeted by the higher prot restaurant and leave the market, at which point it will be replaced by another restaurant. If all the restaurants are initially run by defecting managers (who always choose a price of 20), can cooperating restaurant owners \"invade\" the population? What is the evolutionarily-stable equilibrium