Y6

Consider 3 voters that will be using an agenda based system to vote between two different bills, a and b vs the status quo, n, such that their rankings across these alternatives are as below: Peter Paul Mary 1st b n 2nd n a 3rd b n b The agenda for the vote is to vote for a vs b and then pit the winner vs n. a. Assume that the voters vote naively. What will be the outcome. b. Assume the voters vote strategically. Find all of the pure strategy Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria of the game (Hint: Be very careful to make sure you define strategies properly). Which do you think is more likely to occur.Consider 3 voters that will be using an agenda based system to vote between two different bills, a and b vs the status quo, n, such that their rankings across these alternatives are as below: Peter Paul Mary 1st b n 2nd n a 3rd b n b The agenda for the vote is to vote for a vs b and then pit the winner vs n. a. Assume that the voters vote naively. What will be the outcome. b. Assume the voters vote strategically. Find all of the pure strategy Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria of the game (Hint: Be very careful to make sure you define strategies properly). Which do you think is more likely to occur