Y7

Consider the repeated game where the following stage game is played an infinite number of times Player 2 Player 1 B 10, 10 o, 12 Assume the following strategies: Player 1: to play B if in the previous period the outcome was either (B, L) or (T, R),- To play T otherwise. Player 2: to play L if in the previous period the outcome was either (B, L) or (T, R); To play R otherwise. Q9 Find the range of the values of the discount factor such that (Player 1 plays B, Player 2 plays L) in each period is a BIO of the repeated game 010 Assume that the game above is played 10 periods (T=1U). Find the range of the values of the discount factor such that (Player 1 plays B, Player 2 plays L) in each period is a BIO of the repeated ga me. The following stage game is played infinite times: 3 players simultaneously contribute to a public good G where G is the sum of the contributions. The player i's payoff is given by 0.5 G gi where gi is the contribution of player i. The individual contribution gi ranges in the interval [0, 10]