you can see the question about Microeconomic Analysis in the next pictures.

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Suppose there are two firms in a market, a big incumbent firm (B) and a start-up challenger firm (C). They compete in a research and development (R&D) race with a random return M that is equally likely to be 0 or 1. There are two periods. R&D costs 0 > 0 per period. In the first period, a firm decides whether or not to enter the race by investing. If the firm does invest, in the second period, it decides whether or not to invest again. In each period, firms move simultaneously, but decisions in the first period are observed before the second period. If one firm stays longer than the other, it gets M and the other 0. If both firms stay until the end, each firm gets %. Othenrvise, both get 0. There is no discounting of payoff between the two periods. A firm's payoff is the payoff at the end, minus the sum of R&D costs (if any). Firm B receives a noisy signal about M but Firm C does not. Prior to the decision in period 1, Firm B gets either good news, g, or bad news, b. The probability that the signal is 9 when M = 1 is q, where g