You have just begun a new stage in your careeryou have been hired to be the Human Resources (HR) Manager for Berkley Innovative Technologies. Upon meeting the CEO, she described how the company's workforce demographics have changed substantially over the pasttwo decades. Previous HR managers, along with many supervisors, have mostly been Caucasian males ranging in age between 50s and early 60s, and typically from a Judeo-Christian background. The CEO also indicated that workplace strife has been steadily increasing, and her team is concerned that it may be related to the changing demographics in the workforce.

The CEO has tasked you with creating an educational manual to be utilized in training the existing front-line supervisors. This will be followed with sensitivity training to help all employees understand the complexities of the changing workforce and what it means for the future.

Diversity Training Manual: Part I

Part I of the training manual should address the following:

U.S. Population Projections: 2005-2050 By Jeffrey S. Passel and D'Vera Cohn I. Overview If current trends continue, the demographic profile of the United States will change dramatically by the middle of this century, according to new population projections developed by the Pew Research Center.1 The nation's population will rise to 438 million in 2050, from 296 million in 2005, and fully 82% of the growth during this period will be due to immigrants arriving from 2005 to 2050 and their descendants. (Figure 1) Of the 117 million people added to the population during this period due to the effect of new immigration, 67 million will be the immigrants themselves, 47 million will be their children and 3 million will be their grandchildren. The Center's projections indicate that nearly one in five Americans (19%) will be foreign born in 2050, well above the 2005 level of 12%, and also surpassing the historic peaks for immigrants as a share of the U.S. population14.8% in 1890 and 14.7% in 1910. (Figure 2) By 2050, the nation's racial and ethnic mix will look quite different than it does now. NonHispanic whites, who made up 67% of the population in 2005, will be 47% in 2050. Hispanics will rise from 14% of the population in 2005 to 29% in 2050. Blacks were 13% of the population in 2005 and will be roughly the same proportion in 2050. Asians, who were 5% of the population in 2005, will be 9% in 2050. Immigration is projected to be the key driver of national population growth in the coming half century, but it is important to note that possible future changes in immigration policy or other events could substantially alter the projected totals. These projections are based on trends over the past half century, during which immigration, both authorized and unauthorized, has played an escalating role in U.S. population growth. From 1960 to 2005, new immigrants and their U.S.born descendants accounted for 51% of population increase. In the later part of that period, from 1980 to 2005, new immigration accounted for 58% of the 68 million additional people. For the period from 2005-2050, new immigrants and their descendants will account for 82% of population increase. The contribution of new immigration to population change was derived by comparing our main projection with an alternative projection that assumes no new immigrants arrive after 2005. (See Contribution of Immigration to Population Change in Appendix.) The heightening role of immigration contrasts with a decrease in fertility in recent decades. The average number of births per woman has declined markedly since the late 1950s, from more than 3.5 then to about 2 now. Also, a smaller proportion of women are of childbearing age now, compared with earlier decades. These two changes have made immigration a more prominent factor in population growth. Methods and Assumptions The Center's projections for the period from 2005 to 2050 are based on detailed assumptions about patterns in births, deaths and immigrationthe three building blocks of population change. All population projections have built in uncertainties, especially for years further in the future, because they are based on assumptions about future behavior. In addition, these uncertainties can multiply because key aspects of population change are often interrelatedfor example, a decline in immigration could also lead to a decline in the birthrate because immigrants tend to have larger families than do native born residents. The Center has developed three different population projections for 2050, but the body of this report presents findings from the main projection (figures from projections based on lower or higher immigration levels are set forth in a section that starts on page 23). These projections consolidate and build upon past trends, present conditions, and factors affecting future behavior. None of the projections should be treated as predictions. The country's policies may change, as may the factors that influence birth, death and immigration rates. Even given these caveats, however, population projections are an important analytical tool for planners. A rise or decline in the overall populationas well as in particular age groupswill have important impacts on the nation's tax base and workforce. Demographic change has major implications for government spending in key areas such as schools, health programs, community services, infrastructure and Social Security. Projections also provide business with a basis upon which to make judgments about future markets. And they are of increasing interest because of the role that population may play in climate change and other environmental concerns. A Note on Methodology The Center's projections use well established demographic methods and models to carry the population forward in time. The models and assumptions are disaggregated by race and by Hispanic origin, as are many projection models (e.g., Census Bureau, 2000). With regard to immigration, the Center's projections also incorporate methods developed by Edmonston and Passel (1992, 1994) that differentiate the population by generation, i.e., the first generation (foreign-born), the second generation (U.S. natives with at least one immigrant parent) and the third-and-higher generations (U.S. native children of two U.S. native-born parents). For more detail, see the \"Methodology\" Appendix to this report. When incorporating birth estimates into the projections, the Center has assumed that the overall fertility rate will remain near the level it has been for the past three decades, with differing rates by race and ethnicity (Appendix, Figure A2). Birthrates are assumed to be well above average for immigrants, slightly above average overall for the second generation (U.S. natives with at least one immigrant parent) and below average for subsequent generations born in the United States. The Center's fertility rate projections are virtually identical to those of the Social Security trustees and slightly lower than those of the Census Bureau. (Census Bureau, 2004; Social Security Administration, 2007). As for death rates, life expectancy is assumed to improve somewhat for all groups throughout the period covered by these projections. (Appendix, Figure A3) The Center's projections employ Census Bureau assumptions about life expectancy gains, which are higher than those of the Social Security Trustees. Immigration to the United States has risen rapidly and steadily for decades as a result of increasing globalization and population movements, changes in U.S. immigration laws, the growing linkages of immigrant families within this country to communities abroad and labor market factors. Not only have the numbers of new U.S. immigrants increased over recent periods, but the rate of immigration also has risen steadily, whether measured from 1930, 1960 or 1980. In the face of these strong and persistent trends, most U.S. government projections, whether done by the Census Bureau (1996, 2000, 2004) or the Social Security Administration (2007) have assumed constant or even decreasing numbers of immigrants, implying sharp and sometimes immediate declines in the rate of immigration. As a result, official projections over the last several decades have consistently underestimated actual population growth. The Pew Research Center projections have assumed that the annual immigration level, now about 1.4 million people, will increase slowly by 1% per year, reaching 2.1 million immigrants in 2050. (Figure 3) This rate of growth is in line with, but somewhat slower than, the growth trends of the last several decades. These immigration levels are slightly higher than those projected by either the Census Bureau or the Social Security Trustees in the short run and substantially higher toward the end of the projection horizon. With the Center's immigration assumption, the rate of immigration remains roughly constant over the 45-year projection horizon at 0.48% per year, or just under five immigrants per 1,000 population for each year. The rate is slightly below the rate for the first half of this decade and equal to the average for the last 35 years. (Figure 4) The decades-long pattern of steady increases has been interrupted recently by year-to-year variation, including a spike in 1998-2001, a sharp decline in 2002-2004 (Passel and Suro, 2005), followed by a return to the long-term average in the last several years. The relatively steady growth of the last 70 years contrasts with substantial fluctuations that occurred in the 19th and early 20th centuries. (Figure 5) Short-term fluctuations are likely to continue to occur, but the Center's projections assume that those variations will be less important than the long-term trends. Although the rate is held steady in the Center's projections, the number of new immigrants rises as the nation's total population goes up. The projections also assume that several hundred thousand foreign-born residents will leave each year, which is in keeping with trends of the past several decades. Reflecting recent trends, the Center's projections include a mix of new arrivals of legal permanent residents and unauthorized, or illegal, migrants, although the two groups are not broken out separately. The issue of illegal immigration has become highly contentious in recent years. Last summer, Congress tried but failed to pass a comprehensive reform bill, and the debate over how to change immigration policies has become a major topic of the current presidential campaign. It is possible that a future Congress will enact laws that would sharply cut immigration flows. This has happened before. The Immigration Act of 1924 (along with an economic depression and a world war) drastically reduced immigrants as a share of the U.S. population from a 20th century peak of 14.7% in 1910 to a low of 4.7% in 1970. This report offers two alternative population projections in addition to its main projection. The alternatives are based on immigration levels roughly 50% above and 50% below the baseline projection, but use the same fertility and mortality assumptions as the baseline projection. Under the lower-immigration scenario, the population would rise to 384 million in 2050, and new immigration would account for 71% of growth during the projections period. Under the higher- immigration scenario, the population would go up to 496 million, and new immigration would account for 87% of the increase. The baseline projection shows the population will rise to 438 million, and new immigration will account for 82% of the increase. Population Trends The Center's main projection indicates that the nation's population will grow 48% over the 2005-2050 period. That growth rate is lower than the 64% increase in the nation's population from 1960 through 2005. The projected annual growth rate of 0.9% equals that of the 1980s but is lower than the pace of growth during other decades since the 1960s. The Center's projections also indicate that between 2005 and 2050 the number of elderly will increase more rapidly than either the number of children or working-age adults.2 Immigration and births to immigrants in the United States will be responsible for all growth of other age groups but will have little impact on the number of elderly, which is affected mainly by the aging of the post-World War II baby-boom generation. The relationship between the size of the working-age population, on the one hand, and the young and elderly on the other hand, is sometimes referred to as a nation's \"dependency ratio.\" The Center's projections show that the dependency ratio, which was 59 young and elderly for every 100 people of working age in 2005, will rise to 72 dependents per 100 people of working age in 2050. That means the costs per worker to support the young and elderly would go up. Under a lower-immigration scenario, the ratio would rise even higher, to 75 dependents per 100 people of working age. Under a higher-immigration scenario, it would be 69 dependents per 100 workingage people. In terms of international comparisons, the United States will continue to be the world's third most populous nation in 2050, behind India and China, each with more than a billion people (United Nations, 2007). The projected annual growth rate for the United States will continue to exceed that in most other developed nations, which are growing at a slower pace, if at all. European countries generally are growing at no more than 0.5% a year, and some are losing population. As is true in the United States, the immigrant populations in many other developed nations have been growing rapidly in recent decades. The United States has a larger foreign-born population than any other country, but U.S. immigrants were a smaller share of the 2005 population (12%) than those in a few countries with long histories of receiving immigrantsincluding Australia at 20% or Canada with 19% (United Nations, 2006). Although immigrants are a larger share of the U.S. population than in most of Europe, some countries have a share of immigrants approaching that of the United States, including France (11%) and the United Kingdom (9%). This report begins by presenting the baseline projection for the total population from 2005 to 2050. The next sections go into detail about the projected estimates for key segments of the population, including the foreign born, Hispanics, blacks, Asians, non-Hispanic whites, workingage adults, children and the elderly. This report then examines how these changes will affect the size of the potential workforce relative to the number of elderly and young people. A final section presents the results of two alternative projections. This overview concludes with a summary of major projections. Racial and Ethnic Groups In the Center's projections, each person is included in only one race or Hispanic category. These projections assume that definitions of race and ethnic categories will remain fixed and that selfidentification does not change over time. In reality, the growing numbers of births to parents of different racial and ethnic groups, as well as changing social norms about racial and ethnic selfidentification, are serving to blur the boundaries of racial/ethnic categories. Consequently, the future sizes of race/ethnic groups could be higher or lower than the projection values even if the underlying demographic assumptions about the future prove to be correct. Key Projections Population and Immigration Between 2005 and 2050, the nation's population will increase to 438 million from 296 million, a rise of 142 million people that represents growth of 48%. Immigrants who arrive after 2005, and their U.S.-born descendants, account for 82% of the projected national population increase during the 2005-2050 period. Of the 117 additional people attributable to the effect of new immigration, 67 million will be the immigrants themselves and 50 million will be their U.S.-born children and grandchildren The nation's foreign-born population, 36 million in 2005, is projected to rise to 81 million in 2050, growth of 129%. In 2050, nearly one in five Americans (19%) will be an immigrant, compared with one in eight now (12% in 2005). The foreign-born share of the nation's population will exceed historic highs sometime between 2020 and 2025, when it reaches 15%. The historic peak share was 14.7% in 1910 and 14.8% in 1890. Births in the United States will play a growing role in Hispanic and Asian population growth, so a diminishing proportion of both groups will be foreign-born. Racial and Ethnic Groups The Hispanic population, 42 million in 2005, will rise to 128 million in 2050, tripling in size. Latinos will be 29% of the population, compared with 14% in 2005. (Figure 6) Latinos will account for 60% of the nation's population growth from 2005 to 2050. The black population, 38 million in 2005, will grow to 59 million in 2050, a rise of 56%. In 2050, the nation's population will be 13.4% black, compared with 12.8% in 2005. The Asian population, 14 million in 2005, will grow to 41 million in 2050, nearly tripling in size. In 2050, the nation's population will be 9% Asian, compared with 5% in 2005. Most Asians in the United States were foreign born in 2005 (58%), but by 2050, fewer than half (47%) will be. The white, non-Hispanic population, 199 million in 2005, will grow to 207 million in 2050, a 4% increase. In 2050, 47% of the U.S. population will be non-Hispanic white, compared with 67% in 2005. Age Groups The working-age populationadults ages 18 to 64will reach 255 million in 2050, up from 186 million in 2005. This segment will grow more slowly over the projection period (37%) than the overall population. Future immigrants and their descendants will account for all growth in this group. Among working-age adults, the foreign-born share, 15% in 2005, will rise to 23% in 2050. The Hispanic share, 14% in 2005, will increase to 31% in 2050. The non-Hispanic white share, 68% in 2005, will decline to 45% in 2050. The nation's population of children ages 17 and younger will rise to 102 million in 2050, up from 73 million in 2005. The child population will grow more slowly in future decades (39%) than will the overall population. Future immigrants and their descendants will account for all growth in this population segment. Among children, the share who are immigrants or who have an immigrant parent will rise to 34% in 2050 from 23% in 2005. The share of children who are Hispanic, 20% in 2005, will rise to 35% in 2050. Non-Hispanic whites, who make up 59% of today's children, will be 40% of children in 2050. The nation's elderly populationpeople ages 65 and olderwill grow to 81 million in 2050, up from 37 million in 2005. This group will grow more rapidly than the overall population, so its share will increase to 19% in 2050, from 12% in 2005. (Figure 7) Immigration will account for only a small part of that growth. The dependency ratiothe number of people of working age, compared with the number of young and elderlywill rise sharply, mainly because of growth in the elderly population. There were 59 children and elderly people per 100 adults of working age in 2005. That will rise to 72 dependents per 100 adults of working age in 2050. (Figure 8) Alternative Projection Scenarios Under a lower-immigration scenario, the total population would rise to 384 million, the foreign-born share would stabilize at 13% and the Hispanic share would go up to 26% in 2050. Under a higher-immigration scenario, the total population would rise to 496 million, the foreign-born share would rise to 23% and the Hispanic share would go up to 32% in 2050. Under a lower- or higher-immigration scenario, the dependency ratio would range from 75 dependents per 100 people of working age to 69 dependents per 100 people of working age. Both of these ratios are well above the current value of 59 dependents per 100 people of working age. A Note on Terminology The terms \"Hispanic\" and \"Latino\" are used interchangeably in this report. The terms \"whites\" \"blacks\" and \"Asians\" are used to refer to the non-Hispanic components of each population. \"Children\" refers to people ages 17 and younger. \"Working-age\" refers to people ages 18 64. \"Elderly\" refers to people ages 65 and older. \"Foreign-born\" refers to an individual who is not a U.S. citizen at birth or, in other words, who is born outside the U.S., Puerto Rico or other U.S. territories and whose parents are not U.S. citizens. The terms \"foreign-born\" and \"immigrant\" are used interchangeably. The terms \"unauthorized immigrants,\" \"undocumented immigrants\" and \"illegal immigrants\" are used interchangeably. This report uses the following definitions of the first, second and third-and-higher generations: First: Foreign-born or immigrant. Second: U.S. native (born in the United States or territories), with at least one firstgeneration parent. Third-and-higher: U.S. native (born in the United States or territories), with both parents native-born. Demographics This page contains information about national labor force statistics with demographic characteristics available from the Current Population Survey (CPS). Data on the labor force characteristics of employed and unemployed persons, plus hours of work and earnings, also are available. Demographic labor force information for States, counties, and cities are available separately from the Local Area Unemployment Statistics (LAUS) program. Contact LAUS staff for state or city data. On This Page Age Race and Hispanic ethnicity Certifications and licenses School enrollment Disability Veterans Educational attainment Volunteering Families and marital status Women Foreign-born workers Youth Older workers Age Labor force, employment, and unemployment statistics by age group. See also Older workers and Youth. Database: Retrieve historical data series Annual table: Employment status by detailed age group, sex, and race (HTML) (PDF) (XLSX) Monthly table: Employment status by detailed age group, sex, and race (HTML) (PDF) Median age of workers by occupation and industry NOTICE Limited historical data are available for these tables due to changes in the occupational and industry classification systems that affect comparability over time. See also Earnings, and other data by occupation and industry. Occupation: Employed persons by detailed occupation and age, including median age Latest year: 2019 HTML PDF XLSX Previous years: 2018 HTML PDF XLSX 2017 HTML PDF XLSX 2016 HTML PDF XLSX 2015 HTML PDF XLSX 2014 HTML PDF XLSX 2013 HTML PDF XLSX 2012 HTML PDF XLSX 2011 HTML PDF XLSX Industry: Employed persons by detailed industry and age, including median age Latest year: 2019 HTML PDF XLSX Previous years: 2018 HTML PDF XLSX 2017 HTML PDF XLSX 2016 HTML PDF XLSX 2015 HTML PDF XLSX 2014 HTML PDF XLSX 2013 HTML - XLSX 2012 HTML - XLSX 2011 HTML - XLSX Chart: Employment-population ratio and labor force participation rate by age (August 2017) Articles: The early 2000s: a period of declining teen summer employment rates (May 2010) (PDF) Record unemployment among older workers does not keep them out of the job market (March 2010) (HTML) (PDF) Trends in labor force participation in the United States (October 2006) (PDF) Certifications and licenses Labor force, employment, and unemployment statistics for persons with or without certifications and licensescredentials that demonstrate a level of skill or knowledge needed to perform a specific type of job. These non-degree credentials are distinct from educational attainment. Questions to identify persons with professional certifications and licenses were added to the Current Population Survey (CPS) in January 2015. Frequently asked questions about data on certifications and licenses Annual tables: Latest annual averages (These are estimates for the nation as a whole; data are not tabulated for states or local areas.) Certification and licensing status by employment status (HTML) (PDF) (XLSX) Employment status by certification and licensing status and selected characteristics (HTML) (PDF) (XLSX) Certification and licensing status of the employed by selected characteristics (HTML) (PDF) (XLSX) Certification and licensing status of the employed by industry and class of worker (HTML) (PDF) (XLSX) Certification and licensing status of the employed by occupation (HTML) (PDF) (XLSX) Median weekly earnings by certification and licensing status and selected characteristics (HTML) (PDF) (XLSX) Median weekly earnings by certification and licensing status and occupation (HTML) (PDF) (XLSX) Previous years: 2018 annual averages (tables) 2017 annual averages (tables) 2016 annual averages (analytical highlights and tables) 2015 annual averages (analytical highlights and tables, first year available) Charts: Labor force participation rates are higher for people with professional certifications or licenses (August 2019) Workers in healthcare occupations most likely to have certifications or licenses in 2015 (April 2015) Why This Counts: New Timely Data on Professional Certifications and Licenses (April 2015) Articles: Professional certifications and occupational licenses: evidence from the Current Population Survey (June 2019) (HTML) (PDF) Adding Questions on Certifications and Licenses to the Current Population Survey (November 2016) (HTML) (PDF) Looking for Foreign Labor Certification (hiring foreign workers for employment in the U.S.)? See the U.S. Department of Labor. Disability Labor force, employment, and unemployment statistics for persons with or without a disability. These are estimates for the nation as a whole; data are not available by state. Questions to identify persons with a disability were added to the Current Population Survey (CPS) in June 2008. Current monthly data: Employment Situation news release (Monthly), Table A-6 (HTML) (PDF) (Charts) (Archives) (Schedule) News release: Labor Force Characteristics of Persons With a Disability (Annual) (HTML) (PDF) (Archives) News release: Persons With a Disability: Barriers to Employment, Types of Assistance, and Other LaborRelated Issues (occasional) (HTML) (PDF) (Archives) Frequently asked questions about disability data Database: Retrieve historical data series Charts: Employment characteristics of people with a disability in 2018, (October 2019) Employment of people with a disability in 2018, (March 2019) Labor force characteristics of people with a disability, Spotlight on Statistics (October 2018) Employment of workers with a disability in 2017 (June 2018) Workers with a disability more concentrated in service occupations than those with no disability (October 2017) Unemployment rate of people with a disability 10.5 percent in 2016 (June 2017) Celebrating National Disability Employment Awareness Month (October 2016) 17.5 percent of people with a disability employed in 2015 (June 2016) People with a disability less likely to have completed a bachelor's degree (July 2015) Largest proportion of workers with a disability work in education and health services in 2014 (June 2015) Almost 60% of people with a disability age 25 and older had a high school education or less in 2013 (October 2014) Employment of people with disabilities in 2013 (June 2014) Workers with a disability more likely to be in production and transportation occupations (June 2014) Labor force characteristics of persons with a disability in 2012 (June 2013) Barriers to employment for persons with a disability (May 2013) People with a disability in 2012: a visual essay (April 2013) (PDF) Unemployment among persons with a disability, 2011 (June 2012) Employment of persons with a disability, 2011 (June 2012) Labor force characteristics of persons with a disability in 2010 (June 2011) Employment among persons with a disability by age, 2009 (August 2010) Articles: The development of questions on disability for the Current Population Survey (April 2014) Working paper: Discussion and presentation of the disability test results from the Current Population Survey (August 2006) - testing disability questions in the February 2006 CPS (Abstract) (PDF) Working paper: Designing questions to identify people with disabilities in labor force surveys (August 2005) - early development work on disability questions for the CPS (Abstract) (PDF) Census Bureau report: Evaluation report covering disability (January 2007) - testing done in the 2006 American Community Survey (ACS) (PDF, Census Bureau's 2006 ACS Content Test Report Series, report P.4) The lack of a disability measure in today's Current Population Survey (June 2001) (PDF) Disability tables, 2008-09 (prior to publication in the Employment Situation news release) Educational attainment Labor force, employment, and unemployment statistics by educational attainment for persons age 25 and older. (Learn how we define educational attainment.) See also Earnings by education, School enrollment and Certifications and licenses. Database: Retrieve historical data series Top series More options (must select age 25 and over) Annual table: Employment status by educational attainment, sex, race, and Hispanic ethnicity (HTML) (PDF) (XLSX) Monthly table: Employment status by educational attainment (HTML) (PDF) Charts: 72.3 percent of 2018 bachelor's degree recipients were employed in October 2018 (May 2019) Foreign-born workers with a bachelor's degree and higher earned more than native born in 2018 (May 2019) Rising educational attainment among Blacks or African Americans in the labor force, 1992 to 2018 (February 2019) Profile of the labor force by educational attainment, Spotlight on Statistics (August 2017) Educational attainment and occupation groups by race and ethnicity in 2014 (November 2015) Educational attainment, employment, and unemployment among African Americans (February 2015) The job market for recent college graduates in the United States (April 2013) Educational attainment of women in the labor force, 1970-2010 (December 2011) Back to College, Spotlight on Statistics (September 2010), includes CPS and other BLS survey data Articles: Recent college graduates in the U.S. labor force: data from the Current Population Survey (February 2013) (PDF) Measuring education in the Current Population Survey (September 1993) (PDF) Families and marital status See also Women, including additional tables on parents, families, and marital status in the annual report on Women in the Labor Force: A Databook. Employment, unemployment, and labor force participation in families News release: Employment Characteristics of Families (Annual) (HTML) (PDF) (Archives) Database: Retrieve historical data series Top series Looking for estimates of wives who earn more than their husbands? These data are available from the U.S. Census Bureau in table F-22. Charts: 5.2 percent of families had an unemployed person in 2018 (April 2019) Married mothers less likely to participate in labor force in 2017 than other moms (April 2018) Employment in families with children in 2016 (April 2017) Husband and wife employed in 48 percent of married-couple families in 2015 (May 2016) Labor force participation of fathers in 2014 (June 2015) 80.1 percent of families had at least one employed family member in 2014 (April 2015) Working wives in married-couple families, 1967-2011 (June 2014) Proportion of families with an unemployed member decreased to 9.6 percent in 2013 (April 2014) Median weekly earnings by sex, marital status, and presence and age of own children under 18 in 2012 (December 2013) Working mothers in 2012 (May 2013) Employment characteristics of families, 2012 (April 2013) Unemployment among families, 2011 (May 2012) Employment status of parents, 2011 (April 2012) Families with an employed mother, 1994-2010 (May 2011) Employment characteristics of families, 2010 (March 2011) Employment and unemployment of fathers without spouses (June 2010) Families with unemployed members in 2009 (June 2010) Labor force participation rates among mothers, March 1975-2008 (May 2010) Labor force participation of women and mothers, 2008 (October 2009) Labor force participation of mothers with infants in 2008 (May 2009) Wives earning more than their husbands, 1967-2006 (January 2009) Labor force participation of mothers, 1975-2007 (January 2009) Labor force status of families: a visual essay (July/August 2007) (PDF) Article: Trends in labor force participation of married mothers of infants (February 2007) (PDF) Employment and unemployment statistics for married men and women Monthly tables: Employment levels (HTML) (PDF) Unemployment levels and rates (HTML) (PDF) Unemployment statistics by marital status Monthly table: Unemployment levels and rates by marital status, sex, race, and Hispanic ethnicity (HTML) (PDF) Annual table: Unemployment levels and rates by marital status, sex, race, and Hispanic ethnicity (HTML) (PDF) (XLSX) Foreign-born workers Labor force, employment, and unemployment statistics by foreign- and native-born status (nativity). (Learn how we define foreign born and native born.) Current monthly data: Employment Situation news release (Monthly), Table A-7 (HTML) (PDF) (Charts) (Archives) (Schedule) News release: Labor Force Characteristics of Foreign-Born Workers (Annual) (HTML) (PDF) (Archives) Database: Retrieve historical data series Charts: Foreign-born workers with a bachelor's degree and higher earned more than native born in 2018 (May 2019) Foreign-born labor force nearly half Hispanic and one-quarter Asian in 2017 (May 2018) Foreign-born workers made 83.1 percent of the earnings of their native-born counterparts in 2016 (May 2017) Foreign born more likely than native born to work in service occupations (June 2016) Foreign born make up 28 percent of labor force in Pacific states (May 2016) Foreign born represented 16.5 percent of the U.S. labor force in 2014, up from 14.8 percent in 2005 (May 2015) Earnings of foreign born were 79.9 percent of native born in 2013 (May 2014) Foreign-born workers in the U.S. labor force, Spotlight on Statistics (July 2013), includes CPS and other BLS survey data Labor force participation rates of the foreign born and native born, 2008-2012 (May 2013) National Hispanic Heritage Month, Spotlight on Statistics (September 2012), includes CPS and other BLS survey data Education and occupations of the foreign born in 2011 (June 2012) Employed foreign-born and native-born persons by occupation, 2010 (June 2011) Unemployment rates for foreign-born workers, 2009 (March 2010) Foreign-born workers by region, 2008 (March 2009) Unemployment and foreign-born workers, 2008 (March 2009) Occupations and foreign-born workers in 2007 (April 2008) Educational attainment of foreign born labor force, 2007 (April 2008) Second-generation Americans, age, and the labor force, 2005 (October 2006) Foreign-born workforce, 2004: a visual essay (PDF) Articles: Labor force characteristics of second-generation Americans (September 2006) (PDF) The role of foreign-born workers in the US economy (May 2002) (PDF) Looking for Foreign Labor Certification (hiring foreign-born workers for employment in the U.S., including H-1B visas)? See the U.S. Department of Labor. Older workers See also Age. Labor force, employment, and unemployment statistics by single year of age for persons age 55 and older are available on request. Contact the Current Population Survey staff to obtain these data. Database: Retrieve historical data series Annual table: Employment status by detailed age group, sex, and race (HTML) (PDF) (XLSX) Monthly table: Employment status by detailed age group, sex, and race (HTML) (PDF) Charts: About 15 percent of workers age 65 and older had been with employer 2 years or less in 2018 (July 2019) More seniors working full time, 1977-2007 (August 2008) Labor force participation of seniors, 1948-2007 (July 2008) Older Workers, Spotlight on Statistics (July 2008), includes CPS and other BLS survey data Article: Record unemployment among older workers does not keep them out of the job market (March 2010) (HTML) (PDF) Race and Hispanic or Latino ethnicity Labor force, employment, and unemployment statistics for whites, blacks or African Americans, Asians, and persons of Hispanic or Latino ethnicity. (Learn how we define race and Hispanic or Latino ethnicity.) See also Earnings by Demographics. Annual report: Labor Force Characteristics by Race and Ethnicity HT 20 20 20 20 ML 18 17 16 15 - - - - - 20 08 PD 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 F 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 09 08 07 Database: Retrieve historical data series Top series by race Top series by Hispanic ethnicity More options Annual tables: Employment status by race (HTML) (PDF) (XLSX) Employment status by Hispanic ethnicity and detailed ethnic group (HTML) (PDF) (XLSX) Employment by major occupation, race, Hispanic ethnicity, and sex (HTML) (PDF) (XLSX) Hispanic workers by detailed ethnic group, sex, and major occupation (HTML) (PDF) (XLSX) Employment by detailed occupation, race, and Hispanic ethnicity (HTML) (PDF) (XLSX) Employment by detailed industry, race, and Hispanic ethnicity (HTML) (PDF) (XLSX) Monthly table: Employment status by race and Hispanic ethnicity (HTML) (PDF) Charts: Black women made up 53 percent of the Black labor force in 2018 (February 2019) Rising educational attainment among Blacks or African Americans in the labor force, 1992 to 2018 (February 2019) Labor market trends for American Indians and Alaska Natives, 2000-17 (November 2018) Labor force participation rate of Hispanics at 66.1 percent in 2017 (September 2018) 26.8 million Hispanics or Latinos in the U.S. labor force in 2016 (September 2017) Unemployment rate and employment-population ratio vary by race and ethnicity (January 2017) Educational attainment and occupation groups by race and ethnicity in 2014 (November 2015) Hispanics and Latinos in industries and occupations (October 2015) Educational attainment, employment, and unemployment among African Americans (February 2015) Civilian labor levels for persons of Hispanic or Latino ethnicity by detailed ethnic group, 1990-2013 (October 2014) Forty-nine percent of employed Asians in management, professional, and related occupations, 2012 (December 2013) Racial and ethnic characteristics of the U.S. labor force in 2012 (November 2013) Occupational employment by race and ethnicity, 2011 (October 2012) National Hispanic Heritage Month, Spotlight on Statistics (September 2012), includes CPS and other BLS survey data Racial and ethnic characteristics of the U.S. labor force, 2011 (September 2012) Employed Asians by occupation, 2008-2010 (May 2012) Educational attainment and unemployment among Asians in the United States (December 2011) Asians in the U.S. labor force, 2008-2010 (December 2011) Unemployment rates by race and ethnicity, 1975-2010 (October 2011) Earnings and employment by occupation, race, ethnicity, and sex, 2010 (September 2011) African American History Month, Spotlight on Statistics (February 2010), includes CPS and other BLS survey data Labor force demographics, 2008 (January 2010) Blacks, Asians, and Hispanics in the civilian labor force: a visual essay (June 2004) (PDF) Articles: Asians in the U.S. labor force: profile of a diverse population (November 2011) (PDF) Counting minorities: A brief history and a look at the future, Report on the American Workforce, Chapter 1 (2001) (PDF) The diversity of Hispanics in the U.S. work force (August 1993) (PDF) The growing presence of Hispanics in the U.S. work force (August, 1988) (PDF) CPS questions on race and Hispanic ethnicity were revised in 2003 School enrollment Labor force, employment, and unemployment statistics for youth ages 16 to 24 by school enrollment status. See also Youth and Educational attainment. News release: College Enrollment and Work Activity of High School and College Graduates (Annual) (HTML) (PDF) (Archives) Monthly table: Employment status by school enrollment, sex, race, and Hispanic ethnicity (HTML) (PDF) Charts: 72.3 percent of 2018 bachelor's degree recipients were employed in October 2018 (May 2019) 77.6 percent of 2017 bachelor's degree recipients were employed in October 2017 (May 2018) Female students more likely than male students to participate in labor force in October 2017 (May 2018) 69.7 percent of 2016 high school graduates enrolled in college in October 2016 (May 2017) Students less likely to work in October 2015 than in the 1980s and 1990s (May 2016) Back to school: enrollment and employment in October 2014 (August 2015) 38 percent of 2014 high school graduates enrolled in college were in labor force in October 2014 (April 2015) 65.9 percent of 2013 high school graduates enrolled in college (May 2014) 48.8 percent of recent high school graduates in labor force (April 2013) The job market for recent college graduates in the United States (April 2013) Labor force participation among students and nonstudents, October 2011 (April 2012) School's Out, Spotlight on Statistics (July 2011), includes CPS and other BLS survey data High school grads not enrolled in college more likely to be in the labor force (April 2011) Summertime school enrollment and employment among teens (June 2010) College enrollment up among 2009 high school grads (April 2010) 2008 high school grads and college enrollment (April 2009) Unemployment rate among recent dropouts, October 2007 (April 2008) Recent high school graduates and labor force participation, October 2007 (April 2008) Back to School, Spotlight on Statistics (August 2007), includes CPS and other BLS survey data Articles: Recent college graduates in the U.S. labor force: data from the Current Population Survey (February 2013) (PDF) Youth enrollment and employment during the school year (February 2008) (PDF) Veterans Labor force, employment, and unemployment statistics for veterans of the U.S. Armed Forces by period of service and service-connected disability. Current monthly data: Employment Situation news release (Monthly), Table A-5 (HTML) (PDF) (Charts) (Archives) (Schedule) News release: Employment Situation of Veterans (annual average and supplemental survey data, including service-connected disability) (HTML) (PDF) (Archives) Database: Retrieve historical data series Seasonally adjusted unemployment rates: Veterans and nonveterans Veteran status by age and sex, including detail for Gulf War-era II veterans Veteran status by period of service and sex Annual table: Employment status of persons 18 years and over by veteran status, age, and sex (HTML) (PDF) (XLSX) Quarterly table: Employment status of persons 18 years and over by veteran status, age, and sex (HTML) (PDF) Monthly table: Employment status of persons 18 years and over by veteran status, age, and sex (HTML) (PDF) Charts: Management, professional, and related occupations most common among veterans and nonveterans (November 2019) Labor force participation rate 73.5 percent in 2018 for Gulf War-era II veterans with a disability (March 2019) Alaska had highest share of veterans in labor force among states in 2017 (March 2018) 31 percent of employed veterans with a disability worked in government in August 2016 (March 2017) 43.3 percent of veterans with a service-connected disability were employed in August 2015 (November 2016) Unemployment rate for Gulf War-era II veterans 5.8 percent in 2015 (March 2016) Employment of veterans by occupation, 2014 (May 2015) Veteran unemployment rate decreases to 5.3 percent in 2014 (March 2015) Employment and unemployment among all veterans, Gulf-War era II veterans, and nonveterans (November 2014) Women veterans ages 25 to 34 had unemployment rate of 9.8 percent in 2013 (September 2014) Women veterans in the labor force, Spotlight on Statistics (August 2014) U.S. military veterans and nonveterans in the labor force, 2013 (June 2014) Unemployment rate for veterans edges down in 2013 (March 2014) Unemployment among veterans declines in 2012 (March 2013) Veterans in the civilian labor force, 2011 (November 2012) Employment Situation of Veterans - 2011 (March 2012) Employment of veterans, 2010 (November 2011) Unemployment rates of veterans, 2010 (March 2011) Demographics of Gulf War-era II veterans (August 2010) Employment Situation of Veterans, Spotlight on Statistics (May 2010), includes CPS and other BLS survey data Charts submitted with Statement on Veterans' Employment (April 2010) Disabled veterans and the labor force, August 2009 (March 2010) Labor force participation in 2008 of veterans of World War II, Korean War, or Vietnam era (March 2009) Unemployment in 2008 and veterans who served since September 2001 (March 2009) Employment characteristics of Gulf War-era II veterans in 2006: a visual essay (PDF) Articles: Employment and earnings of recent veterans: data from the CPS (July 2010) (PDF) BLS Deputy Commissioner's Statement on Veterans' Employment (April 2010) (PDF) (Slides, including charts) Special notices and technical documentation: Beginning with data for January 2014, estimates for veterans incorporate updated weighting procedures that more accurately reflect the current demographic composition of the veteran population. The new weighting methodology had little effect on unemployment rates for veterans, regardless of gender or period of service. Learn more about the effect of the January 2014 weighting change on labor force estimates for veterans. Beginning with data for January 2013, estimates for veterans incorporate population controls derived from an updated Department of Veterans Affairs population model. In accordance with usual practice, BLS did not revise estimates for December 2012 and earlier months. Revised Data from the August 1995 Vietnam Veterans Survey Volunteering These statistics reflect persons who volunteered through or for an organization. They come from a special supplemental survey last conducted in September 2015. NOTICE The last volunteer supplement and associated BLS news release reflected data collected in September 2015. The volunteer supplement was sponsored by the Corporation for National and Community Service (CNCS). Please direct inquiries about newer data to the CNCS. News release: Volunteering in the United States (HTML) (PDF) (Archives) Charts: Volunteer rate down slightly for the year ending in September 2015 (March 2016) Volunteering in 2014 (February 2015) Volunteering rate at 25.4 percent for year ending September 2013 (February 2014) Volunteering declines in 2012 (February 2013) Volunteer rate rises in 2011 (February 2012) Volunteering in 2010 (January 2011) Volunteering on the rise: September 2008-September 2009 (February 2010) Most frequent volunteer activities, 2008: fundraising, tutoring, and teaching (January 2009) Education and volunteering, 2007 (January 2008) Volunteering in 2007 (January 2008) Volunteering in the United States, 2005: a visual essay (PDF) Article: Volunteerism in the United States (August 2003) (PDF) Women Labor force, employment, and unemployment statistics for women. See also Families and marital status and Earnings by demographics. Database: Retrieve historical data series Annual tables: Complete list Employment by detailed occupation and sex (HTML) (PDF) (XLSX) Employment by detailed industry and sex (HTML) (PDF) (XLSX) Monthly and quarterly tables: Complete list Annual report: Highlights of Women's Earnings Highlights of Women's Earnings in 2018 (HTML) (PDF) (tables in XLSX) Highlights of Women's Earnings in 2017 (HTML) (PDF) (tables in XLSX) Highlights of Women's Earnings in 2016 (HTML) (PDF) (tables in XLSX) Highlights of Women's Earnings in 2015 (HTML) (PDF) (tables in XLSX) Earlier years (PDF only): 201 201 201 201 201 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 199 199 4 3 2 1 0 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 9 8 Annual report: Women in the Labor Force: A Databook HT 201 201 201 201 ML 9 8 7 6 - - - - 201 200 0 9 - - - - 201 9 PDF editi on 201 4 editi on 201 3 editi on 201 2 editi on 201 1 editi on 201 0 editi on 200 7 editi on 200 6 editi on 200 5 editi on 200 4 editi on 201 8 editi on 201 7 editi on 201 6 editi on 201 5 editi on 200 9 editi on 200 8 editi on Charts: Percentage of employed women working full time little changed over past 5 decades (December 2017) Women's and men's earnings by age in 2016 (August 2017) 39 percent of managers in 2015 were women (August 2016) Educational attainment and earnings of women (June 2014) Women's earnings, 1979-2012 (November 2013) Women as a percent of total employed in selected occupations, 2011 (May 2012) Employment status of parents, 2011 (April 2012) Educational attainment of women in the labor force, 1970-2010 (December 2011) Women in the labor force, 2010 (December 2011) Women at Work, Spotlight on Statistics (March 2011), includes CPS and other BLS survey data Women's earnings and employment by industry, 2009 (February 2011) Women in the labor force, 1970-2009 (January 2011) Women's-to-men's earnings ratio by age, 2009 (July 2010) Labor force participation rates among mothers, March 1975-2008 (May 2010) Labor force participation of women and mothers, 2008 (October 2009) Labor force participation of mothers with infants in 2008 (May 2009) Wives earning more than their husbands, 1967-2006 (January 2009) Labor force participation of mothers, 1975-2007 (January 2009) Women and employment by industry, 2007 (January 2009) Women at work: a visual essay (October 2003) (PDF) Articles: Women still underrepresented among highest earners (March 2006) (PDF) The labor force experience of women from 'Generation X' (March 2002) (PDF) Youth Labor force, employment, and unemployment statistics for youth ages 16 to 24. See also Age and School Enrollment. Database: Retrieve historical data series News release: Summer Employment and Unemployment Among Youth (Annual) (HTML) (PDF) (Archives) News release: College Enrollment and Work Activity of High School Graduates (Annual) (HTML) (PDF) (Archives) Charts: Youth labor force participation rate at 61.8 percent in July 2019, a 9-year high (August 2019) 55.0 percent of 16- to 24-year-olds employed in July 2018 (August 2018) Summer youth labor force in July 2017 (August 2017) Youth unemployment rate, 11.5 percent; employment-population ratio, 53.2 percent in July 2016 (August 2016) Summer youth employment in July 2015 (August 2015) Youth employment and unemployment, July 2014 (August 2014) Youth labor force participation rate in July 2013 same as a year earlier (August 2013) Youth employment in summer 2012 (August 2012) Youth employment in July 2011 (August 2011) School's Out, Spotlight on Statistics (July 2011), includes CPS and other BLS survey data Youth unemployment and employment in July 2010 (August 2010) Youth unemployment and employment in July 2009 (August 2009) Summer 2008 labor force participation of youth (September 2008) Unemployment among youth, Summer 2008 (August 2008) Articles: The early 2000s: a period of declining teen summer employment rates (May 2010) (PDF) Youth enrollment and employment during the school year (February 2008) (PDF) Declining teen labor force participation (September 2002) (PDF) Trends in Youth Employment: Data from the CPS; Report on the Youth Labor Force (November 2000) (PDF) Last Modified Date: May 5, 2020 America's Changing Religious Landscape The Christian share of the U.S. population is declining, while the number of U.S. adults who do not identify with any organized religion is growing, according to an extensive new survey by the Pew Research Center. Moreover, these changes are taking place across the religious landscape, affecting all regions of the country and many demographic groups. While the drop in Christian affiliation is particularly pronounced among young adults, it is occurring among Americans of all ages. The same trends are seen among whites, blacks and Latinos; among both college graduates and adults with only a high school education; and among women as well as men. (Explore the data with our interactive database tool.) To be sure, the United States remains home to more Christians than any other country in the world, and a large majority of Americans - roughly seven-in-ten - continue to identify with some branch of the Christian faith.1 But the major new survey of more than 35,000 Americans by the Pew Research Center finds that the percentage of adults (ages 18 and older) who describe themselves as Christians has dropped by nearly eight percentage points in just seven years, from 78.4% in an equally massive Pew Research survey in 2007 to 70.6% in 2014. Over the same period, the percentage of Americans who are religiously unaffiliated - describing themselves as atheist, agnostic or \"nothing in particular\" - has jumped more than six points, from 16.1% to 22.8%. And the share of Americans who identify with non-Christian faiths also has inched up, rising 1.2 percentage points, from 4.7% in 2007 to 5.9% in 2014. Growth has been especially great among Muslims and Hindus, albeit from a very low base. The drop in the Christian share of the population has been driven mainly by declines among mainline Protestants and Catholics. Each of those large religious traditions has shrunk by approximately three percentage points since 2007. The evangelical Protestant share of the U.S. population also has dipped, but at a slower rate, falling by about one percentage point since 2007.2 Even as their numbers decline, American Christians - like the U.S. population as a whole - are becoming more racially and ethnically diverse. Non-Hispanic whites now account for smaller shares of evangelical Protestants, mainline Protestants and Catholics than they did seven years earlier, while Hispanics have grown as a share of all three religious groups. Racial and ethnic minorities now make up 41% of Catholics (up from 35% in 2007), 24% of evangelical Protestants (up from 19%) and 14% of mainline Protestants (up from 9%). Religious intermarriage also appears to be on the rise: Among Americans who have gotten married since 2010, nearly four-in-ten (39%) report that they are in religiously mixed marriages, compared with 19% among those who got married before 1960.3 The rise in intermarriage appears to be linked with the growth of the religiously unaffiliated population. Nearly one-in-five people surveyed who got married since 2010 are either religiously unaffiliated respondents who married a Christian spouse or Christians who married an unaffiliated spouse. By contrast, just 5% of people who got married before 1960 fit this profile. Explore data on religious groups in the U.S. by affiliation, geographic and demographic information. While many U.S. religious groups are aging, the unaffiliated are comparatively young - and getting younger, on average, over time. As a rising cohort of highly unaffiliated Millennials reaches adulthood, the median age of unaffiliated adults has dropped to 36, down from 38 in 2007 and far lower than the general (adult) population's median age of 46.4 By contrast, the median age of mainline Protestant adults in the new survey is 52 (up from 50 in 2007), and the median age of Catholic adults is 49 (up from 45 seven years earlier). These are among the key findings of the Pew Research Center's second U.S. Religious Landscape Study, a follow-up to its first comprehensive study of religion in America, conducted in 2007. Because the U.S. census does not ask Americans about their religion, there are no official government statistics on the religious composition of the U.S. public.5 Some Christian denominations and other religious bodies keep their own rolls, but they use widely differing criteria for membership and sometimes do not remove members who have fallen away.6 Surveys of the general public frequently include a few questions about religious affiliation, but they typically do not interview enough people, or ask sufficiently detailed questions, to be able to describe the country's full religious landscape. The Religious Landscape Studies were designed to fill the gap. Comparing two virtually identical surveys, conducted seven years apart, can bring important trends into sharp relief. In addition, the very large samples in both 2007 and 2014 included hundreds of interviews with people from small religious groups that account for just 1% or 2% of the U.S. population, such as Mormons, Episcopalians and Seventh-day Adventists. This makes it possible to paint demographic and religious profiles of numerous denominations that cannot be described by smaller surveys. The most recent Religious Landscape Study also was designed to obtain a minimum of 300 interviews with respondents in each state and the District of Columbia as well as to represent the country's largest metropolitan areas, enabling an assessment of the religious composition not just of the nation as a whole, but also of individual states and localities. (See Appendix D.) The latest survey was conducted in English and Spanish among a nationally representative sample of 35,071 adults interviewed by telephone, on both cellphones and landlines, from June 4-Sept. 30, 2014. Findings based on the full sample have a margin of sampling error of plus or minus 0.6 percentage points. The survey is estimated to cover 97% of the non-institutionalized U.S. adult population; 3% of U.S. adults are not reachable by telephone or do not speak English or Spanish well enough to participate in the survey. (See Appendix A for more information on how the survey was conducted, margins of error for subgroups analyzed in this report and additional details.) Even a very small margin of error, when applied to the hundreds of millions of people living in the United States, can yield a wide range of estimates for the size of particular faiths. Nevertheless, the results of the second Religious Landscape Study indicate that Christians probably have lost ground, not only in their relative share of the U.S. population, but also in absolute numbers. A Note on Defining Religious Affiliation and the Study's Terminology In 2007, there were 227 million adults in the United States, and a little more than 78% of them - or roughly 178 million - identified as Christians. Between 2007 and 2014, the overall size of the U.S. adult population grew by about 18 million people, to nearly 245 million.7 But the share of adults who identify as Christians fell to just under 71%, or approximately 173 million Americans, a net decline of about 5 million. This decline is larger than the combined margins of sampling error in the twin surveys conducted seven years apart. Using the margins of error to calculate a probable range of estimates, it appears that the number of Christian adults in the U.S. has shrunk by somewhere between 2.8 million and 7.8 million.8 Of the major subgroups within American Christianity, mainline Protestantism - a tradition that includes the United Methodist Church, the American Baptist Churches USA, the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) and the Episcopal Church, among others - appears to have experienced the greatest drop in absolute numbers. In 2007, there were an estimated 41 million mainline Protestant adults in the United States. As of 2014, there are roughly 36 million, a decline of 5 million - although, taking into account the surveys' combined margins of error, the number of mainline Protestants may have fallen by as few as 3 million or as many as 7.3 million between 2007 and 2014.9 By contrast, the size of the historically black Protestant tradition - which includes the National Baptist Convention, the Church of God in Christ, the African Methodist Episcopal Church, the Progressive Baptist Convention and others - has remained relatively stable in recent years, at nearly 16 million adults. And evangelical Protestants, while declining slightly as a percentage of the U.S. public, probably have grown in absolute numbers as the overall U.S. population has continued to expand. The new survey indicates that churches in the evangelical Protestant tradition - including the Southern Baptist Convention, the Assemblies of God, Churches of Christ, the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, the Presbyterian Church in America, other evangelical denominations and many nondenominational congregations - now have a total of about 62 million adult adherents. That is an increase of roughly 2 million since 2007, though once the margins of error are taken into account, it is possible that the number of evangelicals may have risen by as many as 5 million or remained essentially unchanged.10 Like mainline Protestants, Catholics appear to be declining both as a percentage of the population and in absolute numbers. The new survey indicates there are about 51 million Catholic adults in the U.S. today, roughly 3 million fewer than in 2007. But taking margins of error into account, the decline in the number of Catholic adults could be as modest as 1 million.11 And, unlike Protestants, who have been decreasing as a share of the U.S. public for several decades, the Catholic share of the population has been relatively stable over the long term, according to a variety of other surveys (see Appendix C). Meanwhile, the number of religiously unaffiliated adults has increased by roughly 19 million since 2007. There are now approximately 56 million religiously unaffiliated adults in the U.S., and this group - sometimes called religious \"nones\" - is more numerous than either Catholics or mainline Protestants, according to the new survey. Indeed, the unaffiliated are now second in size only to evangelical Protestants among major religious groups in the U.S. Factors Behind the Changes in Americans' Religious Identification One of the most important factors in the declining share of Christians and the growth of the \"nones\" is generational replacement. As the Millennial generation enters adulthood, its members display much lower levels of religious affiliation, including less connection with Christian churches, than older generations. Fully 36% of young Millennials (those between the ages of 18 and 24) are religiously unaffiliated, as are 34% of older Millennials (ages 25-33). And fewer than six-in-ten Millennials identify with any branch of Christianity, compared with seven-in-ten or more among older generations, including Baby Boomers and Gen-Xers. Just 16% of Millennials are Catholic, and only 11% identify with mainline Protestantism. Roughly one-in-five are evangelical Protestants. However, generational replacement is by no means the only reason that religious \"nones\" are growing and Christians are declining. In addition, people in older generations are increasingly disavowing association with organized religion. About a third of older Millennials (adults currently in their late 20s and early 30s) now say they have no religion, up nine percentage points among this cohort since 2007, when the same group was between ages 18 and 26. Nearly a quarter of Generation Xers now say they have no particular religion or describe themselves as atheists or agnostics, up four points in seven years. Baby Boomers also have become slightly but noticeably more likely to identify as religious \"nones\" in recent years. As the shifting religious profiles of these generational cohorts suggest, switching religion is a common occurrence in the United States. If all Protestants were treated as a single religious group, then fully 34% of American adults currently have a religious identity different from the one in which they were raised. This is up six points since 2007, when 28% of adults identified with a religion different from their childhood faith. If switching among the three Protestant traditions (e.g., from mainline Protestantism to the evangelical tradition, or from evangelicalism to a historically black Protestant denomination) is added to the total, then the share of Americans who currently have a different religion than they did in childhood rises to 42%. By a wide margin, religious \"nones\" have experienced larger gains through religious switching than any other group. Nearly one-in-five U.S. adults (18%) were raised in a religious faith and now identify with no religion. Some switching also has occurred in the other direction: 9% of American adults say they were raised with no religious affiliation, and almost half of them (4.3% of all U.S. adults) now identify with some religion. But for every person who has joined a religion after having been raised unaffiliated, there are more than four people who have become religious \"nones\" after having been raised in some religion. This 1:4 ratio is an important factor in the growth of the unaffiliated population. By contrast, Christianity - and especially Catholicism - has been losing more adherents through religious switching than it has been gaining. More than 85% of American adults were