You helped me with the paper describe bellow and I was wondering if you can also help me with the PowerPoint slides.

About 10 slides

References can't be older than 5 Years. I need at least 6 references.

1. Body of the paper PT2 (The Fraud Triangle)

• Pressure/Incentive: What was Volkswagen gaining by cheating and deceiving its customers and regulators (diesel cars with a cleaner performance yet great fuel economy)
• Opportunity: Where were the regulators? Why did the emissions test fail to deliver true results (cheat mode) under EPA's oversight
• Rationale: What was Volkswagen allegations before pleading guilty

Running Head: VOLKSWAGEN EMISSION 1 Volkswagen Emission Name Tutor Course Date VOLKSWAGEN EMISSION 2 Abstract In the current global workplace, all executives and businesses must safeguard that their managers and employees make right and justifiable decisions for their own long standing interest as well as those of the environment and customers. Volkswagen has conventionally been acknowledged as a quality brand of automotive organization but now they will also remain to be recognized as a worldwide company that deliberately and determinedly deployed their car's software to fabricate data. They will be recognized as a company that cheated the United States government as well as the public concerning compliance with production standards. However, they got caught and will pay a hefty amount in handling this predicament. This deliberate outrage makes one think if government deception was deemed normal and suitable in Volkswagen business culture and how such operation can be vetoed in the future. This paper will provide an overview of the facts about the Volkswagen emissions crisis together with a discussion of the detrimental effects resulting from the outrage. The paper will also discuss why the emission test under the Environmental Protection Agency oversight failed to deliver true results as well as the Volkswagen's allegations before it pleaded guilty. Introduction Volkswagen is one of the world's largest automobile producers. The company was unable to manufacture diesel cars that had the perfect combination of performance; low-cost fuel and low effluence and therefore, it resolved all these by foregoing cleanliness and slackening the pollution controls. It attained this through software that was premeditated to deceive its regulators as well as its customers. This was generally illegitimate and eventually the company was caught. The company is alleged to have been caught cheating on American air pollution tests. The allegations were made by the United States Conservational Protection Support group VOLKSWAGEN EMISSION 3 after independent investigators raised questions about the releases levels, instigating the government interventions to investigate further. In most of the United States America, cheating on supervisory testing has a long history. It happens often in the automobile productions control and elsewhere but for the case of Volkswagen, cheating was preprogrammed into the system that controlled the automobile's emissions. Volkswagen has been cheating in emission tests to make its diesel cars seem less contaminating than they really are. For many years, most of the Volkswagen diesel cars comprised of a software that turned their effluence controls on only when the cars were being verified by the regulators (Barrett et al., 2015). The software was customized in a way that it regulated mechanisms such as catalytic converters or the faucets used to reuse some of the exhaust gasses. It detected when the car was being verified and then triggered the equipment that reduced the emissions. However, the software turned the equipment down when driving thus increasing the emissions far above the authorized bounds presumably to save fuel or to improve the vehicle' stoning force and speeding up (Barrett et al., 2015). The vehicle's computer could save diesel by letting more waste products to pass through the exhaust system. Research shows that, fuel saving is one possible cause that Volkswagen's software could have been changed to make cars pollute more. What they wanted to achieve out of this is that the effluence control probably had an adverse effect on the car's overall resilience. They made the locomotives run hotter and made the cars exhaust faster and this caused the automobiles to get worse gas mileage than it would have without the effluence control (Hakim & Bradsher, 2015). The alleged reasons as to why Volkswagen decided to cheat is that they could not find a mechanical solution within the company's budget so as to manufacture diesel engines that would VOLKSWAGEN EMISSION 4 meet the United States emission canons. Volkswagen had to depend on its diesels so as to meet United States fuel proficiency ideals since it had nothing else. Conforming with the standards by fitting social corporate responsibility to its volume cars, which would elevate their price, decrease their performance as well as lowering their fuel budget is all what they could have done. Even after the engineers found a solution, they went on cheating instead of employing it. Diesels were indeed more cost-effective since it needed two distinct power trains which are power-driven and gasoline which were very pricey as compared to hybrids (Barrett et al., 2015). What Volkswagen gained by cheating and deceiving their customers is that they were able to produce cars that drove well with the reduced emissions control with better acceleration as well as better fuel economy. While other automobile producers engaged in electric cars and hybrids, Volkswagen had for a long time used its green-technology chips on diesels. The company was also obsessed in its desire for size, which it gained after cheating its customers and regulators. It was passionate about getting better than Toyota and becoming the world's biggest car company regardless of making little money from its high-volume goods. This necessitated the company to upsurge its small share of the American market, which is the largest after China (Barrett et al., 2015). Diesel fuel has more energy for every gallon as compared to petrol and the diesel locomotives work more competently. While diesel cars produce less carbon dioxide emissions, they also release more nitrogen oxide which form smoke and particulate substances that can harm the lungs. In the past, Europe has dealt with this trade-off by inflicting comparatively loose emission standards on diesel vehicles in search of improved fuel economy. At the same time, the diesel technology has progressively been getting virtuous through a combination of lower VOLKSWAGEN EMISSION 5 Sulphur fuel, innovative appliances as well as innovative productions control technology (Olden Kamp, Zelm & Huijbregts, 2016). The United Kingdom, Italy, France, South Korea, Canada and, Germany have begun investigations. All over the world, politicians, regulators and conservational groups are enquiring the validity of Volkswagen's emissions testing. The regulators elevated concerns about Volkswagen's discharges levels, but these were dismissed by the company as mechanical issues and unpredicted real-world conditions. The Environmental Protection Agency tests have recognized profile and practices. In most occasions, the test cars are placed on rollers and run at a certain pace for a certain time, then at another known speed for another known period. The vehicle' s main computer can perceive whether inputs go with those expected in the test conditions (Olden Kamp, Zelm & Huijbregts, 2016). The emission test failed to deliver true results because the company was trying to use this technology to try to game the United States Environmental Protection Agency's restrained emissions certification process. Most cars use the software-controlled systems to regulate the engine releases when the vehicle requires more engine power to clamber a steep slope or pulling a weighty load. Systems automated into these machines determine when a vehicle needs to be boosted by evaluating the temperature of the engine as well as rotations per minute, speed of the vehicle, transmission gear and other conditions. According to Hakim & Bradsher (2015), apart of the problem is that, the controllers tests these cars under laboratory environments positioning them on a huge treadmill and necessitating them to do a sequence of operations. Along with the fact that the car manufacturers are evolving continually more sumptuous software that can regulate and refine tune locomotives, there are more than enough opportunities for deception. VOLKSWAGEN EMISSION 6 In real sense, the system failed to syndicate good fuel economy with compliant nitrogen oxide emissions to program the Engine Control Unit in order to shift from good fuel economy and high nitrogen oxide emissions to low emissions compliant mode when it noticed an emissions test. This caused the engine to produce nitrogen oxide to the levels above limits in daily operations but conform with the United States nitrogen oxide standards only when being tested instituting a defeat device. The underlying matter that Volkswagen was trying to resolve is that, the catalytic converter technology has been very efficient in plummeting nitrogen oxide in petrol engine exhausts owing to its moderately high proportions of oxygen (Oldenkamp, Zelm & Huijbregts, 2016). The exhaust gas recirculation that is one of the technologies that Volkswagen employs decreases both fuel efficiency and power which car owner don't like. Research shows that this recirculation was one thing that the software turned off when the managers were not observing. Selective catalytic reduction that is used in some latest cars reacts nitrogen oxide with ammonia thus reducing the subsequent level of effluence by a great deal. But devising, mounting and operating these systems all puts an extra cost to the car (Hakim & Bradsher, 2015). A car manufacturer's authorized staff naturally confers the Auxiliary Emission Control Devices performance with the Environmental Protection Agency or straight with a state agency. They must meet emissions factors that are reputable by such agencies so, as to sell their vehicles in the United States. These negotiations sound ordinary but they are very secretive. More severe productions controls make vehicles less fuel effective, which patrons may not like and the aptitude to ease such limits can bestow a competitive advantage. When automobile industries surpass their negotiated productions restrictions, it is often a mistake (Oldenkamp, Zelm & Huijbregts, 2016). Volkswagen may have failed to fabricate its vehicles to produce suitable VOLKSWAGEN EMISSION 7 emissions levels under entirely testing conditions or they basically were not knowledgeable of the precise conditions. Productions testing should be enhanced by offering car manufacturers with superior transparency pertaining the conditions they will face in the course of the testing. Regardless of the complications with the present approach to emissions testing, Volkswagen problems were evidently not the result of a mistake. The company secretively connected extra Auxiliary Emission Control Devices in five types of four chamber diesels that were not itemized in their submission for emissions authorization. These systems contained a system that used navigation wheel position, vehicle speed, locomotive operation length and atmospheric pressure to find out when the automobile was being verified so, that it could dial back productions to meet the Environmental Protection Agency benchmarks. However, during usual driving situations, those automobiles' locomotive power would be humped up by plummeting the efficiency of the production control system. This produced up to forty times the amount of smoke producing nitrogen oxides allowed by the United States Clean Air Act (Schiermeier, 2015). The European Commission that is deemed to supervise the execution of its own regulation made no effort to get the defeat devices in its research work into emissions testing that also led to the test failure to deliver true results. Schiermeier (2015) has argued its emphasis was on offering legislation that would reduce defeat devices futile. The European Union implemented law that would change the testing for nitrogen oxide productions away from research laboratory and on to the roads where software artifices should attest unusable. Through this long delay in improving the nitrogen testing rule, the European Commission's researchers presaged that the defeat devices could distort the laboratory test results. VOLKSWAGEN EMISSION 8 National consultants have offered a variety of reasons why they have not searched for defeat devices during the authorization of new automobiles. The German authorities said they only had a directive to manage the current European Union context on nitrogen oxide productions through research laboratory tests and could not perform their own on-the-road testing. A substantial inconsistency in automobile's nitrogen oxide production during laboratory and the resultant on the road tests would indicate the use of a defeat device something the Environment Protection Agency acknowledged with Volkswagen in the United States (Hakim & Bradsher, 2015). The federal prosecutors announced criminal charges against the Volkswagen executives for their roles in the company's emissions cheating scandal. The company lawfully pleaded guilty to charges of scheme to compel wire scam, customs defilements and also the obstruction of justice. Volkswagen conceded to using incorrect records to import vehicles to the United States and impeding inspections when the authorities became apprehensive of the productions levels from the diesel locomotives (Hakim & Bradsher, 2015). The firm is also accused of partaking in a scheme to swindle the United States and its American customers, as well as breaking the Clean Air Act by using cheating software in its cars. The company has also been accused by the Environmental Protection Agency for moderating software on the three-liter diesel locomotives installed to some Porsche and Audi as well as Volkswagen models. It however refused the allegations, which affect at least 10,000 cars (Hakim & Bradsher, 2015). Volkswagen declared that about eleven million diesel cars worldwide were equipped with alleged defeat devices, entrenched systems used to game emissions. The reimbursement pushes the cost of the outrage to more than $23 billion in the United States and Canada and this will force the company to raise the funds set aside to pay forfeits and compensate the affected VOLKSWAGEN EMISSION 9 customers (Hakim & Bradsher, 2015). Under the provisions of the petition agreement that must be acknowledged by the court, Volkswagen will plead guilty to all these delinquencies and will be under an independent corporate conformity monitor who will supervise the company for at least three years and agrees to wholly liaise with the current Justice Department's investigation and prosecution of persons responsible for these delinquencies (Burki, 2015). The emissions deceiving dented the authentic status of German engineering and this endangered the feasibility of a company that competes with Toyota Motor Company as the world's major car manufacturer. Volkswagen constrained to undertake investigations and charges as quickly as possible, while thriving to refurbish its reputation with car buyers and merchants. It is today vending more vehicles and trucks than before, offsetting declines in the United States with strong sales in China. The company and its administrators are still under investigation in Germany and it faces the investor litigations at home and in the United States (Hakim & Bradsher, 2015). Volkswagen's tries to escape the emissions standards and import deceptively certified cars into the country. This characterizes an egregious destruction of our nation's ecological, customer protection as well as the financial laws. Today's actions replicate the Department of Justice unwavering commitment to protecting consumers, caring for the environment and the financial organization as well as detaining the individuals and companies responsible for corporate offence(Burki, 2015. The Volkswagen charge of guilt hits analysts as both an indication of the strength of the government's case and the steadfast route for an automaker attempting to escape negative headlines that have poured out for more than a year since the outrage broke. It also stands in VOLKSWAGEN EMISSION 10 divergence to current cases relating other automakers including Toyota's difficulty with the abrupt acceleration of its cars (Burki, 2015). According to Burki, (2015), the company has been mortified by the United States authorities, penalized for using illegitimate software to cover the level of discharges produced by its diesel power-driven cars. Not only has it been hit with hefty charges, but as well had to plead guilty to offending charges and sign to a Statement of Facts which is an approved edition of procedures that sets out exactly what the company did wrong. Some of the regulators are now facing charges over their alleged role in the issue and the prosecutors have already made it clear they deem that senior persons were entailed in efforts to conceal what was going on (Burki, 2015). Conclusion In summary, Volkswagen's cheating on emissions is widely being debated in terms of its effects on the global economy. German car sales might drop and the brand could suffer in general internationally. In real sense, the incident not only demonstrates how not to do business, but also advises what should be done. Basically, at the directive of the German government and supplicants for the German locomotive manufacturing, the European Union has turned a blind eye to signals of this deceiving. The company has been demeaned by the United State authorities andpenalized for using illegitimate software to cover the level of discharges produced by its diesel power-driven cars. Volkswagen intended to become the biggest car company in the. Specifically, the goal was to surpass Toyota, whose Prius was a hot seller in the United States particularly. Instead of coming up with accurately innovative technology like hybrid cars, Volkswagen remained with diesel and Germany's best wangles could not get it to work at the right price hence the conspiracy. VOLKSWAGEN EMISSION 11 References Barrett, S. R., Speth, R. L., Eastham, S. D., Dedoussi, I. C., Ashok, A., Malina, R., & Keith, D. W. (2015). Impact of the Volkswagen emissions control defeat device on US public health. Environmental Research Letters, 10(11), 114005. Burki, T. K. (2015). Diesel cars and health: the Volkswagen emissions scandal. The Lancet Respiratory Medicine, 3(11), 838-839. Hakim, D., & Bradsher, K. (2015). After Volkswagen Revelation, Auto Emissions Tests Come Under Global Scrutiny. The New York Times (Sept 24, 2015). Available at: http://www. ny times. com/2015/09/25/business/international/volkswa gen-emissions-pollution- regulations. html. Oldenkamp, R., van Zelm, R., & Huijbregts, M. A. (2016). Valuing the human health damage caused by the fraud of Volkswagen. Environmental Pollution, 212, 121-127. Schiermeier, Q. (2015). The science behind the Volkswagen emissions scandal. Nature News, 25