Your friend asks you (1) why debtor countries are staying away from using Covid-19 Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSS) despite its potential financial benefit to them, (2) why is restructuring of international bonds issued by sub-sovereigns (such as provinces) and state-owned enterprises (SOE) harder than restructuring of sovereign bonds (Table 1), (3) why holdout behavior cannot be fully prevented under the single-limb voting mechanism in some countries (Table 2), (4) why is restructuring of Venezuelan debt highly complex? 0- 0.4 0.4- 0.8 0.8- 1.2 1.2. 1.6 1.6- 2.0 2.0- 2.4 Table 1: SOE and Sub-National International Bond Issuance (billions of dollars) Table 2: Minimum Bond Purchase for Holdouts In Low Income Countries (billion $) Number of Low Income Countries 2009 20 13 1 2 2 2014 2019 79 140 Your friend asks you (1) why debtor countries are staying away from using Covid-19 Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSS) despite its potential financial benefit to them, (2) why is restructuring of international bonds issued by sub-sovereigns (such as provinces) and state-owned enterprises (SOE) harder than restructuring of sovereign bonds (Table 1), (3) why holdout behavior cannot be fully prevented under the single-limb voting mechanism in some countries (Table 2), (4) why is restructuring of Venezuelan debt highly complex? 0- 0.4 0.4- 0.8 0.8- 1.2 1.2. 1.6 1.6- 2.0 2.0- 2.4 Table 1: SOE and Sub-National International Bond Issuance (billions of dollars) Table 2: Minimum Bond Purchase for Holdouts In Low Income Countries (billion $) Number of Low Income Countries 2009 20 13 1 2 2 2014 2019 79 140