Your job is to brief the attached case: Eldred v. Ashcroft. See the attached steps on how to brief a case and also the example of Branzburg v. Hayes case brief for help. A brief ideally should not exceed one page in length (one and a half in a bind)

How to brief a case:

1. Cause of action (onee sentence)

Is it an action for an injunction or an action for damages? what is the nature of the underlying complaint?

2. Facts (max threee sentences)

the essential facts that initially led to the legal conflict. Just the legally relevant facts.

3. Proceeding below (max twoo sentences)

The decisions of the courts and agencies that decided the case before it was appealed to the current court.

4. Issue(s) (max threee sentences)

The legal question(s) for the court to answer. Should be stated in the form of a question.

5. Holding(s) (max twoo sentences)

Answers to the legal question(s) posted in the issue(s). States how the case was decided on appeal.

6. Reasoning (as many sentences as possible)

Explain why the court arrived at its decision. Give all the reasons that the court gives for the rulings.

Branzburg v. Haves Cause of Action: Appeal to determine whether reporters have a privilege not to give evidence before a grand jury and for an injunction against the court forcing the reporters to disclose information. Facts: Branzburg was called to testify before a grand jury about illegal activities that he had written articles about. Since he had promised his sources confidentiality, he moved to quash the summons, Pappas was allowed to take photographs of a Black Panther news conference as long as he did not disclose anvthing he saw or heard. Therefore, when summoned before the Grand Jury he refused to answer questions claiming a reporters' privilege. Caldwell, a reporter assigned to cover stories involving radical groups, also moved to guash a subpoena requiring him to appear before a grand jury with his notes and tape recordings. Proceedings Below: The lower courts in Branzburg and Pappas did not recognize a constitutional reporter's privilege. The lower court in Caldwell, however, recognized a constitutional privilege. Issue: Whether requiring newsmen to appear and testify before state or federal grand juries abridges the freedom of speech and press guaranteed by the First Amendment? Holding: No. The First Amendment does not guarantee a constitutional reporter's privilege not to testify before a grand jury, Branzburg and Pappas affirmed; Caldwell reversed. Reasoning: 1. Newsmen have no constitutional right to access scenes of crime where the general public 15 not allowed, nor do they have immunity from the application of general laws. The only testimonial privilege, provided by the 5% Amendment, is that against self incrimination. Reporters do not have a testimonial privilege. 3. The public interest in law enforcement and prosecuting current criminal activity outweighs the burden on newsgathering on future news about crime said to result from the requirement that reporters appear before grand juries. 4. The press' right to withhold news is not equivalent to an exemption from furnishing information to a grand jury, 3. Journalists have a duty like any other citizen to come in and present whatever evidence they have to Grand Jury. 6. The countrv has always operated without a constitutional privilege for the press and the press has flourished. 7. The administration of a reporter's privilege would lead to the problem of defining categories of newsmen to be protectad. 8. There is no intrusion on the right to speech or assembly and reporters are still free to seek news from any source by means within the law. b ELDRED V. ASHCROFT Supreme Court of the United States, 2003 123 S. Ct. 769 Justice GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court. This case concerns the authority the Constitution assigns to Congress to prescribe the duration of copyrights. The Copyright and Patent Clause of the Constitution, Art. 1, $8, cl. 8, provides as to copyrights: "Congress shall have Power ... [tjo promote the Progress of Science ... by securing [to Authors] for limited Times ... the exclusive Right to their ... Writings." In 1998, in the measure here under inspection, Congress enlarged the duration of copyrights by twenty years. Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA) (amending 17 U. S. C. $5302, 304). As in the case of prior extensions, principally in 1831, 1909, and 1976, Congress provided for application of the enlarged terms to existing and future copyrights alike. Petitioners are individuals and businesses whose products or services build on copyrighted works that have gone into the public domain. They seek a determination that the CTEA fails constitutional review under both the Copyright Clause's "limited Times" prescription and the First Amendment's free speech guarantee. Under the 1976 Copyright Act, copyright protection generally lasted from the work's creation until fifty years after the author's death. Under the CTEA, most copyrights now run from creation until seventy years after the author's death. Petitioners do not challenge the "life-plus-seventy-years" time span itself. "Whether fifty years is enough, or seventy years too much," they acknowledge, "is not a judgment meet for this Court." Congress went awry, petitioners maintain, not with respect to newly created works, but in enlarging the term for published works with existing copyrights. The "limited Time]" in effect when a copyright is secured, petitioners urge, becomes the constitutional boundary, a clear line beyond the power of Congress to extend. As to the First Amendment, petitioners contend that the CTEA is a content-neutral regulation of speech that fails inspection under the heightened judicial scrutiny appropriate for such regulations.... We evaluate petitioners' challenge to the constitutionality of the CTEA against the backdrop of Congress' previous exercises of its authority under the Copyright Clause. The Nation's hist copyright statute, enacted in 1790, provided a federal copyright term of fourteen years from the date of publication, renewable for an additional fourteen years if the author survived the first term. The 1790 Act's renewable fourteen-year term applied to existing works (i.e., works already published and works created but not yet published) and future works alike. Congress expanded the federal copyright term to forty-two years in 1831 (twenty-eight years from publication, renewable for an additional fourteen years),and to fifty-six years in 1909 (twenty-eight years from publication, renewable for an additional twenty-eight years). Both times, Congress applied the new copyright term to existing and future works. In 1976, Congress altered the method for computing federal copyright terms. For works created by identified natural persons, the 1976 Act provided that federal copyright protection would run from the work's creation, not-as in the 1790, 1831, and 1909 Acts-its publication; protection would last until fifty years after the author's death. In these respects, the 1976 Act aligned United States copyright terms with the then-dominant international standard adopted under the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works. For anonymous works, pseudonymous works, and works made for hire, the 1976 Act provided a term of seventy-five years from publication or 100 years. from creation, whichever expired first. These new copyright terms, the 1976 Act instructed, governed all works not published by its effective date of January 1, 1978, regardless of when the works were created. For published works with existing copyrights as of that date, the 1976 Act granted a copyright term of seventy-five years from the date of publication, a nineteen- year increase over the fifty-six-year term applicable under the 1909 Act. The measure at issue here, the CTEA, installed the fourth major duration extension of federal copyrights. Retaining the general structure of the 1976 Act, the CTEA enlarges the terms of all existing and future copyrights by twenty years.... This standard harmonizes the baseline United States copyright term with the term adopted by the European Union in 1993.... ... For works published before 1978 with existing copyrights as of the CTEA's effective date, the CTEA extends the term to ninety-five years from publication. Thus, in common with the 1831, 1909, and 1976 Acts, the CTEA's new terms apply to both future and existing copyrights. B ... [The District Court entered judgment for the Attorney General (respondent here ) . ... The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed.... We granted certiorari to address two questions: whether the CTEA's extension of existing copyrights exceeds Congress' power under the Copyright Clause; and whether the CTEA's extension of existing and future copyrights violates the First Amendment. We now answer those two questions in the negative and affirm.A We address first the determination of the courts below that Congress has authority under the Copyright Clause to extend the terms of existing copyrights. Text, 164 history, and precedent, we conclude, confirm that the Copyright Clause empowers Congress to prescribe "limited Times" for copyright protection and to secure the same level and duration of protection for all copyright holders, present and future. The CTEA's baseline term of life plus seventy years, petitioners concede, qualifies as a "limited Tim[e]" as applied to future copyrights. Petitioners contend, however, that existing copyrights extended to endure for that same term are not "limited." . ..' . Petitioners' argument essentially reads into the text of the Copyright Clause the command that a time prescription, once set, becomes forever "fixed" or "inalterable." The word "limited." however, does not convey a meaning so constricted. ... [A] time span appropriately "limited" as applied to future copyrights does not automatically cease to be "limited" when applied to existing copyrights.... To comprehend the scope of Congress' power under the Copyright Clause, "a page of history is worth a volume of logic." History reveals an unbroken congressional practice of granting to authors of works with existing copyrights the benefit of term extensions so that all under copyright protection will be governed evenhandedly under the same regime. As earlier recounted, the First Congress accorded the protections of the Nation's first federal copyright statute to existing and future works alike....Congress' consistent historical practice of applying newly enacted copyright terms to future and existing copyrights reflects a judgment stated concisely by Representative Huntington at the time of the 1831 Act: "[J]ustice, policy, and equity alike forbfid]" that an "author who had sold his {work) a week ago, be placed in a worse situation than the author who should sell his work the day after the passing of [the] act.\" The CTEA follows this historical practice by keeping the duration provisions of the 1976 Act largely in place and simply adding twenty years to each of them. Guided by text, history, and precedent, we cannot agree with petitioners' submission that extending the duration of existing copyrights is categorically beyond Cengress' authority under the Copyright Clause. Satisfied that the CTEA complies with the "limited Times" prescription, we turn now to whether it is a rational exercise of the legislative authority conferred by the Copyright Clause. On that point, we defer substantially to Congress.. .. The CTEA reflects judgments of a kind Congress typically makes, judgments we cannot disrniss as outside the Legislature's domain. As respondent describes, a key factor in the CTEA's passage was a 1993 European Union (EU) directive instructing EU members to establish a copyright term of life plus seventy years. Consistent with the Berne Convention, the EU directed its members to deny this longer term to the works of - any non-EU country whose laws did not secure the same extended term. By extending the baseline United States copyright term to life plus seventy years, Congress sought to ensure that American authors would receive the same copyright protection in Europe as their Evropean counterparts. .. - i Tid policy judgments ol 1his otder, however debatable or arguably unwise they may be. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the CTEAwhich continues the unbroken congressional practice of treating future and existing copyrights in parity for term extension purposes-is an impermissible exercise of Congress' power under the Copyright Clause. B Petitioners' Copyright Clause arguments rely on several novel readings of the Clause. We next address these arguments and explain why we find them unpersuasive. Petitioners contend that even if the CTEA's twenty-year term extension is literally a "limited Time]," permitting Congress to extend existing copyrights allows it to evade the "limited Times" constraint by creating effectively perpetual copyrights through repeated extensions. We disagree. As the Court of Appeals observed, a regime of perpetual copyrights "clearly is not the situation before us." Nothing before this Court warrants construction of the CTEA's twenty-year term extension as a congressional attempt to evade or override the "limited Times" constraint Critically, we again emphasize, petitioners fail to show how the CTEA crosses a constitutionally significant threshold with respect to "limited Times" that the 1831, 1909, and 1976 Acts did not.... N . . . ... [Pletitioners contend that the CTEA's extension of existing copyrights does not "promote the Progress of Science" as contemplated by the preambular language of the Copyright Clause. ... [T]hey maintain that the preambular language identifies the sole end to which Congress may legislate; accordingly, they conclude, the meaning of "limited Times" must be "determined in light of that specified end." The CTEA's extension of existing copyrights categorically fails to "promote the Progress of Science," petitioners argue, because it does not stimulate the creation of new works but merely adds value to works already created. As petitioners point out, we have described the Copyright Clause as "both a grant of power and a limitation" and have said that "[the primary objective of copyright" is "[to promote the Progress of Science." The "constitutional command," we have recognized, is that Congress, to the extent it enacts copyright laws at all, create a "system" that "promote(s] the Progress of Science." We have also stressed, however, that it is generally for Congress, not the courts, to decide how best to pursue the Copyright Clause's objectives. The justifications we earlier set out for Congress' enactment of the CTEA provide a rational basis for the conclusion that the CTEA "promote[s] the Progress of Science."... For the several reasons stated, we find no Copyright Clause impediment to the CTEA's extension of existing copyrights