Exercise 22.29. * Consider a society consisting of three individuals, 1, 2 and 3 and a resource of size 1. The three individuals vote over how to distribute the resource among themselves and each individual prefers more of the resource for himself and does not care about consumption by the other two. Since all of the resource will be distributed among the three individuals, we can represent the menu of policies as {(x1, x2) : x1 ≥ 0, x2 ≥ 0 and x1 + x2 ≤ 1}, where xi denotes the share of the resource consumed by individual i. A policy vector (x1, x2) is accepted if it receives two votes. (1) Show that individual preferences over policy vectors do not satisfy single crossing or the conditions in Exercise 22.28. (2) Show that there does not exist a policy vector that it is a Condorcet winner.