The Pinto was a rush project. Ordinarily, auto manufacturers work to blend the engineering concerns with the
Question:
The Pinto was a rush project. Ordinarily, auto manufacturers work to blend the engineering concerns with the style preferences of consumers that they determine from marketing surveys. As a result, the placement of the Pinto fuel tank was dictated by style, not engineering. The preferred practice in Europe and Japan was to locate the gas tank over the rear axle in subcompacts because a small vehicle has less "crush space" between the rear axle and the bumper than larger cars. \({ }^{43}\) The Pinto's styling, however, required the tank to be placed behind the rear axle, leaving only 9 to 10 inches of "crush space"-far less than in any other American automobile or Ford overseas subcompact.
In addition, the Pinto's bumper was little more than a chrome strip, less substantial than the bumper of any other American car produced then or later. The Pinto's rear structure also lacked reinforcing longitudinal side members, known as "hat sections," and horizontal cross members running between them, such as those in larger cars produced by Ford. The result of these style-driven changes was that the Pinto was less crush-resistant than other vehicles. An additional problem was that the Pinto's differential housing had an exposed flange and bolt heads. These resulting protrusions meant that a gas tank driven forward against the differential by a rear impact would be punctured. \({ }^{44}\)
Pinto prototypes were built and tested. Ford tested these prototypes, as well as two production Pintos, to determine the integrity of the fuel system in rear-end accidents. It also tested to see whether the Pinto would meet a proposed federal regulation requiring all automobiles manufactured in 1972 to be able to withstand a 20-mile-per-hour fixedbarrier impact and those made after January 1, 1973, to withstand a 30-mile-per-hour fixed-barrier impact without significant fuel spillage. \({ }^{45}\)
The crash tests revealed that the Pinto's fuel system as designed could not meet the proposed 20-mile-per-hour standard. When mechanical prototypes were struck from the rear with a moving barrier at 21 miles per hour, the fuel tanks were driven forward and punctured, causing fuel leakage in excess of the proposed regulation standard. A production Pinto crashing at 21 miles per hour into a fixed barrier resulted in the fuel neck being torn from the gas tank and the tank being punctured by a bolt head on the differential housing. In at least one test, spilled fuel entered the driver's compartment through gaps resulting from the separation of the seams joining the rear wheel wells to the floor pan. Other vehicles Ford tested, including modified or reinforced mechanical Pinto prototypes, proved safe at speeds at which the Pinto failed. Vehicles in which rubber bladders had been installed in the tank and were then crashed into fixed barriers at 21 miles per hour had no leakage from punctures in the gas tank. Vehicles with fuel tanks installed above rather than behind the rear axle passed the fuel system integrity test at 31 miles per hour against a fixed barrier. A Pinto with two longitudinal hat sections added to firm up the rear structure passed a 20 -mile-per-hour fixed-barrier test with no fuel leakage. \({ }^{46}\).
The vulnerability of the Pinto's fuel tank at speeds of 20 and 30 miles per hour in fixed-barrier tests could have been remedied inexpensively, but Ford produced and sold the Pinto without doing anything to fix the defects. Among the design changes that could have been made were side and cross members at \(\$ 2.40\) and \(\$ 1.80\) per car, respectively; a shockabsorbent "flak suit" to protect the tank at \$4; a tank within a tank and placement of the tank over the axle at \(\$ 5.08\) to \(\$ 5.79\); a nylon bladder within the tank at \(\$ 5.25\) to \(\$ 8\); placement of the tank over the axle surrounded with a protective barrier at \(\$ 9.59\) per car; imposition of a protective shield between the differential housing and the tank at \$2.35; improvement and reinforcement of the bumper at \(\$ 2.60\); and addition of eight inches of crush space at a cost of \(\$ 6.40\). Equipping the car with a reinforced rear structure, smooth axle, improved bumper, and additional crush space at a total of \(\$ 15.30\) would have made the fuel tank safe when hit from the rear by a vehicle the size of a Ford Galaxy. If, in addition, a bladder or tank within a tank had been used or if the tank had been protected with a shield, the tank would have been safe in a rear-end collision of 40 to 45 miles per hour. If the tank had been located over the rear axle, it would have been safe in a rear impact at 50 miles per hour or more. \({ }^{47}\)//................
Discussion Questions
1. If you had been one of the engineers who were concerned, what would you have done differently?
2. Do you think there was anything you could have done?
Step by Step Answer:
Business Ethics Case Studies And Selected Readings
ISBN: 9780357453865
9th Edition
Authors: Marianne M. Jennings