3. Before the enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1367, a compulsory counterclaim fell within the ancillary jurisdiction of the federal court and so did not require an independent basis of subject-matter jurisdiction; by contrast a permissive counterclaim did require an independent basis of jurisdiction. See Great Lakes Rubber Corp. v. Herbert Cooper Co., 286 F.2d 631, 633–34 (3d Cir. 1961), explaining that the test for whether ancillary jurisdiction exists is the same as whether a counterclaim is compulsory and that both doctrines “are designed to abolish the same evil, viz., piecemeal litigation in the federal courts.” With the enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1367, some circuits have held that supplemental jurisdiction may be exercised over any counterclaim, whether permissive or compulsory, that logically is “so related” to the claim over which original jurisdiction exists as to form one case or controversy.

See Note 2, p. 329, supra.