A Question of Ethics A troublesome issue concerning the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination has to do with the extent to which trickery by law enforcement offi cers during an interrogation may overwhelm a suspect’s will to avoid self-incrimination. For example, in one case two offi cers questioned Charles McFarland, who was incarcerated in a state prison, about his connection to a handgun that had been used to shoot two other offi cers. McFarland was advised of his rights but was not asked whether he was willing to waive those rights. Instead, to induce McFarland to speak, the offi cers deceived him into believing that

“[n]obody is going to give you charges,” and he made incriminating admissions. He was indicted for possessing a handgun as a convicted felon. [United States v. McFarland, 424 F.Supp.2d 427 (N.D.N.Y.

2006)]

1 Review the discussion of Miranda v. Arizona in this chapter’s Landmark in the Law feature on page 163. Should McFarland’s statements be suppressed—that is, not be admissible at trial—because he was not asked whether he was willing to waive his rights before he made his selfincriminating statements? Does the Miranda rule apply to McFarland’s situation?

2 Do you think that it is fair for the police to resort to trickery and deception to bring those who may have committed crimes to justice? Why or why not? What rights or public policies must be balanced in deciding this issue?