1. The employees in this case pointed to the fact that Integrity could have greatly reduced the amount of time for screening to just a few minutes by employing more personnel and metal detectors. Should the Court have given more weight to that fact? Why or why not?

2. What did the Court identify as the error made by the Court of Appeals? Why was it important? 

3. Is this decision consistent with the objectives of the FLSA? Does it protect workers from unfair and harsh treatment by an employer? Should Congress or the Department of Labor define work hours more carefully?  How would you craft a definition?

Madden, O’Bar, and Wortman were hired by Lumber One Home Center (Lumber One) to serve as supervisors and managers in a newly established Lumber One store. The employees were salaried, labeled as executives, and classified by Lumber One as  exempt  from overtime pay under  the  FLSA provision that exempted “any employee employed in a bonafide executive, administrative, or professional capacity” from over-time pay requirements. In anticipation of the new store opening, Madden and O’Bar assembled shelves and received merchandise. Once the store opened, Madden and O’Bar completed data entry tasks and helped out in the lumberyard by assisting customers, unloading trucks, and collecting trash when needed. Wortman worked in the lumberyard and waited on customers, helped load trucks, and on occasion would direct the truck drivers regarding where to make deliveries. The parties agreed that the plaintiffs worked overtime throughout their employment at Lumber One. However, because Lumber One classified
Madden, O’Bar, and Wortman as executives, the employees were not paid overtime.

Madden, O’Bar, and Wortman filed suit against Lumber One claiming they were improperly classified as executives rather than as employees and therefore were entitled to overtime pay under the FLSA. The jury found in favor of Lumber One, but the trial court overturned the jury’s verdict and ruled in favor of the employees. Lumber One appealed the court’s ruling.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ruled in favor of Madden and O’Bar but reversed the trial court’s ruling relating to Wortman. The court reasoned that in order to qualify for an executive exemption, Lumber One must show, among other things, that the exempt employees had the authority to hire or fire employees, or that their recommendations regarding personnel decisions were given particular weight by the decision maker. Since Lumber One’s owner made all of the hiring and firing decisions at the store and did not consult Madden or O’Bar, the court reasoned that Lumber One did not satisfy the “authority” test or the “particular weight” required to exempt an employee from FLSA coverage. The court rejected Lumber One’s argument that the owner’s informal solicitation of input from existing employees about an applicant was sufficient to meet the exemption requirements. 

In the case of Wortman, the court ruled that Lumber One had made a sufficient showing that Wort-man had been involved in recommending at least one driver to Lumber One’s owner. Therefore, the court held that Wortman could reasonably be classified as a supervisor who is exempt from overtime under the FLSA. 

“[Lumber One’s owner] testified that none of the plaintiffs hired or fired other employees. Therefore, in order to satisfy the fourth element, Lumber One needed to present evidence at trial that the plaintiffs were consulted about personnel decisions and that [the owner] gave each of their opinions particular weight regarding specific hiring decisions. Prior to hiring a new employee, [the owner] generally asked all of the [store] employees if they knew the applicant and could provide information about that person, and Lumber One believes this is sufficient to support the jury’s verdict.

“At trial, [the owner] generically described how he elicited input from employees about applicants and how he used the information he received. For example, when asked if the plaintiffs were ever consulted during the screening process for new applicants, [he] responded: ‘[W]e would always ask all of our people if they knew someone before we hired them. When we would be interviewing them, we would ask for input from them because these guys were from the local area and we’d always ask if they knew the people or could recommend or knew anything at all about them.’ [The owner] also said he took this information seriously, adding that ‘it was good information. We’re hiring blind here, so any input we could have or reference, it was used in making that determination. Lumber One did not present any evidence that the plaintiffs were involved in, for instance, screening applicants, conducting interviews, checking references, or any-thing else related to its hiring process. . . .

“The material point, however, is that in order to meet the fourth element of the executive exemption, Lumber One must present some proof that the purported executives’ input into personnel decisions was given particular weight. For example, one way they could have done this is to show that the purported executives’ input had more influence than hourly employees’ input. This is especially true if that recommendation is the only evidence relied on for the exemption, which is what happened in this case.”