Why did the court rule that Logan-Baldwin had a right to sue for breach of contract?

Logan-Baldwin and other owners (collectively Logan-Baldwin) contracted with L.S.M. General Contractors (LSM) to renovate a historic residence. LSM subcontracted to Henry Isaacs Home Remodeling (Isaacs) to perform roofing work as part of the renovations. Isaacs then contracted with Brewster to install a new roof on the residence. Soon after the roof was completed, it showed signs of leaking and it became clear that the roof was not installed correctly. LSM and Isaacs attempted to fix the problems, but they were unsuccessful and subsequently abandoned the project. Logan-Baldwin hired other contractors to fix the problems and sued LSM, Isaacs, and Brewster for breach of contract. Isaacs defended that it did not directly contract with Logan-Baldwin and therefore could not be sued for breach of contract. Logan-Baldwin argued that they had contract rights over Isaacs because they were an intended third-party beneficiary. The trial court ruled in favor of Isaacs, and Logan-Baldwin appealed.

The N.Y. Supreme Court Appellate Division reversed the trial court and held for Logan-Baldwin. The court reasoned that a nonbreaching party is entitled to damages as long as the underlying contract is entered into for the benefit of a third party. In this case, because Logan-Baldwin, as the owners of the house, were logically the intended beneficiary of the home renovations, they had rights as a third-party beneficiary. Since they were the intended third-party beneficiary, the court ruled that Logan-Baldwin had the right to maintain a breach of con-tract claim against Isaacs.

“Parties such as the plaintiffs herein who are ‘asserting third-party beneficiary rights under a contract must establish (1) the exis-tence of a valid and binding contract between other parties, (2) that the contract was intended for [their] benefit and (3) that the benefit to [them] is sufficiently immediate, rather than incidental, to indicate the assumption by the contracting parties of a duty to compensate [them] if the benefit is lost.’ . . .Indeed, ‘[i]t is almost inconceivable that those who render their services in connection with a major construction project would not contemplate that the performance of their contractual obligations would ultimately benefit the owner. . . . It is obviously inferable that they knew, or should have known, that someone owned the [property], and that such person or entity was to be the ultimate beneficiary of their services.’ . . . To the extent that the [trial] court interpreted our decision in . . . as holding that an express contractual provision was required [for an intended beneficiary to exist], the court erred. An express contractual provision concerning third-party beneficiaries ‘is but an alternative factor upon which a court might base a finding that a certain party is, in fact, a third-party beneficiary.’”