01 Question (7 points) a See pagesss Consider a market served by two rms, rm A and rm B. Demand for the good is given [in inverse form} by P(Q) = 250 1.00Q. where Q is total quantity in the market (and is the sum ofrm A's output. (La, and rm B's output, (m) and P is the price ofthe good. Eachrm has a cost function of (:01) = 10.001}, which implies marginal cost of $10.00 for each rm, and the goods sold byrmsA and B are identical. lst attempt Part 1 (3 points) 0 See Hint Suppose that the two rms compete by setting quantities [Cournot competition). In equilibrium they will each produce units and the price ofthe good will be $ . Each rm will earn prot of 35 .(Give your answers to two decimal places.) Part 2 (4 points) 0 See Hint Now suppose instead of competing, the two rms agree to collude and form a cartel. lfthe cartel is successful each rm will produce units and the price ofthe good will r to $ . Each rm's prot will 7 (compared to the Cournot competition outcome in Part 1)