2. [14] Two gas stations are located side-by-side. As is customary in the industry, they are competing on price (they both have enormous signs advertising their selling price for a litre of gasoline on the roadside). Station 1 has the cost function C(q, ) = 4q, and station 2 has the cost function C(q2) = 5q2 where q1 and q2 are the number of litres sold by station 1 and station 2, respectively. The market demand for gasoline is Q(p) = 50 - p where Q = q1 + 92. a. [4] Write the demand functions of the two firms. b. [4] Are the two firms selling their gas at $5 per liter a Bertrand-Nash equilibrium? Explain why or why not. c. [6] Characterize a Bertrand-Nash equilibrium. How many litres of gas will each firm sell in this equilibrium