2. (40} Consider modifying the GlostenMilgroln (1985) model to allow for informed traders to mistakenly inter pre't their private inormation. Suppose that the true value is V\" = 1 or Vb = D with equal probability. A proportion 1 a = 2 of traders are uninformed liquidity traders who buy or sell with equal probability, while the remaining a = 3- are informed insiders1 who choose their trade direction correctly only with probability A = g' submitting the wrong type of order 1 A = ll.' of the time. (a) {11]} Draw the game tree. (b) {11]} Calculate the conditional probabilities of receiving buy and sell orders, given each possible value of V. (c) {11]} Using Bayes1 rule' calculate the posterior probabilities of V taking each of its values1 conditional upon observing either type of order; (cl) {11]} Calculate the bid and ask prices and report the bid-ask spread. How doa it compare to spread in the standard model