2. [6] Professor Ghetpayd has a monopoly in the market for undergrad game theory textbooks. The time-discounted value of Professor Ghetpayd's future earnings is $13,000. Professor Vantkash is considering entering the textbook market and releasing a competing book. With two books amicably splitting the market, the time-discounted value of each professor's future earnings would be $600. Suppose each professor knows the profits of the other (full information). Consider each of the strategies below. For each one, determine whether it is a rational way for Professor Ghetpayd to deter Professor Vantkash from bringing his competing textbook to market. Explain your reasoning.

i. [2] Professor Ghetpayd threatens to cut his price and attack the credibility of Professor Vantkash's book so that Professor Vantkash would loose $8. In so doing, Professor Ghetpayd would still make $700 over time.

ii. [2] Professor Ghetpayd makes a side-deal and with Professor Vantkash's and pays him $1,000 to destroy all drafts of his textbook. In so doing, Professor Getpayd remains a monopolist (assume no other potential entrants exist).

iii. [2] Professor Ghetpayd threatens to cut his price so that Professor Vantkash would loose $800. In so doing, Professor Ghetpayd would loose $80 over time.