2. Consider the following game: Player 3 D 4,0,0 5,5,4110,0 99k (a) Identify all pure-strategy Nash equilibria assuming k = 1. (3 marks) (b) Identify all Pareto efficient outcomes of the game for k = 1. (3 marks) (c) Suppose the game is played twice. Is there a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (or equilibria) which involves an outcome in the first stage which is not a Nash equilibrium in the one-off stage game assuming players do not discount period 2 payoffs and that k=17 (6 marks) (d) Suppose again that the game is played twice. For which values of k is there a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in which players play (D, R, B) in period 1 and (U, L, B) in period 27 (6 marks)