2) Years ago (this may still be true) the Metropolitan Opera sold \"last-minute\" tickets to anyone with a student ID. At the time a friend, a young law professor, told me he had discovered that all you needed to show to buy such a ticket was a Columbia ID. It did not matter if your appearance suggested you were not a student~they did not check! He asked: how can the Met waste money like that? For trther background, note that the Met is a very large opera house (it may be the biggest in the world). Second, the Met puts the \"grand\" in grand opera. Here are two examples you can peer at to get a sense: Aida (Verdi): httpsy'fwwwyoutube. comfwatch'?v=HgNa9CpaS L8 La Boheme (Puccini): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sLWyFZJBth a) We have mentioned that sellers will have a greater incentive to price discriminate when: i) there is high variability in buyers' willingness to pay or elasticity, and ii) the seller has high xed costs and low marginal costs. Does the above background suggest that holds for the Met? Discuss briey. b) Given that, would you say the Met is crazy to be lax on the ID policy? What might its strategy be? c) CT argue that a pharmaceutical company is more likely to spend $100 million to develop a vaccine when it knows it can charge different prices in different countries. What does that have to do with high xed and low marginal costs? d) How is the Met like a pharmaceutical company