3. Suppose we have individuals, i E {P1, P2, P3} voting over alternatives, A = {X, Y, Z}. Sup- pose Pi ranks alternatives in A as ZX >Y, where P2 has ranking, X Y > Z, and P3 has ranking Y > Z > A. Further suppose that Pi is the agenda setter who chooses which pairwise election occurs in round one of voting. The pairwise winner proceeds to round two to face the remaining alternative. The pairwise winner of round two is then declared the winner. Assuming strategic voting behavior, use the concept of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium to determine which pairwise contest P1 selects for round one and what the eventual, winning item in A is. 3. Suppose we have individuals, i E {P1, P2, P3} voting over alternatives, A = {X, Y, Z}. Sup- pose Pi ranks alternatives in A as ZX >Y, where P2 has ranking, X Y > Z, and P3 has ranking Y > Z > A. Further suppose that Pi is the agenda setter who chooses which pairwise election occurs in round one of voting. The pairwise winner proceeds to round two to face the remaining alternative. The pairwise winner of round two is then declared the winner. Assuming strategic voting behavior, use the concept of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium to determine which pairwise contest P1 selects for round one and what the eventual, winning item in A is