3. There is a market for an indivisible good with B buyers and S sellers. . Each seller has only one unit of the good and has a reservation price of 0. . Each buyer wants to buy only one unit of the good and has a reservation price of 1. . Thus v(C) = min(Bc, Sc) where Bc and Scare the number of buyers and sellers in coalition C (and so, for instance, v(i) = 0 for any single player, and v(i, j) = 1 if i, j are a pair of a buyer and seller). Now assume that we increase the number of sellers so that B = 2 and S = 2. Which allocations are in the core? [There might be more than one] a) Each seller receives 1 and each buyer receives 0. b) Each seller receives 0 and each buyer receives 1. c) Each seller receives 1/2 and each buyer receives 1/2