5. This question concerns the labor market in coronavirus pandemic. Let's use the two-sided search model to address this question. In this model, firms pay a cost & to post a vacancy. Let A denote the number of vacancies. When a vacancy is matched, a worker produces a units of good. The expected net payoff for a firm is py(2 - w) - k. where py denotes the probability of finding a worker and w denotes wage. Firms can freely enter or exist the market. Let @ denote the number of consumers who decide to search for work. Consumers must decide whether to work at home or to search for work. The expected payoff to search for work P is P(Q) = b + Pc(w -b). where b is the unemployment insurance benefit, p. is the probability of finding work of a consumer, and w is wage. The number of successful matches between workers and firms M is determined by: M = em(Q, A). where e denotes the matching efficiency, and the function m has constant returns to scale and marginal products are diminishing. Wage is determined by Nash bargaining. The optimal condition is given as the following: w=at (1- a)b. where 0