6. Adam and Eve own a company together (each owns 50 percent of the company). They are tired of each other and would like to dissolve their partnership. To that end, one wishes to buy out the other. Their value for owning the whole company is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1 , and their valuations are independent. They agree on the following mechanism: each submits a sealed bid, say a and e. Whoever submits the higher bid gets full ownership and pays the other person 1/2 of (a+e)/2 in exchange for their 50% share of the company. Is bidding truthfully a Bayes Nash equlibrium? Justify your answer. 6. Adam and Eve own a company together (each owns 50 percent of the company). They are tired of each other and would like to dissolve their partnership. To that end, one wishes to buy out the other. Their value for owning the whole company is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1 , and their valuations are independent. They agree on the following mechanism: each submits a sealed bid, say a and e. Whoever submits the higher bid gets full ownership and pays the other person 1/2 of (a+e)/2 in exchange for their 50% share of the company. Is bidding truthfully a Bayes Nash equlibrium? Justify your