answer: a brief recitation of the issue(s) considered by the court as it analyzes the respective rights and responsibilities of the parties

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND NATURE OF THE CASE

On or about March 1^st, 2004 the former Roslyn Nash consulted with a Dr. Steven Wigdor for a follow up visit in Dade County, Florida concerning some contact lenses that Dr. Wigdor had previously prescribed for Ms Nash. Dr. Wigdor at all times represented to Ms Nash that he and his entire staff were properly trained and that any procedures that would be performed on her eyes that day were completely safe, proper, necessary and painless. Dr Wigdor proceeded to have his employee/assistant, a technician by the name of Jay Velez remove her contact lenses. As a direct and proximate result of the negligence and carelessness of Dr Wigdor and his staff, Ms Nash received a painful injury to her left eye which directly caused her eye to bleed and become totally red. (TT page 6, lines 23 - 25; page 64, lines 23 & 24; page 7, lines 6 - 7) Despite the obviousness of the injury to her eye, Dr Wigdor attempted to down play the seriousness of the injury. Ms Nash later sought treatment from another local Doctor, Dr. Harvey Zalaznick who confirmed that her left eye had indeed suffered a scratch on the cornea and directed her to begin taking antibiotics to prevent any infection to her eye that could, if left untreated, lead to even more serious consequences including possibly losing sight in that eye. This medical advise from Dr Zalaznick directly contradicted Dr Wigdor's attempts to mislead Ms Nash concerning the seriousness of her injury.

Subsequently, the former Ms Nash executed a written contract with the Respondent, to have the Respondent represent her in a lawsuit against Mr Wigdor for damages and the pain and suffering that she endured as a direct and proximate result of the negligence involved in treatment and advice that she received on that day from Dr Wigdor and his staff in Dade County, Florida. See Bar exhibit "F".

Ms Nash was at that time living in Dade County, Florida with her finance, Mr Walter Leibowitz (TT page 67, lines 6-7). Mr Leibowitz was foreign attorney who was a member of the California and Washington D.C. Bars. (See TT page 66, lines 16 & 17) Prior to becoming a member of the California Bar Mr Leibowitz had been suspended from the Florida Bar as a result of a felony conviction which took place over a quarter of a century ago, (see TT, page 64, lines 2-8). In addition, Mr Leibowitz is a licensed real estate agent and mortgage broker. ( TT page 66, lines 7&8) In order to comply with the regulations of real estate agents, Mr Leibowitz had received the approval of Jim Caris who owned and operated the Caris Business

Center located at 2630 Hollywood Boulevard in Hollywood, Florida and the Respondent who operated a business known as Hollywood Executive Suites at the same address, permission to put a sign meeting the requirements of the regulations for real estate agents on the door of an empty storeroom in the back part of the area that was sublet by Mr Caris to the Respondent for use as the Hollywood Executive Suites. (TT page 65, lines 22 - 25) Mr Caris continued to have his law offices in another part of the building.

Mr Leibowitz inquired from the Respondent if it would be possible for him to enter into any suit that might be filed in Dade County, Florida as co-counsel with the Respondent on a pro hace vici basis. The Respondent agreed that if the local Dade County Court authorized him to act as cocounsel, then at that point and only at that point, could Mr Leibowitz enter into the lawsuit as co-counsel with the Respondent. (TT page 76, lines 411; page 80, lines 15 - 17) However, under the circumstances, the Respondent did not feel comfortable having Ms Nash drive with her eye injury, so the Respondent did suggest that Mr Leibowitz could assist the Respondent and Ms Nash by acting as her chauffeur/driver and take her to any appointment that might be needed for further treatment of her injuries or trips to meet with the Respondent, etc. (TT page 80, lines 9 - 11)

Contrary to the express wishes and understanding that the Respondent thought he had with Mr Leibowitz regarding the matter, shortly afterwards, Mr Lebowitz, as a consequence of his fiance's impatience and contrary to the directions of the Respondent, sent a letter to put the potential defendant, Mr Wigdor on notice that Ms Nash was contemplating a possible lawsuit against him. This letter was prepared by Mr Leibowitz on his own from his apartment in Dade County, Florida with the letterhead styled " Law Offices of Lebowitz and Razor" and indicated that Mr Lebowitz was a member of the California Bar only and gave his address of 12555 Biscayne Boulevard #924, Miami, Florida 33181 and a Dade County, Florida telephone and fax number that did not belong to the Respondent. See TT page 70, lines 1 - 8 and Bar's composite exhibit "A".

Subsequently, Mr Wigdor complained that he felt he was being subjected to "extortion". See Bar's composite exhibit "A". This in turn eventually led to the Florida Bar filing a complaint against the Respondent alleging that the Respondent had violated the Bar rules by entering into a partnership with Mr Lebowitz. See copy of the Bar's formal complaint and the Bar letter to Respondent dated June 16, 2005. Despite the fact that Mr

Lebowitz was a foreign attorney properly licensed in the State of California, and Washington D.C., the Bar chose to repeatedly mis-characterize Mr Lebowitz as a "non-attorney or non-lawyer" rather than as a foreign attorney. (TT page 11, line 22 and the formal complaint) After the formal complaint was filed, Supreme Court Justice Pariente chose to assign the formal complaint to the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit contrary to the express venue provisions of the Florida Bar rules, the normal rules of Florida civil procedures, Florida case law and the constitutional rights of the Respondent to due process under the Florida Constitution, despite that fact that even the most cursory review of the Bar's complaint shows that none of the events in question transpired outside of Dade or Broward County, Florida. When the Respondent, through counsel objected to the venue, the Florida Bar argued that venue was proper in Palm Beach County, Florida despite the plain language of Bar Rule 3-7.6(d) as the Bar was doing the Respondent a "favor" by bringing the matter up outside of the normal venue and that it was also proper because it was akin to a probation proceeding whereby it is customary to bring an action for violation of probation back before the initial judge who placed the Respondent on probation. How this can be akin to a violation of probation when the Respondent has not been charged or accused of any violation of probation has never been explained. This argument by

the Florida Bar effectively established the Alice in Wonderland nature of the proceedings against the Respondent. The Respondent was not on probation at the time of the events alleged in the complaint and the

Respondent is not currently on probation. Faced with this dilemma the Referee chose to ratify the violation of the Respondent's due process rights by transferring the location of the hearing to Broward County, Florida but illegally and improperly retaining his control as the referee over the matter. (See the Order by the Referee on the Respondent's venue motion) The Respondent, seeing the unmistakable bias of the Referee, objected and moved for the Referee to remove himself for bias. (See the Respondent's motion for Disqualification of Referee.) So strong was the Referee's prejudice against the Respondent along with the Referee's desire to punish the Respondent even before the final hearing could be heard that the Referee denied the motion to recuse himself. (See Order on the Respondent's motion to disqualify Referee)

During the pre-trial phase of the proceedings, the Respondent's cocounsel served the Bar counsel with various interrogatories in an attempt to clarify the charges against the Respondent and exactly what act or acts on

behalf of the Respondent the Bar was alleging violated the Bar rules. (See the various discovery interrogatories to the Bar) The Bar responded through it's counsel, Juan Carlos Arias who answered in writing, under oath before a notary public for the State of Florida, that it felt the Respondent was in violation of the bar rules by two actions:

[1] "The act of creating a partnership by agreeing to "collaborate" with a non-lawyer to assist a person in a legal matter.

[2] The act of participating in the drafting and sending of a letter to the possible defendant in a legal matter implying association with a non-lawyer." (See response to first set of interrogatories # 7)

These responses to the Respondent's interrogatories were signed by Juan Carlos Arias and dated August 1^st, 2006. These responses are consistent with the Bar's initial formal letter dated June 16, 2005 which outlined for the first time, the Bar's allegations against the Respondent. Based upon the representations made by Bar counsel in the Bar's answers to the interrogatories, Respondent's co-counsel prepared and filed a written motion for summary judgment. Despite the fact that the Respondent's motion for summary judgment was legally sound and based upon the Respondent's affidavit and the sworn testimony of Walter

Lebowitz from his deposition with no opposing affidavits presented by the

Florida Bar, the Referee denied the motion for summary judgment. (See Referee's Order on motion for summary judgment).

As a part of the Bar's responses to the Respondent's request for discovery information that he is entitled to under the Bar Rules so that the

Respondent would have access to any exculpatory evidence available to the Bar, the Respondent's counsel spoke with Bar counsel in a good faith attempt to get the cooperation of the Bar in the discovery process. Bar counsel Juan Carlos Arias flatly refused to permit himself to be deposed even though he was the individual who responded, under oath, on behalf the Bar to the Respondent's interrogatories and the fact that Mr Arias had responded to numerous interrogatories by indicating that the Florida Bar did not have the information requested at that time. (See the Bar's responses to interrogatories). Respondent's counsel subsequently made a formal written motion to have the referee compel the Bar to permit the Respondent's counsel to depose Mr Juan Carlos Arias. (See Respondent's motion to compel) Based upon the Referee's willful disregard for the Respondent's due process rights to discovery and his personal bias against the Respondent, the Referee refused to compel the Bar to participate further in the discovery process that may have allowed the Respondent to uncover additional pertinent, exculpatory evidence to support his position and rebut the numerous errors of the Bar's position against the Respondent.

On November 2^nd, 2006 the Referee proceeded to trial in Broward

County, Florida, ostensibly upon the formal written complaint of the Florida

Bar against the Respondent but in typical Alice in Wonderland fashion, the

Referee who has no jurisdiction over the merits of the pro se lawsuit filed in Dade County, Florida by Ms Nash against Mr Wigdor, decides instead to pass judgment on the merits of that lawsuit without having any notice to either Ms Nash or the Respondent that the merits of her pro se lawsuit were going to be reviewed, weighed or determined by the Referee; without any opportunity to cross examine Mr Wigdor or present expert witnesses and concludes that Ms Nash did not suffer any painful injury, did not have any constitutional right to seek the redress of her grievances through a peaceful access to the courts of her county and concludes that if Mr Wigdor were to testify that he would be credible and Ms Nash would not be credible and any attempt by Ms Nash to exercise her constitutional right to have access to the courts of Florida for redress of her legitimate grievances against Mr Wigdor is merely an attempt on her part to "....shake down someone for money." Transcript page 104, lines 24 - 25. Consequently, the Referee concludes that the Respondent is guilty of various violations of the Bar rules such as 34.2, 3-4.3, 4-5.3B, 4-5.5 B and 4-8.4D, not based upon the allegations contained in the complaint as supplemented by the Bar's sworn answers to interrogatories concerning what act or acts the Respondent committed, but because "...he [the Respondent] created an environment that permitted Mr. Lebowitz to use his name...." emphasis added at lines 23- 25 of the

Transcript. The Referee then held a sanctions hearing on December 13, 2006 and filed his report on or about February 1, 2007. The Respondent filed his notice of request for formal review with the Supreme Court on or about March 1, 2007.