answer question 1 and 2

The C Earlier this month, the California Supreme Court heard argument in a case raising important issues about how the crime of fetal murder is to be defined in the State of California. The Justices' questions and comments to counsel during oral argument suggest that they are inclined to rule that a defendant can be guilty of murder for killing the fetus of a woman who neither the defendant, nor the woman herself, knew was pregnant. The Recent California Case: Unknowing Fetal Murder The recent case of a fetus being murdered presents a different set of facts than the Keeler case. First, in the current case, when defendant Harold Taylor shot his ex-girlfriend Patty Fansler to death in 1999, neither the victim nor Taylor knew that Fansler was pregnant. In killing her, the defendant accordingly did not intentionally or knowingly cause the death of anyone other than his ex-girlfriend. Second, unlike in Keeler, where the fetus was viable and could probably have been born alive and healthy on the very day that the killing took place, Patty Fansler's fetus was nowhere near the time of birth, at somewhere between eleven and thirteen weeks gestation -- that is. Why Intent Might not Matter Upon first considering the Taylor prosecution, it might seem that the killer's ignorance about his ex-girlfriend's pregnancy should be an acceptable defense to a murder conviction. Having had no idea that the fetus even existed, how could Taylor possibly be guilty of "murdering" it? The answer is that he could not, if he had lacked any sort of murderous intention. knowledge, or recklessness. Had Taylor, for example, accidentally caused a miscarriage by slipping on a crowded subway platform and consequently knocking a pregnant woman to the ground, he could not be prosecuted for murder. Our case, however, is notably distinct from this hypothetical scenario. The actual Harold Taylor intentionally killed his ex-girlfriend by shooting her to death. His behavior was in no way accidental, and he was in fact subsequently convicted of second-degree murder for killing Fansler. In the process of deliberately killing his intended victim, however, he unwittingly also killed her fetus. A truer analogy, then, is not to the man who slips on a subway platform but rather to the man who shoots at a woman who is lying in her bed but whose bullet kills not only the woman but also a child concealed underneath the woman's blanket. Though the shooter did not know about the child when he aimed his gun, his actions were nonetheless intentional, and he specifically meant for those actions to result in a person's death. When confronted with a hypothetical scenario like this one at oral argument, Harold Taylor's attorney conceded that the shooter in the example would probably be guilty of murder for both deaths. This concession logically amounts to an acknowledgment that intent with respect to one murder victim can be understood to extend to all victims killed by the same deliberately homicidal action that was directed against one of the victims, even if the presence or existence of other victims was unknown to the killer Harold Taylor Was Properly Charged with Murder of an Undiscovered Fetus So it was for good reason that the Justices on the California Supreme Court appeared, during the arguments, unconvinced that Harold Taylor's conviction for murder of a fetus should be overturned on appeal in the absence of proof that he knew of the fetus's existence. The discussion at oral argument rested largely on the failure of the law to specify that a defendant must intend or know of the death of the fetus. But the underlying moral principles are sound as well. The death of Patty Fansler's fetus was no "accident"; it was instead the direct product of intentionally (and successfully) homicidal behavior by the defendant. The fact that a fetus is not yet born, or even viable, speaks not to the value of that fetus but only to the consequences of terminating an unwanted pregnancy. Lack of viability -- and the location of a growing fetus inside a mother who is prepared to carry that fetus -- thus do nothing to mitigate (lessen) the homicide of a living creature. California law in its current incarnation properly affirms that premise. 1. Discuss the major differences between the cases involving Taylor and Keeler. Do you agree more with the law applied during the Keeler case, or during the Taylor case